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Abstract 
Behaviour Profiling for Mobile Devices 
Fudong Li  
With more than 5 billion users globally, mobile devices have become ubiquitous in our daily life. 
The modern mobile handheld device is capable of providing many multimedia services through a 
wide range of applications over multiple networks as well as on the handheld device itself. These 
services are predominantly driven by data, which is increasingly associated with sensitive 
information. Such a trend raises the security requirement for reliable and robust verification 
techniques of users.  
This thesis explores the end-user verification requirements of mobile devices and proposes a novel 
Behaviour Profiling security framework for mobile devices. The research starts with a critical 
review of existing mobile technologies, security threats and mechanisms, and highlights a broad 
range of weaknesses. Therefore, attention is given to biometric verification techniques which have 
the ability to offer better security. Despite a large number of biometric works carried out in the 
area of transparent authentication systems (TAS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), each have 
a set of weaknesses that fail to provide a comprehensive solution. They are either reliant upon a 
specific behaviour to enable the system to function or only capable of providing security for 
network based services. To this end, the behaviour profiling technique is identified as a potential 
candidate to provide high level security from both authentication and IDS aspects, operating in a 
continuous and transparent manner within the mobile host environment. 
This research examines the feasibility of a behaviour profiling technique through mobile users 
general applications usage, telephone, text message and multi-instance application usage with the 
best experimental results Equal Error Rates (EER) of 13.5%, 5.4%, 2.2% and 10% respectively. 
Based upon this information, a novel architecture of Behaviour Profiling on mobile devices is 
proposed. The framework is able to provide a robust, continuous and non-intrusive verification 
mechanism in standalone, TAS or IDS modes, regardless of device hardware configuration. The 
framework is able to utilise user behaviour to continuously evaluate the system security status of 
the device. With a high system security level, users are granted with instant access to sensitive 
services and data, while with lower system security levels, users are required to reassure their 
identity before accessing sensitive services.   
The core functions of the novel framework are validated through the implementation of a 
simulation system. A series of security scenarios are designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the novel framework to verify legitimate and imposter activities. By employing the smoothing 
function of three applications, verification time of 3 minutes and a time period of 60 minutes of 
the degradation function, the Behaviour Profiling framework achieved the best performance with 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) rates of 7.57%, 77% and 11.24% for the normal, protected and overall 
applications respectively and with False Acceptance Rate (FAR) rates of 3.42%, 15.29% and 4.09% 
for their counterparts. 
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1 Introduction & Overview  
1.1 Introduction  
Whilst the term mobile devices can refer to a variety of devices, such as mobile phones, laptops 
and games consoles, the mobile phone and its variants form the largest market segment. In this 
thesis, the phrase ‘mobile device’ describes two kinds of mobile computing devices: the standard 
mobile phone and the Smartphone. After almost 40 years of development, the mobile device has 
transformed from a purely telephony based handset into a multimedia and multi-networking 
computing device. Currently, with more than 5 billion subscribers around the world, the mobile 
device has become a ubiquitous object within our daily life (GSM World, 2011). People can utilise 
it to complete various tasks, such as making telephone calls, surfing the Internet, checking emails, 
transferring money, playing games, viewing documents and storing information; to name but a 
mere fraction of the functionality and applications available.  
In order to accommodate these services, the mobile device has become incredibly powerful in 
terms of processing power, networking ability and data storage. Some mobile device Central 
Processing Units (CPU) clock up to 1.5 GHz allowing many complex programs (e.g. high definition 
games) to be run smoothly on them (Qualcomm, 2010). With the availability of various wireless 
technologies such as Wi-Fi and NFC (Near Field Communication), people can utilise many network-
based services in additional to telephony and text messaging. For instance, by using a Wi-Fi 
network, a mobile device user can access web pages, check emails and shop online. At the start of 
2011, over 50% of mobile users (more than 2.5 billion) connected to the Internet via a Wi-Fi 
connection (Cabume, 2011). Moreover, in 2011 the total number of mobile devices connecting 
with Wi-Fi networks overtook the number of laptops accessing the same resource (GigaOM, 2011). 
As the JiWire Mobile Audience Insights Report suggested, 47% of all mobile device users use the 
Internet as their primary source for online shopping in the US (JiWire, 2009). According to a survey 
conducted by the Internet Advertising Bureau (IAB), over 23 million people use their mobile 
devices to make online purchases in the UK (Newbusiness, 2010). The latest BRC-Google retail 
monitor found that mobile online shopping increased by 27% in the second quarter of 2011 
(Walesonline, 2011). Another example is that the mobile device can be transformed into a mobile 
wallet that enables people to pay for goods directly from their handset by connecting with a NFC 
payment device. In the UK, the mobile operator Orange launched the first mobile payment service 
which allows their customers to buy food in superstores imitating a service that has been used in 
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Japan and Korea for many years (BBC, 2011). According to the Juniper Research, mobile payment 
via NFC will generate $50 billion of revenue by 2014 around the world (Knowyourmobile, 2011). 
Being equipped with internal memory and other an external micro Secure Digital (SD) card, the 
storage capability of the mobile device has increased significantly. Today, a typical mobile device 
has a data capacity of up to 32 GigaBytes (GB) enabling a large amount of information, such as text 
messages, calendar entries, pictures, Word documents, to-do lists and emails, to be stored. A 
number of studies have demonstrated that such information is highly likely to be related to 
personal, financial or business data. Which? Mobile (2011) showed that 13.5 million UK mobile 
users stored personal information (e.g. date of birth) on the device. Also, Regenersis’ study 
revealed that 99% of 2,000 randomly selected mobile devices contained some amount of personal 
data (Regenersis, 2009). Moreover, the Smartphone IT security survey of Kaspersky Lab showed 
that approximately 33% of the 1,600 surveyed stored login credentials (i.e. user name and 
password) for accessing personal and business email accounts on their mobile devices (Kaspersky 
Lab, 2011a). The mobile and security report of McAfee also indicated that more than 20% of 
organisations’ employees store business critical data, such as customer data, corporate intellectual 
property or financial information on their mobile device (McAfee, 2011b). 
While people enjoy the convenience provided by the mobile device, the services and the 
information stored on the device pose an increasing threat to the owners when a device is 
misused, such as being lost or stolen or infected by malware. According to the Metropolitan Police 
(2011) website there are more than 10,000 mobile devices lost or stolen in London every month. 
Traditionally, the cost of the hardware was the driving factor for theft. However, the increased 
functionality and access to information could drive the prime motivation towards information 
theft. By using the services and information, malicious users can abuse the mobile devices in many 
ways. For instance, buy goods in a shop or online at the owner’s expense, review the personal 
information and eventually steal the owner’s identity (Helium, 2008). If a stolen device belongs to 
a company, malicious users could sell the information stored on the device to its competitors; also, 
by using the device as a gateway, malicious users could harvest more information from the 
company internal network. Since the first mobile virus ‘Cabir’ was reported in 2004 (BBC, 2004), 
over 1,000 unique variants were already identified by the end of 2010 (Kaspersky Lab, 2011b). 
These malware attack mobile devices regardless of platform and may cause severe damage, such 
as disabling mobile services, sending text messages to a premium rate service or stealing data 
(Securelist, 2009). Therefore, it is mission critical to protect the mobile device from being misused.  
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Currently, the most popular mobile device access control is the password or Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) based authentication approach. This technique requires users to 
provide a correct PIN before gaining access to the mobile device regardless of their legitimacy. 
Although this approach is mostly available on mobile devices, a survey conducted by Credant 
demonstrated that alarmingly 40% of their participants failed to utilise this simple point-of-entry 
security mechanism (Credant, 2009). Even if all mobile users employed this technique on their 
devices possible misuse could still occur if they did not use it properly in practice, such as never 
changing the PIN, writing the PIN on a paper or sharing the PIN with others (Clarke and Furnell, 
2005; Kurkovsky and Syta, 2010). To protect the mobile device against malware attacks a number 
of mobile antivirus and firewall software are already commercially available. However, as they are 
heavily reliant upon the latest signatures to detect malware presence they are not effective 
against zero day attacks. Besides, their ability to detect user related misuse such as viewing 
calendar events or modifying documents is limited. To date, only behaviour based network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are capable of detecting mobile users’ abnormal activities (i.e. 
telephony service fraud) (Samfat and Molva, 1997; Gosset, 1998; Sun et al, 2006). This has not 
been a big issue as the mobile device could only access service providers’ networks and offer 
telephony and text messaging services. However, as the modern mobile device can now access 
multiple networks and provides a wide range of host based services a more sophisticated method 
which can provide continuous protection for all the mobile services is needed.  
1.2 Aims and objectives  
The aim of this research is to propose a behavioural profiling security framework for mobile 
devices which is capable of fulfilling the increased security requirements and providing continuous 
protection to ensure the legitimacy of the current user. Also, the framework would work in three 
distinct modes: a standalone security control (standalone mode), a transparent authentication 
mechanism (Transparent Authentication System (TAS) mode) and a misuse detector (IDS mode).    
The main objective for this research is to explore, propose and evaluate a behavioural profiling 
approach which enhances the security for the mobile device. In order to achieve this, this project 
is divided into five distinct stages: 
1. To investigate the security requirements for the mobile device and identify the need for a 
behavioural profiling security approach.  
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2. To compose a comprehensive review of biometric authentication approaches and examine 
the applicability of deploying a behaviour profiling technique on mobile devices.  
3. To design a series of experiments for exploring the feasibility of deploying a behaviour 
profiling approach on mobile devices. 
4. To propose a novel security framework to support the aim of behaviour profiling on 
mobile devices in a continuous and transparent manner.  
5. To evaluate the security effectiveness of the proposed behaviour profiling framework for 
mobile devices through a simulation method.  
1.3 Thesis structure  
Chapter 2 begins by reviewing mobile communication technologies along with current mobile 
services establishing the importance of the security of the mobile device. By presenting both 
potential security threats and existing security approaches, a need for a new security mechanism 
which can provide continuous and transparent protection for the mobile device is identified. The 
chapter concludes by highlighting the need for a more comprehensive and sophisticated security 
control and suggesting possible solutions.  
Having established the need for a new security technique for mobile devices, Chapter 3 presents 
and discusses the feasibility of utilising biometric verification techniques as a solution for tackling 
this issue. Chapter 3 starts by presenting a generic biometric model and biometric system 
performance measurement and requirement factors. The chapter then proceeds to describe an 
overview of existing biometric techniques based upon their physiological or behavioural 
characteristics. By comparing all applicable biometric approaches for the mobile device, a novel 
behaviour profiling based technique was chosen due to its various advantages. The chapter 
concludes by undertaking a comprehensive literature review on mobile behaviour profiling 
techniques to date. 
Chapter 4 introduces a number of experimental studies into the feasibility of behaviour profiling 
on a mobile device. The studies have been based upon examining user interactions with mobile 
devices to verify the user, especially, the way in which users utilise intra-standard and intra-
extended applications. By comparing a number of pattern classification methods based upon 
statistical and artificial intelligence algorithms in a preliminary study, a number of application 
features towards success verification and the most appropriate classifier have been identified. The 
chapter finishes with evaluating the behaviour profiling technique on mobile user application 
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usage via the combination of the rule based approach, a dynamic profiling technique and a 
smoothing function.  
Chapter 5 presents a novel Behaviour Profiling framework which provides transparent and 
continuous protection for mobile devices to fulfil two security purposes: authentication and IDS. 
The framework verifies the identity of a user based upon their applications usage. In order to 
provide more accurate verifications, a dynamic profiling technique which updates the profile of a 
user on a daily basis was utilised. Also, the framework reduces the impact of the high false 
rejection problem which every single behavioural biometric technique experiences by employing a 
smoothing function. The framework performs verification processes based upon three criteria (the 
smoothing function, a verification time and the sensitivity of an application) and updates a System 
Security (SS) level accordingly. The SS level introduces a level of intelligence to the framework: the 
identity of a user is not verified based upon a single pass or fail but a number of consecutive 
verification results. The chapter concludes by presenting a process algorithm which permits the 
behaviour profiling framework providing continuous and transparent security for mobile devices.   
Chapter 6 evaluates the proposed the framework via a simulation. The chapter begins by 
describing the implementation of the simulation. The chapter finishes by presenting and 
discussing a number of scenarios that have been designed to examine various configurations of 
the Behaviour Profiling framework. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions from the research, highlighting its achievements 
and limitations. Future research and development for this project are also suggested in this 
chapter.  
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2 The evolution of Mobile Devices 
2.1 Introduction  
The mobile device was initially designed to provide a telephony service via a cellular network. With 
the widespread availability of newer wireless technologies and the evolution of the mobile device 
itself, they can now also utilise other network mechanisms, namely: Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and NFC. This 
firm foundation allows the mobile device to offer a wide range of network based services. For 
example, Internet surfing via Wi-Fi hotspots, video conferencing through a 3G connection, road 
navigating by a Global Positioning System (GPS) link, picture sharing by using Bluetooth pairing and 
data synchronisation with laptop/desktop computers via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable. People 
can utilise these services to carry out a huge variety of personal and business tasks.  
2.2 Mobile communication technologies and mobile devices  
2.2.1 Mobile cellular technologies  
In 1979, the first fully automatic cellular network (the First Generation (1G) network) was 
launched in Japan. By using a Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) multiplexing method 
over an analogue circuit, people were able to talk with each other over the air via their handsets 
for the first time. However, it was only the rich who had the luxury to experience the mobile 
telephony service. By providing a more reliable service and charging an affordable price to the 
general public, the Second Generation (2G) cellular networks gradually replaced the 1G cellular 
networks in the early 1990s. By employing digital circuit switching technology, the 2G cellular 
networks supported both voice and data services. The data service was offered in the form of the 
Short Messaging Service (SMS) which allowed mobile users to communicate with each other by 
short text messages.  
Since the introduction of the SMS, a trend of providing higher data rate and more number of 
services started to emerge. Table 2.1 illustrates the evolution of mobile cellular services over the 
last 30 years. By deploying the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) on the Second Generation 
Enhanced mobile network (2.5G), mobile users were able to access Internet based services (e.g. 
web surfing) at a data rate of 9.6 kilobit per second (kbps) around the year 2000.  
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 1G 2G 2.5G 3G 4G 
Technical        
Standards   HSCSD GPRS EDGE IM-2000  
Transmission type Analogue Digital Digital Digital Digital Digital Digital 
Data rate (per second) - 9.6K 57.6K 114K 384K 2M 1G 
Switching Circuit Circuit Circuit Packet Circuit/ 
Packet 
Packet Packet 
Multiplexing FDMA TDMA/ 
CDMA 
TDMA TDMA/ 
FDMA 
TDMA/ 
FDMA 
  
Services        
Voice call        
SMS        
Internet        
MMS        
Video call        
Video conference        
Watch TV program        
Miscellaneous        
Availability 1983 1992 2000 2001 2002 2001 2015 
Adapted from: Clarke, 2004 
Table 2.1: The evolution of cellular mobile communication technologies 
Despite 2G network technology being first introduced nearly 20 years ago, it still dominates the 
current cellular communication market. By providing the service to more than 3.5 billion 
subscribers globally, 2G networks held almost an 80% share of the mobile communication market 
in 2009 (GSM World, 2009). Nonetheless, due to the rapid development of newer communication 
technologies, the revenue of 2G network has slowly declined over the last few years 
(Communications Today, 2010).  
Since the first commercial Third Generation (3G) mobile network was launched by NTT DoCoMo in 
Japan in 2001, 3G technology has gradually been adopted. As shown in Figure 2.1, by the end of 
April 2011, a total of 400 3G networks had been successfully deployed around the world. With a 
maximum data rate of 2 Megabits per second (Mbps), 3G networks support many data services 
which were not previously available to mobile users, such as video conferencing and the 
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS). Table 2.2 illustrates a number of available 3G services. 
Based upon their Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, a higher priority will be given to 
conversational services (i.e. voice calling and video conferencing) when they access a 3G network. 
In contrast, a lower network access priority will be applied to background services, such as email 
and SMS. With currently more than 650 million subscribers in the world, the 3G network holds 
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approximately 10% of the mobile communication market share (GSA, 2011b). Moreover, the 
future 3G market has been strongly predicted. For Europe alone, the number of 3G subscriptions 
will outnumber 2G in 2012. Also, in the same year, it is anticipated that approximately 70% of the 
total cellular subscriptions will be 3G network based (GSA, 2011a).   
 
     Source: GSA,2011b 
Figure 2.1: 3G: Cumulative network launches worldwide  
QoS Classes Example of 3G services 
Conversational Voice, video telephony, video gaming 
Streaming Multimedia, video on demand, webcast 
Interactive Web browsing, network gaming, database access 
Background Email, SMS, downloading 
Table 2.2: 3G services with their QoS requirements 
Other cellular technology, such as 3rd Generation Partnership Project Long Term Evolution (3GPP 
LTE), is also at the frontier of the mobile communication market. As its bandwidth does not meet 
the requirement of the Fourth Generation (4G) but is higher than the counterpart of the 3G, 
people refer to it as a pre-4G technology despite it being branded as a 4G technology in the 
market. Since its first appearance in 2009, LTE has experienced a steady growth in market share. In 
addition, the revenue of LTE technology is forecasted to be US$942 million in the US and a further 
$650 million from Western Europe in 2015 (PC advisor, 2010).    
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2.2.2 Other mobile communication technologies  
Apart from accessing the aforementioned cellular communication technologies, mobile devices 
can also connect with a number of other communication technologies, namely Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 
NFC, ZigBee and USB.  
Wi-Fi is a general term for the IEEE 802.11 wireless technology standards. Wi-Fi technology 
enables computing devices to connect to the Internet, with a bandwidth up to 150 Mbps per 
stream, within an approximate range of up to 250 metres. By using a Wi-Fi connection, a mobile 
user can access many Internet based services, such as sending/receiving emails, chatting online 
and accessing web pages. Currently many network operators provide the Wi-Fi service around the 
world. BT alone offers 2.8 million Wi-Fi connections in the UK and Republic of Ireland (BTopenzone, 
2011). This provides an additional platform via which mobile devices can be permanently 
connected. Although the coverage of a single Wi-Fi network is somewhat limited, by connecting a 
number of them together, a wireless mesh network can be formed which improves a user’s 
mobility greatly. For example in London, a city-sized Wi-Fi network allows millions of mobile 
devices to be connected with high speed (BBC news, 2007). Figure 2.2 illustrates the Wi-Fi market 
projections between 2005 and 2012. It demonstrates that approximately 1 billion Wi-Fi enabled 
devices will be shipped in the year 2012. In addition, more than half of such devices will be mobile 
devices. 
 
Source: Skyhook, 2007 
Figure 2.2: Wi-Fi market projections 2005-2012  
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Bluetooth wireless technology allows computing devices to communicate with each other at a 
speed of up to 3Mbps with a maximum range of approximately 100 metres. Within a Bluetooth 
formed Personal Area Network (PAN), mobile devices can exchange information directly with each 
other, such as transferring data files, sending text or multimedia messages and connecting to 
headsets. In 2010, a total of 1.7 billion Bluetooth enabled devices (e.g. mobile devices, laptops and 
gaming consoles) were shipped worldwide (Bluetooth SIG, 2011). Moreover, 1.6 billion mobile 
devices were shipped and 64% of them were Bluetooth enabled (Communities Dominate Brands, 
2010). In addition, statistics indicate that more than 70% of the mobile device users enable their 
Bluetooth connections during the day (Article Alley, 2010).  
Some other technologies, such as NFC and Zigbee, are also at the forefront of wireless 
communication development. NFC technology supports two devices to communicate with each 
other within a very close rang (i.e. less than few centimetres). It can be utilised in many areas, such 
as access control, consumer electronics, information collection and exchange, and payment. 
Mobilecommercedaily (2010) suggested that 50 million NFC-enabled mobile devices would be 
commercially available in 2011. Also, according to the Juniper Research, mobile payment via NFC 
will generate $50 billion of revenue by 2014 (Knowyourmobile, 2011). Zigbee is a standard 
wireless technology which supports low-cost and low-power wireless sensors. The impact of 
Zigbee on mobile devices will be huge because of the level of sensitive information it accesses, 
such as secure mobile payment details and mobile office access control data (ZigBee Alliance, 
2011). In addition, with over $1 trillion in revenue, Zigbee outsold all other wireless technologies 
in 2009 (Telecompaper, 2010). 
USB is a technique for establishing a data connection between two computing devices with a 
maximum data rate of 180 Mbps. By using a USB cable, a mobile device can be connected with a 
desktop computer for exchanging information (e.g. data backups and synchronising with calendar 
schedules). In addition, a USB connection can be utilised for charging the battery of a mobile 
device. In 2009 alone, over 2 billion USB enabled devices were shipped (PC world, 2009). 
Compared with other aforementioned communication techniques, USB provides a more stable 
and faster connection for mobile devices but limits them to zero mobility.  
The previous two sections described a number of mobile communication technologies that exist to 
date. Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between their data rates and their mobility. Although 
cellular communication technologies provide a safe and untethered environment to mobile users, 
their data throughput is somewhat limited. In comparison, other communication technologies 
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provide reliable and high rates of data exchange; however the mobile devices’ mobility reduces 
significantly. In addition, how safely these technologies can be utilised is heavily dependent upon 
individual mobile users. It is not the author’s intention to discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages for these technologies but to highlight their existence. Their availability affects 
mobile devices two-fold: by utilising various communication channels, mobile devices can provide 
many network based services; at the same time, this also creates a complex environment for 
deploying security controls anywhere other than on the mobile device itself.  
 
Source: NFC Forum, 2011 
Figure 2.3: Mobile communication technologies data rate vs. mobility 
2.2.3 Mobile devices 
Along with the rapid development of mobile communication technology, the mobile device has 
also experienced a dramatic evolution. Traditionally, people could only use the handset to make 
voice calls. Currently, the mobile has become a multimedia and multi-network computing device. 
Indeed, the mobile device operates similarly to a computer in terms of networking, processing 
power and data capacity. As demonstrated in Table 2.3, the iPhone 4, a typical mobile device 
which is commercially available, outperforms an average Personal Computer (PC) manufactured in 
2001 in many aspects. Also, with a retail price of £520, 1.7 million iPhone 4 handsets were sold in 
the first three days when the device was first made available for purchase (CNET news, 2010).   
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Device  Iphone 4 (2010) PC (2001) 
Network 3G, GSM1, WiFi, Bluetooth LAN, Broadband 
Memory 512 MB(internal) 256 MB (internal) 
Processing power Apple A4 800 MHz-1GHz Intel Pentium III 800 MHz 
Data capacity 32 GB  30 GB 
Operation System iPhone OS 4.2.1 Windows Millennium Edition  
Market Price £ 520 £1200 
Table 2.3: Mobile device (2010) VS PC (2001) 
At present, there are more than 5 billion mobile devices being used around the world. For the 
2010 Q4 mobile device markets alone, a total of 101.2 million smart phones were shipped by 
various manufactures. The top five platform vendors were Google Inc., Nokia Corporation, Apple 
Inc., Research In Motion (RIM) Limited and Microsoft Corporation, with 32.9%, 30.6%, 16%, 14.4%, 
and 3.1% market share respectively (Canalys, 2011). As these smart phones are equipped with a 
number of communication network interface cards, a powerful CPU and massive data storage, 
they can provide a wide range of services and applications similar to that which a PC offers. By 
default, a number of common applications are preinstalled on the mobile devices by their 
manufacturers, such as: phonebook, clock and voice calling. In addition, mobile users can 
download and then install any other applications on the devices according to individual preference. 
This option completely changed the way that people utilise their mobile devices: from a dummy 
handset into a personalised computing gadget. Also, the more applications that are installed on 
devices, the greater the potential usage deviation is between various users. These mobile 
applications are designed by different vendors. Table 2.4 demonstrates a number of examples of 
application software stores. In total, there are more than 1 million applications available for 
people to choose from, across different mobile platforms. In addition, almost 15,000 new mobile 
applications become available for people to download every month (Distimo, 2010). Moreover, 
according to a white paper from Juniper Research, the mobile application global market is 
expected to triple from $10 billion in 2009 to $32 billion in 2015 (Juniper Research, 2010). 
Application 
(App) stores 
Established 
Available 
Apps 
No. of 
Downloads 
Device Platform 
Android Market October, 2008 200,000 5 billion Android 
App store July, 2008 500,000 15 billion IOS 
App World April, 2009 38,000 1 billion Blackberry 
Ovi store May, 2009 80,000 1.8 billion Nokia 
Table 2.4: Examples of App stores in 2011 
                                                          
1
 Global System for Mobile Communications 
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Each mobile application has a unique risk impact on the mobile system security based upon 
several criteria, such as their connection types, how much information they associate with, the 
nature of the information, their threat level and their vulnerability level. Based upon these criteria, 
Ledermuller and Clarke (2011) proposed the risk level which is associated with their application 
categories (as shown in Table 2.5). By employing the risk level of each application, their impact on 
the mobile system security can be observed: the higher the risk level an application has, the more 
impact it has on the system security. Therefore, various security controls can be applied for each 
individual application based upon their risk level: the higher the risk level an application has, the 
tighter the security control should be implemented for that application.  
Application category 
Application 
value 
Threat 
level 
Risk 
temp 
Vulnerability 
level 
Risk 
level 
E-Mail (corporate) 8 4 8 2 8 
E-banking 7 5 8 1 7 
E-health 8 4 8 2 8 
Remote access (corporate) 7 5 8 1 7 
Remote access (private) 6 5 7 1 6 
Voice communication 6 3 6 1 5 
Stored business 
documents 
6 3 6 3 7 
Physical device 6 2 5 0 5 
Personal information 
(online synchronized) 
4 3 4 2 4 
E-Mail (private) 4 3 4 2 4 
Social networking 4 3 4 1 3 
Messaging 3 3 3 2 4 
Personal information 4 2 3 2 3 
Web access (browser) 2 4 3 3 4 
Stored documents 3 1 2 2 2 
Maps & Navigation 2 1 1 3 2 
News client 1 1 1 1 1 
Utilities 1 1 1 2 1 
                                                                                      Source: Ledermuller and Clarke, 2011 
Table 2.5: Applications with their risk scores 
Table 2.6 illustrates a number of examples of both network based and host based mobile services 
which mobile users may use for a variety of purposes. For communication, people can send 
messages to each other through SMS, MMS, email and online messengers. In 2010, the mobile 
messaging market was valued at $179.2 billion. This number is predicted to increase to $209.8 
billion by the end of 2011 and rise to $334.7 billion in 2015 (Portio Research, 2011). For finance, 
people can use Internet banking to check their account balance, transfer money and pay utility 
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bills. Also, by using the mobile NFC service, people can pay for goods at supermarket checkouts or 
vending machines. For instance, Orange and Barclaycard launched a mobile payment service 
which enables the users to pay for goods up to £15 (Aol tech, 2011). According to a research 
report of Berg Insight, there were 133 million mobile money users who made a total of $25 billion 
of transactions in 2010. Furthermore, they also predicted that with an annual increase rate of 40%, 
there will be 709 million mobile money users in 2015 with a total of $215 billion transactions (Berg 
Insight, 2011). Data storage enables people to store different kinds of information on a mobile 
device, such as personal contacts, calendar schedules, messages and documents.  
Services Network based Host based 
Voice  Make voice phone calls  Speech recorder  
Data  
Text message, multimedia message service, 
Emails, file transfer/sharing  
Contacts, calendar, to do list, 
data storage  
Multimedia  
Video conferencing, 
GPS (Global Position System) 
Music and movie player,  
taking picture and videos  
Internet  
Web browsing, Online messenger, mobile 
banking, mobile commerce  
---  
Others  
Listen to the radio,  watch TV programs, 
mobile NFC payment 
Games, create documents, 
calculators, convertors  
Table 2.6: Examples of mobile services 
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the findings of a consumer mobile platform activities survey conducted 
by TNS mobile life (2011). In 2011, the top six user activities are related to data downloading. 
Moreover, 19% of the respondents communicate with their friends via social networking tools. 
Furthermore, mobile financial services, such as mobile banking and mobile payment grew strongly 
in 2011 compared with the previous year. In addition, Gartner (2009) predicted that among the 
top ten services a mobile device user would use in 2012, seven will be related to data downloading, 
mobile money and mobile communication.           
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                                                                                                               Source: TNS mobile life, 2011 
Figure 2.4: Consumer mobile platform activities 2011 
As shown in this section, the functionalities of the device have increased in many aspects. This 
enables the mobile device to provide a wide range of services. Currently, people use these services 
to complete various tasks in their daily life. However, these tasks may be highly likely related to 
private personal information or critical business data. For instance, mobile financial services have 
to utilise bank account details of an individual to complete a transaction. Also, communication 
services may carry personal messages and customer information. Furthermore, as suggested by 
various studies, people store sensitive information on their mobile devices, such as passwords, 
bank account details, login credentials for personal and business email accounts, customer data 
and corporate intellectual property (Regenersis, 2009; BBC news, 2010; Kaspersky Lab, 2011; 
McAfee, 2011). Therefore, it is mission critical to ensure the legitimacy of a mobile user 
throughout every single session of usage. Otherwise, misuse would occur on both the services and 
information provided by the mobile devices.  
2.3 Mobile device security threats 
As demonstrated in the last section, the mobile device has become a powerful multimedia and 
multi-networking computing device. However, its ability is a double-edged sword. With mobile 
devices being able to host various services and store different information at the same time, this 
brings a number of security threats to the mobile environment, such as service fraud, Denial of 
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Service (DoS) attacks, malware and information disclosure (Stajano and Anderson, 1999; Viruslist, 
2009; Muir, 2003). In this section, a comprehensive discussion will be given on mobile security 
threats.  
2.3.1 Mobile service fraud 
A mobile device provides many services through a telecommunication service provider network 
connection, such as voice calling, text messaging and web surfing. In order to utilise these services, 
a charge needs to be paid to the service providers. However, when a person uses such services 
without paying a charge, a service fraud occurs. For instance, when a mobile device is stolen, an 
unauthorised person could access the mobile services within a relatively small time frame until the 
owner of the device reports the incident to their service provider, who then has the power to 
terminate the connection. In order to maximise the window of opportunity for abusing the 
services, criminals could plot more sophisticated attacks which have a smaller footprint for 
detection, such as a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card cloning attack. By exploring the coding 
flaws within a cellular network authentication process, criminals could clone a victim’s SIM card 
and abuse the services at the victim’s expense (Rao et al, 2002). In this way, even at the end of a 
billing month, a mobile owner may not notice the abuse has occurred unless a thorough checking 
of their statements is undertaken. Moreover, criminals could launch a far larger scale of attack 
against the telecommunication service providers by using the SIM cloning trick. In 2010, the 
mobile operator O2 was hit by a multi-million pound fraud as a group of gangs cloned O2 SIM 
cards and called international premium rate telephone numbers (Which?, 2010). According to the 
Global Fraud Loss Survey 2009 of Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA), service fraud 
is estimated to cost telecommunication service providers $72-80 billion every year around the 
world (CFCA, 2009). In addition, the number of fraud attacks has increased significantly by 74% 
between 2008 and 2009 (BBC news, 2009).  
2.3.2 Denial of Service attack 
Instead of abusing the mobile services, some criminals could plot DoS attacks to make these 
services unavailable to users. As a result, DoS attack is a security threat to the devices’ availability. 
Within the mobile environment, a perpetrator could attack a mobile device or the networks it 
connects to with the launch of a DoS attack. The mobile devices rely on rechargeable batteries to 
function properly. By plotting a battery exhaustion attack, a mobile battery will be drained in a 
much shorter time than under normal usage (Stajano and Anderson, 1999). As the mobile devices 
use radio waves as a communication media, an attacker may use a signal jamming technique to 
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block the legitimate radio waves. As a result, all the network based services will become 
temporarily unavailable. Moreover, malicious attackers could disable a device completely over 
radio waves. For instance, attackers could use Bluetooth smacking which is a Ping-of-Death DoS 
attack to ‘kill’ a mobile device immediately (Browning and Kessler, 2009). Furthermore, as a 
mobile device is connected to the Internet, experienced attackers could plot a Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) flooding attack to stop the device from functioning properly (Swami and 
Tschofenig, 2006). Despite this there have not been any mobile DoS attack incidents reported yet, 
however, people should be aware of their existence.     
2.3.3 Mobile malware 
As described in the previous section, the modern mobile device has become much like a normal 
computer in terms of information processing, data storage and networking abilities. Unfortunately, 
mobile devices also face similar security issues which the traditional computers experience, such 
as malware. Malware stands for malicious software. It is designed to harm a computing system, 
harvest information or launch other types of attacks. The most recognisable malware are viruses, 
worms, spyware and Trojans. The first mobile device virus ‘Cabir’ was reported in June 2004 (BBC, 
2004). Since then, the number of mobile malware increased steadily over the last few years. 
Indeed, by the end of 2009, there were more than 106 malware families with 514 variants 
identified (Securelist, 2009). Moreover, the number of new mobile malware being found in 2010 
has increased considerably by 46% compared with those occurring in 2009 (McAfee, 2010). 
Furthermore, McAfee catalogued around 1200 unique mobile malware variants at the end of June 
2011 (CSO online, 2011). 
As demonstrated in Table 2.7, malware can affect the security of a mobile device at various levels. 
From simply duplicating itself to drain device batteries, to secretly sending SMS messages to a 
premium number; from basically changing a screen display, to remotely controlling a mobile 
device over the Internet. Mobile malware can be spread in many ways, such as through a 
Bluetooth connection, via a multimedia message or by embedding itself in a mobile application. 
Among these methods of proliferation, malware embedded in an application holds the largest 
potential threat. Once the application is downloaded and installed, the malware is also installed 
but without the owner’s knowledge. For instance in 2010, up to 4.6 million Android users 
downloaded a suspicious application that secretly collected and transmitted users’ information to 
a website in China (ComputerWeekly, 2010).  
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Threat levels Malware Effects 
Low 
Cabir 
Constantly replicates itself through an active Bluetooth connection 
or removable media to drain the mobile battery 
Skulls.A 
Allows the users to make or receive phone calls, all other 
applications are blocked and the screen is changed to display skulls 
Medium 
RedBrowser Secretly sends SMS messages to a premium number  
Locknut.A Blocks the phone and prevents any applications from opening 
High 
FlexiSpy 
Sends call logs and copies of SMS/MMS messages to a secret 
server  
Brador 
Allows a hacker to remote control the device via an Internet 
connection 
Table 2.7: Example of Mobile malware and its effects 
As illustrated by Figure 2.5, mobile malware attacks mobile devices regardless of their operating 
systems (OS). The number of malware for individual platforms highly depends upon their 
popularity of usage. As there are more than 3 billion Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME) enabled mobile 
devices around the world (Java, 2011), the J2ME platform has become the top targeted platform 
by the malware creators associated with 613 variations of malware (57.67% of total malware). 
Despite the share of malware for the iPhone platform being significantly lower when comparing it 
with other platforms, the damage caused by the iPhone related malware can be severe. For 
instance, if an iPhone is infected by the iPhone/Privacy.A worm, attackers can gain access to the 
user’s contacts and messages, and eventually steal a phone owner’s identity (ZDnet, 2009).      
 
                                                                                                                  Source: Securelist, 2011 
Figure 2.5: The distribution of malware by platform 
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2.3.4 Social engineering attack 
Social engineering attacks utilise emails or malicious websites to steal personal information and 
computer system login credentials by masquerading as a legitimate organisation. In the mobile 
environment, attackers can additionally utilise two techniques to solicit information: Voice call 
phishing (Vishing) and SMS phishing (Smishing). Normally, attackers make a voice call or send out a 
spam text message purporting to be from a financial organization. For example, attackers could 
call bank users with the following message “Your ATM card needs to be reactivated” and ask for 
their personal information. If the user is fooled by the Vishing attack, their information will be 
abused (FBI, 2010). Another example, early in 2011, a text message containing a phishing site was 
sent to customers of Bank of China as a reminder to reactivate their online banking tokens 
(McAfee, 2011a). If any customer clicked the phishing link, their login credentials (i.e. login ID, 
password and token) would be obtained and later abused by the attackers. Furthermore, the 
Smishing technique can also be used to plot other attacks. For instance, by simply replacing a 
phishing site with a link for a Trojan horse, if clicked, attackers could take the control of the mobile 
device without the owner’s knowledge (PCWorld, 2006).  
2.3.5 Loss or theft of the device 
As mobile devices have always been high value computing gadgets, this consistently makes them 
prominent targets for attackers. Due to the small physical size and lack of physical protection that 
mobile devices possess, they can easily be lost or stolen. Indeed, according to the metropolitan 
police website, there are around 10,000 mobile devices lost or stolen in London every month 
(Metropolitan Police Service, 2011). When a mobile device is lost or stolen, there is an initial cost 
of replacement. More damage could occur if the attacker accesses the mobile services and 
information. For instance, the thief can make free phone calls, send multimedia messages and surf 
the Internet at the owner’s cost. Also, as demonstrated in section 2.2.3 people do store sensitive 
information on their devices, such as bank details, login credentials for computer systems and 
emails, customer data and business plans. As a result, the attacker could also review all the 
information stored on the mobile device. Indeed, a survey shows that 32% of all information 
disclosure incidents were related to lost or stolen mobile devices (Ponemon Institute, 2011). 
Moreover, the McAfee mobile and security report indicated that “Four in 10 organizations have 
had mobile devices lost or stolen and half of lost/stolen devices contain business critical data”, 
such as customer data, corporate intellectual property and financial information (McAfee, 2011). 
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Furthermore, such information can be used to perform other illegal activities and the damage is 
well beyond imagination. For instance, attackers could use the mobile owner’s bank account login 
details to transfer money to their own bank accounts, or view a latest blueprint of product and sell 
it to the owner’s competitors.  
All of these aforementioned mobile security threats are considered as outside threats however 
security threats may come from inside as well. For instance, a colleague borrows a person’s mobile 
device for making a voice call. Apart from utilising the telephony service, the colleague also has 
the opportunity to access other services or information, such as reading the owner’s email 
messages, viewing the owner’s social networking profiles, accessing the owner’s document files or 
even installing malware on the device to capture the owner’s call logs. Mobile devices lack the 
physical protection which other computing devices normally experience being kept within offices 
and homes which prevents these actions being carried out without the owner’s notice. Such a 
security threat is also known as an insider attack. Comparing this with the aforementioned security 
threats, the insider attack is easier for attackers to plot and is more difficult for users to detect. 
According to the 2011 CyberSecurity Watch Survey, 21% of attacks on computing services and 
data were perpetrated by insiders compared with 58% by outsiders 2(Cert, 2011). Also, a Credant 
(2011) white paper suggested that 47% of security incidents were caused by insiders. Although the 
figures from the two findings are different, it is important to highlight the existence of insider 
attacks because they are just as dangerous as outsider attacks.    
2.4 Mobile security controls 
In order to counter the highlighted mobile security threats, various security projects have been 
proposed and developed. For instance, employing an authentication technique to stop 
unauthorised usage, using mobile antivirus products to detect and remove mobile malware, taking 
advantage of mobile firewall to filter unwanted traffic, utilising an encryption mechanism to 
protect the information stored on the devices, and making use of battery based mobile IDS 
systems to detect malware presence. These security controls will be discussed in the following 
section.   
 
 
                                                          
2
 The other 21% was unknown.  
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2.4.1 Authentication 
A PIN is a knowledge based authentication technique. A user is required to enter the correct PIN 
before accessing a mobile device. Two types of PINs can be deployed: the first is for the mobile 
device itself and the second is for the SIM card. Normally, a mobile PIN contains between 4 and 8 
digits. The PIN is a point-of-entry technique and is therefore only required when a device is initially 
switched on. Without the correct PIN, the device would not start and the SIM card would not 
authenticate with the cellular networks. However, most of the time the user will not be required 
to re-enter the PIN until the next reboot. This provides plenty of opportunities for attackers to 
abuse a mobile device. Recently, the use of the PIN technique has become more sophisticated; 
PINs can now be set to be requested again after a certain period of time dependent upon the 
user’s preference. This would significantly reduce the possibility of the device being abused. 
Nonetheless, in practice, as many mobile users do not employ the technique properly, such as 
never changing the PIN, sharing it with friends or writing it down on paper, this makes the PIN 
based authentication technique inadequate as a protection of mobile devices (Clarke and Furnell, 
2005; Kurkovsky and Syta, 2010).  
With increasing hardware availability, a significant portion of mobile devices are equipped with 
new technologies (e.g. touch screens and built-in cameras). This provides opportunities for 
developing other authentication techniques on the mobile devices, such as the Android password 
pattern, a type of graphical password. Users are required to draw a shape on the 3 by 3 contact 
points on a touch screen as their password (as demonstrated in Figure 2.6). As users can only link 
two adjacent contact points together, this means the points which are not neighbouring with each 
other (e.g. 1 and 3) can never be used as a combination. As a result, the Android password pattern 
provides less password combinations than the traditional PIN based password technique can. In 
consequence, this method is more vulnerable to a brute force attack. As this method is also a 
knowledge based approach, it suffers several disadvantages as mentioned earlier, such as never 
being changed or being shared with others. In addition, research showed that this type password 
can be easily determined when a screen is greasy (Aviv et al, 2010).  
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Figure 2.6: An example of Android password pattern 
2.4.2 Mobile Antivirus solutions  
Since the discovery of the first mobile phone virus in 2004, the antivirus software industry started 
to shift its attention from the traditional computing environment towards to the mobile platform. 
The first mobile antivirus software was developed by F-Secure and became available on the 
market in August 2005 (F-Secure, 2005). Since then, other antivirus companies also developed 
their counterparts, such as Kaspersky Mobile Security®, Trend Mobile Security® and Norton 
Mobile Security®. Mobile antivirus software was initially designed to detect and remove malware 
for the Symbian and Windows CE platforms due to their large market shares in the past. Latest 
mobile antivirus products also encompass other mobile platforms, such as Android based mobile 
devices because of its increasing popularity.  
Just like traditional antivirus software, mobile antivirus software needs to update its signatures 
regularly to detect the latest malware. This process requires a dedicated Internet connection 
which was not available for mobile devices several years ago. However, with the growing 
availability of 3G and Wi-Fi technologies, it makes the updating process much easier and mobile 
devices could get the latest signatures promptly.   
2.4.3 Mobile Firewall products  
As mentioned in the last section, the mobile device could be exposed to various network based 
attacks due to its ability to access multiple wireless networks. In order to protect a mobile device 
from network based attacks, a mobile firewall software monitors the network traffic continuously 
and only allows legitimate services (e.g. web browsing) to go through a mobile device. Two types 
of firewalls can be implemented: on the network or on the mobile device. Nokia Corporation 
proposed a network based firewall which can be implemented on the mobile service provider’s 
networks. It can be used for blocking malicious data going into a mobile device (Newscientist, 
2007). As the filtering process is undertaken by the network service providers, there is no 
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overhead for mobile devices. However, it would be impossible for the service provider’s firewall to 
protect mobile devices when they are connected with other networks such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. 
For the host based firewall, several security firms have already released products, such as 
ProtecStar Mobile Firewall 1.0 and Trend Micro™ Mobile Security 5.0 (ProtectStar, 2009; Trend 
Micro, 2009). As the firewall runs on the mobile device itself, it has the ability to monitor all 
networks that the mobile handset connects with. Nevertheless, due to the complexity of the 
multi-network environment, it is difficult to assess how well these host based mobile firewalls 
perform.  
2.4.4 Mobile Encryption  
Encryption techniques transform information to an unreadable format unless a key for the secured 
data is provided. As mentioned in earlier sections, mobile devices have the ability to store large 
amounts of information that could be related to both individuals and corporations. Without 
encrypting the information, anyone obtaining the device could access the information. In order to 
protect the information stored on the mobile devices, a number of encryption methods have been 
proposed. For instance, Microsoft Corporation offers encryption on Windows based mobile 
devices and RIM provides email encryption for the email system of Blackberry. Moreover, 
according to the Goode Intelligence mSecurity survey, 40% of organisations are planning to deploy 
data encryption methods on their mobile devices (Goode Intelligence, 2010). Nonetheless, 
encryption methods require a certain level of education for the average mobile device user before 
they can implement this technique.  
2.4.5 Battery monitoring based mobile IDS 
It is broadly recognised that the battery plays a key role in a mobile device. Depending upon the 
battery, the mobile device continuously provides various services. Several studies have identified 
that each mobile service consumes a unique amount of battery current (Martin et al, 2004; Jacoby 
et al, 2004). Based upon this theory, current usage of battery can be analysed. Two kinds of 
battery behaviour signatures can be created for detecting abnormal activities within the mobile 
device: for legitimate applications (e.g. calendar) or for malicious activities (e.g. malware).  
To date, only Martin et al (2004) suggested that by using the legitimate services as the signature to 
prevent the battery exhaustion attack on mobile devices via the Power Secure Architecture (PSA). 
The main aim for the PSA was to protect the mobile device from three types of attacks: service 
request power attacks, benign power attacks and malignant power attacks. The PSA constantly 
monitors the mobile’s battery usage level in order to obtain the battery signature of the current 
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running service, and then compares that signature with all trusted applications’ signatures within a 
database. If no match is found in the database, possible power attack on the mobile device occurs 
and that service will be stopped immediately. The advantages of the PSA are: it detects possible 
power attacks to protect the life of the battery. Also it would possible detect malware attack. 
Nonetheless, as the system utilises the legitimate services to obtain the signature, it was 
reasonable as the number of mobile applications was limited in 2004. However, at the moment, 
there are millions of mobile applications available for the mobile users to choose. As a result, to 
obtain the signatures for legitimate service will not be an easy task. Even if all the signatures were 
obtained it would take too long to detect any intrusions. Furthermore, the system has not got the 
ability to detect any user related misuse, such as when the SMS service is abused by an attacker.  
Comparing with the aforementioned method, the majority of the research employed the malicious 
software battery activities as the signature (as shown in Table 2.8). These systems frequently 
compare the present battery status with their signature database. If the battery signature of 
current activity matches with any signature of malicious software, the IDS system will stop that 
activity functioning. The advantages for battery based IDSs are that they are able to detect mobile 
malware and battery related attacks; hence, they protect the integrity and availability of mobile 
device. Also, they have a much lower false positive alarm rate and provide meaningful descriptions 
for each incident compared that which a behavioural based IDS system could offer. In contrast, 
obtaining and updating signatures can be a complicated task. A further limitation is that although 
battery based IDS systems monitor all running mobile applications’ activities they cannot detect 
attacks which abuse legitimate applications, such as making an international phone call or data 
modification on the mobile device. 
Name 
Correlation 
location 
Signatures types 
Attacks can be 
detected 
Martin et al, 
2004 
Host Legitimate Services Power attacks  
Jacoby et al, 
2004 
Host and network Common network  attacks 
 Common network 
attacks 
Jacoby et al, 
2006  
Host and network Common network  attacks 
Common network 
attacks 
Buennemeyer et 
al, 2008  
Host Common network attacks 
Bluetooth network 
and Wi-Fi network 
attacks 
Shabtai et al, 
2010 
Host Mobile malware Mobile malware 
Table 2.8: A summary of battery based mobile IDS 
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Table 2.9 illustrates a comparison between existing mobile security mechanisms and mobile 
security threats. Although antivirus software can detect the presence of malware, firewall 
applications can block malicious network traffic, battery based mobile IDS can sense both malware 
and network related attacks and encryption can translate information to an unreadable format 
unless a secret key is provided, their abilities of identifying any user related activities are rather 
limited. For instance, they cannot determine the legitimacy of a user when a voice call is made or a 
file is accessed. Knowledge based authentication, such as using a PIN, can provide a basic level of 
protection for the mobile services and information being misused by unauthorised users. For 
example, without entering a correct PIN, a user will not be able to access any mobile services nor 
the information on the mobile devices. However, due to bad practice, such as choosing a simple 
password, never changing it, writing it on paper or sharing it with co-workers, unauthorised users 
are able to misuse the mobile device. Moreover, as the PIN is a point-of-entry based 
authentication method, as long as a correct password is given, a user will be granted access 
regardless of their true identity. In addition, this raises another issue with the knowledge based 
authentication approaches. When an authorised user forgets their PIN, they will be denied access 
despite their legitimacy. Therefore, none of the existing security controls can truly protect the 
multimedia and multi-networking mobile devices. As a result, a novel security control which can 
continuously protect both the mobile services and information based upon the users’ legitimacy is 
desperately needed.   
 Antivirus Encryption Firewall PIN/Password Battery based IDS 
Mobile service fraud      
DoS service      
Malware      
Social Networking      
Lost/stolen      
Insider attack      
Table 2.9: Mobile security mechanisms vs. Mobile security threats 
2.5 Conclusion  
With more than 5 billion users globally, mobile devices have become ubiquitous in our daily life. 
Mobile devices have the ability to provide various services across multiple communication 
networks and also on the handsets alone. People utilise them to complete different tasks, that are 
not only related to basic activities, such as making a phone call or playing games but also, more 
importantly, may involve sensitive information, such as storing personal data, transferring money 
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over the Internet and accessing corporate emails. As a result, the security requirement should be 
heightened to ensure the legitimacy of a user throughout the course of usage.  
With the increased popularity of mobile devices, the associated threats are also increased from 
both outside and inside. For instance, the total occurrence of mobile malware has increased by 46% 
from 2009 to 2010 (McAfee, 2010). Another example, a survey conducted by the Ponemon 
Institute shows that 32% of information disclosure incidents were caused by loss or theft of the 
mobile device (Ponemon Institute, 2011). In addition, mobile services and information can be 
misused by a colleague when ‘borrowing’ a device. Several security controls, such as antivirus 
software, firewall applications, battery based IDS systems and encryption mechanisms, can be 
used to protect the mobile devices from being harmed by malware, network attacks and 
information disclosure attacks. However, their ability to detect user related activities (e.g. making 
phone calls and accessing information) is rather limited. Although the knowledge based 
authentication technique (e.g. PIN) could provide some level of protection against user misuse, its 
weaknesses have been well documented by literature (Clarke and Furnell, 2005; Kurkovsky and 
Syta, 2010).  
As demonstrated in this chapter, the mobile device has the ability to access multiple networks and 
store a wide range of information and so it is critical to guarantee the legitimacy of user. Despite 
the antivirus, firewall and encryption applications that are already commercially available, their 
impact on monitoring user activity is minimal. The knowledge based authentication technique 
would provide a level of protection against unauthorised misuse. However, in practice, as the 
knowledge can be shared and learnt, this renders the method ineffective. As a result, a new 
security mechanism which can continuously assess the legitimacy of a user while the mobile 
services and information are used is definitely needed. The feasibility of utilising such a method 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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3 Review of Biometric Authentication 
3.1 Introduction  
To authenticate a person, three fundamental approaches can be used: something the person 
knows (i.e. password/PIN), something the person has (i.e. token) or something the person is (i.e. 
biometrics) (Wood, 1977). The first two authentication methods have frequently been utilised in 
security systems encountered in our daily life. In general, either of them can be employed if a 
system requires a basic level of protection. For instance, a password is required by a computer 
login system to prevent unauthorised usage; a user needs to swipe their ID card at their office 
building entrance to gain entry. When a system requires a higher level of protection, these two 
techniques can be deployed together to form a two-factor authentication method which provides 
stronger security than either of them could in isolation. For example, a user must provide both a 
password and possess a token to access their online bank account. However, these two techniques 
face a number of weaknesses in practice. Passwords can be forgotten, written down, shared with 
other people or even guessed by an attacker; tokens can be lost, stolen, borrowed by a colleague 
or cloned illicitly. In consequence, system security will be compromised and the system can then 
be abused by attackers. Therefore, an authentication method which can offer more robust 
security is needed and so attention has turned to biometrics.   
Over the last 50 years, the development of biometric authentication techniques has increased 
dramatically: various biometric techniques have been extensively researched and some of them 
have already been developed for people to utilise. Initially, these authentication approaches were 
mainly utilised in areas requiring high security, such as governments and banks. Around the year 
2000, biometric authentication techniques became more commercially viable and widespread in 
the public domain. For instance, a user can gain instant access to a computer system by swiping 
their finger on a scanner which is embedded in a keyboard or mouse. In another example, many 
countries have deployed a biometric passport system to verify the identity of a passport carrier 
based upon their biometric information.  
3.2 An introduction of the biometric system 
People use biometrics in their daily life despite the possibility that they may not be aware of its 
existence. For example, we can instantly identify our friends in a crowd through recognition of 
their faces; also, when we make a phone call to a friend, although we cannot see the person at the 
 42 
 
other end, we can verify the identity of that person through their voice (either we know the 
person or we do not). However, within the computing environment, biometrics operates 
differently as the whole identification process is performed by a computer. In this section, a 
generic biometric system will be introduced along with various system performance measurement 
and requirement factors.  
3.2.1 A generic biometric system  
Biometric recognition or biometrics is an automatic process to uniquely identify humans based 
upon one or more physical (e.g. face) or behavioural (e.g. hand writing) characteristics or traits 
(Prabhakar, 2003). In the computing environment, a biometric system is mainly deployed as an 
authentication method for protecting the security of a computer system. In order to obtain system 
access, a user will be authenticated based upon the biometric information they possess.   
A biometric system follows three distinct phases to perform an authentication process: enrolment, 
storage and comparison (as shown in Figure 3.1). Each step is performed by the following three 
main system components: a sensor, a computer and a classification method.  
 
Figure 3.1: A generic biometric system 
First of all, an individual user needs to enrol on a biometric system. During the enrolment process, 
biometric information of the user is captured by a sensor, then unique biometric characteristics 
are extracted, analysed and stored on a computer as a reference template. In subsequent usage, 
biometric information of a current user will be collected and compared with the reference 
template to perform the authentication process. Therefore, it is critical that the reference 
template information is obtained with a high degree of quality and accuracy. Also, some of the 
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behavioural biometric characteristics (e.g. the way people walk) tend to change under various 
circumstances such as environmental factors. As a result, it is essential to update the template 
regularly to maintain a high level of system performance.    
The authentication process compares an input biometric sample with the reference template 
sample(s). A current user’s biometric information of is captured using a sensor and discriminate 
biometric characteristics are extracted, forming an input sample. Then, the input sample is 
compared with the template sample. The similarity between the two samples is calculated using a 
pattern classification method (e.g. a Neural Network) yielding an output value. Finally, the output 
value is compared with a predefined threshold: within the threshold, system access will be 
granted; exceeding the threshold, system access will be denied. It is important to choose a 
discriminatory system threshold. A poorly selected threshold will compromise system security by 
allowing imposters to enter the system too easily and system performance by denying legitimate 
users access to the system.  
Depending upon whether a biometric authentication system is used to verify or determine the 
identity of a person, it can operate in two distinct modes: verification and identification. 
 Verification: verifies an individual as the person who they claim to be (Am I who I claim I 
am?).   
 Identification: identify who a person is (Who am I?).  
The verification mode is sometimes called one-to-one matching (as shown in Figure 3.2). It 
compares the biometric sample of a current user with the only reference template that contains 
the biometric sample of the claimed person. The comparison output is either true or false. For 
example, a fingerprint enabled computer login system operates in verification mode. When a user 
attempts to access the computer, their fingerprint sample is compared with the owner’s 
fingerprint sample only. If the samples match with each other the user will be granted access, 
otherwise they will be refused.    
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                                                                                                                            Source: Jain et al, 2004 
Figure 3.2: A biometric verification process  
In identification mode, a current user’s biometric sample of a current user must be compared with 
every single template on the system database to determine if a match exists. Therefore, the 
process is also known as one-to-many matching (as shown in Figure 3.3). At the end of the 
comparison process, the identity of the user can be either reviewed or the user cannot be 
identified. For instance, when the police need to ascertain if a suspect has broken the law before 
or not, the biometric information of the suspect (e.g. fingerprint) is compared with the templates 
in a database of known criminals. Another example, in the US, before a person claims social 
services benefit, their biometric information is checked on the system database which contains 
samples from people who have already claimed the benefit, enabling the detection of fraudulent 
claims. So far, 90,000 people have been enrolled on the benefit system of the social service 
(GlobalSecurity, 2011). This means the biometric information of an honest applicant would be 
checked against 90,000 templates before they will be awarded their claim for benefit. Compared 
with the verification mode, the identification mode is a more complex process as it requires more 
time and computational power to complete. More importantly, the biometric traits employed in 
an identification system need to be highly unique. As a result, behavioural traits (e.g. gait) are not 
recommended as candidates for any identification systems.   
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                                                                                                                          Source: Jain et al, 2004 
Figure 3.3: A biometric identification process  
3.2.2 Biometric system performance measurement factors 
As mentioned in the last section, a biometric system identifies the legitimacy of a user based upon 
the comparison between the biometric sample of the current user and the existing reference 
template. For a particular biometric technique, the performance of the template matching process 
is reflected by two important error rates: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate 
(FRR). 
 FAR: is the probability that a biometric system incorrectly matches a biometric sample 
with a non-matching template. It measures the percentage of how many imposters are 
incorrectly accepted by the system. 
 FRR: is the probability that a biometric system fails to match the biometric sample of a 
user with a matching template. It measures the percentage of how many legitimate users 
are incorrectly rejected by the system. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, these two rates share a mutually exclusive relationship: as one rate 
decreases the other increases. As a result, the security level of a biometric system can be 
controlled by adjusting the threshold setting. A tightened system security level can be obtained by 
increasing the FRR; this means fewer attempts will be granted with the system access. While by 
increasing the FAR, the system security level is slacker as more attempts will be granted access.  
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Figure 3.4: Mutually Exclusive Relationship between FAR/FRR 
To compare the performance of various biometric techniques, a universal measurement 
parameter such as the Equal Error Rate (EER) can be employed. The EER is an average value 
obtained from the FAR and the FRR. It is the point at which the FAR and FRR are equal, when they 
cross each other as in Figure 3.4 or the smallest distance between these two rates when they do 
not cross. To acquire the EER for a particular biometric based authentication system, a number of 
participants are invited to test it and their individual EERs are recorded. The average EER from all 
the participants is then calculated and this final figure signifies the EER for the system. As a result, 
the performance of a biometric system is heavily reliant upon the number of participants, the 
uniqueness of each participant and the sophistication of the employed classification method. In 
general, a biometric technique with a smaller EER tends to be more accurate.  
When designing a biometric authentication system other performance parameters such as the 
failure to enrol rate, failure to capture rate and the template capacity, should also be taken into 
consideration. When the failure to enrol rate of a system is high, users have to make more effort 
to be successfully enrolled on the system. If the failure to capture rate is high it suggests that there 
may be an equipment problem and so an alternative sensor can be used to replace the original. 
The capacity of the template also needs to be considered as identification based biometric 
systems hold more than one user’s biometric information.  
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3.2.3 Biometric system requirement  
People have a large number of biometric characteristics and traits, such as face and gait. If a 
biometric characteristic or trait can be utilised for an authentication system, it should meet the 
following criteria (Jain et al, 2004):   
 Universality: requires that every single person should have the characteristic or trait. For 
instance, people have got fingers; hence the fingerprint has the potential to be used as a 
biometric identifier.  
 Uniqueness: examines how well a biometric technique discriminates people from each 
other: a person’s fingerprint is much more unique than their hair colour, but less unique 
than their iris.  
 Permanence: indicates how constant a biometric characteristic remains over time. The 
fingerprint of a person never changes, however, the way they walk will change due to 
their age, fitness level, footwear and even the weather conditions.  
 Collectability: how easy it is to collect the biometric sample. Using a normal camera a 
facial image can be taken within a couple seconds, however to obtain an iris image users 
have to stare at a special infrared camera for a much longer time.  
 Performance: refers to how well a biometric performs: its accuracy, speed and robustness. 
 Acceptability: indicates at what level people are willing to use biometrics as an 
authentication method in their lives. People would prefer a fingerprint scan compared 
with an iris scan as the latter technique is more intrusive.  
 Circumvention: refers to how easy a system can be tricked by using a substitute. A 
fingerprint scan system can be fooled using a fake finger; while it is difficult to trick a facial 
thermograph based authentication system with a replicated face as the system has the 
ability to detect whether the face is live or not.  
As a result, an ideal biometric authentication system should fit all the above requirements.  
3.3 Biometric characteristics  
Based upon characteristics, biometric systems can be subdivided into two categories: physiological 
and behavioural. The physiological characteristics are related to the shape of the human body, 
such as face, fingerprint and iris. In contrast, behavioural characteristics are the ways in which the 
human body behaves, such as how an individual writes a letter (i.e. hand writing), how they walk 
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(i.e. gait) from one location to another and how they speak (i.e. voice). Over the last 100 years, 
significant amounts of effort have been spent on a variety of biometric projects. This section will 
describe these biometric methods both in the research field and related commercial applications.   
3.3.1 Physiological biometrics  
The physiological biometric based systems utilise the characteristics of a human body part to 
identify individuals. In general, physiological biometric characteristics are resistant to various 
factors which may affect their performance. For instance, people’s fingerprints will not be affected 
by their age, mood, body fitness or the weather conditions. Moreover, an individual’s physiological 
biometric characteristics contain high levels of discriminatory information. For example, a person’s 
iris is so unique that even identical twins have different iris patterns. Research into physiological 
biometric approaches started in the late 1800’s and primarily focused on the usage identification 
via fingerprint. Since then, many other studies into various physiological biometrics have been 
performed. 
Ear recognition examines the shape of the outer human ear as a means of identifying individuals 
(as shown in Figure 3.6). In 1949, Alfred Iannarelli conducted the first experiment in which he 
studied the uniqueness of human ears. By manually studying more than 10,000 random hand 
drawn pictures of human ears, Iannarelli suggested that the human ear shape is unique even for 
biological twins (Iannarelli, 1989). Later, the Iannarelli System was developed to identify 
individuals through their ear shape based upon 12 measurement points, such as the concha and 
lobe areas. Burge and Burger (2000) described the potential of using ear recognition in the 
computing environment. Their approach utilised the features extracted from the Voronoi diagram 
of the human ear to identify individuals. Other research also suggested that ear recognition is a 
reliable technique to discriminate people through 2D or 3D images (Yuan and Mu, 2007; Yan and 
Bowyer, 2007). Currently, the majority of ear recognition work is carried out in the research arena. 
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Source: Advancedsourcecode, 2011 
Figure 3.5: An anatomical sketch of a human ear  
In general, ear recognition techniques can provide a reliable and robust identification method for 
individuals. Additionally, this approach is considered as user convenient as the ear image can be 
taken from a distance. Nonetheless, in several circumstances, it may be difficult for an ear 
recognition system to carry out the identification process, for instance when an ear is covered by 
an object (e.g. ear rings) or inconsistent lighting impedes the capture of an image of suitable 
quality. However, Burge and Burger (2000) suggested that by employing an expensive infrared 
camera, a certain level of identification can still be obtained by capturing a thermogram ear image.  
Facial recognition is a technique to identify and verify people through their faces. The research 
into facial recognition started in the 1960s despite humans having naturally used the face to 
identify each other throughout time. Bledsoe (1966) and Goldstein et al (1971) identified several 
unique characteristics from human face photographs to distinguish people, such as the distance 
between the eyes, width of the nose, the shape of cheekbones and the depth of eye sockets (as 
shown in Figure 3.7). Since then, many related research projects have been proposed. Although 
each research project may choose the facial features differently, most of the projects employed 
one of the following three popular methods to perform the classification: Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) (Turk and Pentland, 1991), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) (Etemad and 
Chellappa, 1997) and Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) (Wiskoot et al, 1997).  
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Source: Geekosystem, 2011 
Figure 3.6: An example of face recognition  
Victor et al (2002) and Chang et al (2003) identified that facial recognition based systems perform 
better than ear recognition based systems do. As a result, facial recognition techniques can also be 
deployed for use as both identification and verification solutions. The facial recognition technique 
is user friendly because a face photograph can be taken from a distance without any user 
interaction. As a result, the identification process can be performed secretly without the user’s 
knowledge. The major drawback of facial recognition approaches is that system performance can 
be significantly affected when a poor quality photo is taken. For example, when the face is covered 
by glasses or a person is too far away from the camera when photographed. In addition, it is 
arguable that the human face shape may change over time and so the system template should be 
updated accordingly if necessary.   
Currently, facial recognition techniques have been developed by many vendors and used for many 
applications (Face-rec, 2011). For instance, the AxxonSoft (2011) facial recognition based 
surveillance system can identify a particular person amongst a large crowd. Toshiba have 
introduced a face recognition based login system on their new laptops which enables users to 
quickly logon to their laptops by presenting their faces to the in-built camera rather than typing 
their passwords (Toshiba America Information Systems, 2011). So far, facial recognition 
techniques have been the fastest growing sector among all the biometric approaches (Free-press-
release, 2011). Moreover, the facial recognition market is expected to grow by 24.2% from 2010 to 
2015 (marketsandmarkets, 2011). 
Facial thermography uses the heat patterns emitted by blood vessels under the skin of the human 
face to identify individuals (as shown in Figure 3.8). The heat pattern is also known as a 
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thermograph which contains strong discriminate information (Prokoski et al, 1992). Apart from the 
image being captured by an expensive infrared camera, the facial thermography technique works 
similarly to facial recognition based approaches. The advantage of the facial thermography 
technique is that it is not an intrusive approach; as the image can be taken from a distance, users 
are not required to make any physical contact with the camera. In addition, as the image is 
obtained by an infrared camera, this permits the technique to work perfectly in a dark or no light 
environment. However, the performance of the system could be affected by several external 
factors, such as surrounding temperature (Socolinsky & Selinger, 2004). Furthermore, due to the 
high manufacturing cost, this technique could only be used for high-level security requirement 
applications (e.g. government intelligence sectors) but not for a wide public deployment.  
  
                                                Source: Socolinsky & Selinger, 2004 
Figure 3.7: An example of human face thermo image  
Fingerprint recognition relies on the patterns of friction ridges and valleys of the human finger to 
distinguish individuals (as shown in Figure 3.9). The uniqueness of fingerprints has never been 
doubted: “Two like fingerprints would be found only once every 1048 years”-Scientific American, 
1911. Research on fingerprint recognition can be traced back in the late 1800’s as Galton 
developed a fingerprint classification system by employing all ten human fingers. Later, based 
upon Galton’s work, Henry (1900) proposed a detailed fingerprint indexing method for assisting 
manual fingerprint comparison. The method is known as “the Henry system” which laid the 
foundation for the majority of existing work in the fingerprint recognition domain. Trauring (1963) 
proposed an automatic comparison method to identify individuals by using finger ridge patterns. 
Since then, many research studies have been conducted in this area.  
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                                                 Source: Neruotechnology, 2011 
Figure 3.8: An example of Fingerprint Recognition 
A fingerprint recognition system requires the user’s fingerprint image to perform the identification. 
Traditionally, a finger image was obtained when a person covered their finger with ink and pressed 
it against a piece of paper. Today, the fingerprint acquisition process is much easier. To capture a 
user’s fingerprint, one of the following hardware sensors can be utilised: capacitance, optical, 
thermal and ultrasonic. Users are required to swipe their fingers against the sensor and then the 
fingerprint image is automatically generated. During the image processing stage, various unique 
features are extracted from the image. Based upon individual system preferences, these features 
are classified by using one of the following methods: correlation based, pattern based and 
minutiae based. Correlation based algorithms superimpose two fingerprint images together and 
correlate between corresponding pixels to calculate the difference between alignments. The 
pattern based matching compares the raw fingerprint patterns (i.e. arch, loop and whorl) from 
two fingerprint images which have to be aligned in the same orientation. The minutiae based 
method extracts a number of minutiae points from the fingerprints, such as the ridge endings and 
ridge bifurcations, to form two dimensional graphs. The difference between these graphs can then 
be analyzed.  
Fingerprints are so unique and consistent over time and can therefore be used for both 
identification and verification. For identification, the technique is frequently used by the law 
enforcement agencies to identify currently unknown suspects against various databases of known 
criminals. For verification, the technique can be deployed as an alternative login method for 
 53 
 
computer systems (e.g. laptops). Nevertheless, the system performance could be significantly 
reduced when the finger is covered by dirt or has suffered a small cut. Moreover, people find this 
technique rather intrusive as it requires users to physically swipe their finger across a sensor to 
capture the image.   
Fingerprint recognition is one of the most well-known and used biometric techniques. So far, it has 
been developed in many applications for the purpose of authentication, such as computer login 
systems, physical access control for office buildings and attendance tracking solutions 
(EyeNetWatch, 2011). Currently, with $1.37 billion estimated revenue in 2010, fingerprint 
recognition based applications hold the largest biometric market share. In addition, the future 
fingerprint biometrics’ market is promising as its expected revenue will reach $3.28 billion in 2015 
(marketsandmarkets, 2011).  
Hand geometry utilises a number of the human hand geometrical shape features such as the 
thickness of the palm, width of the fingers and length and the distance between knuckles, to 
discriminate people. The research into hand geometry started in the early 1970s. Although limited 
literature was produced on the topic at that time, a number of patents were filed describing how 
hand geometry based systems work (Ernst, 1971; Sidlauskas, 1988). In order to obtain the image 
of the hand geometry, two approaches have been proposed. Traditionally, a hand geometry 
system required users to place their hands in a fixed position by using pegs on a scanner (Jain et al, 
1999; Sanchez-Reillo, 2000) (as shown in Figure 3.10). As a result, the scanner can easily locate the 
human hand and generate the hand image accordingly. As the pegs may affect the quality of the 
image, Covavisaruch et al (2005) suggested another method which allows users to freely put their 
hands on a scanner without having the pegs. Later, the hand geometry characteristics (e.g. 
thickness of the palm) are located using pre-designed computer software. Despite various 
classification methods being employed by different systems, they all examine a similar set of hand 
geometry features (Duta, 2009). 
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Source: Clevelandtime, 2011 
Figure 3.9:  An example of hand geometry scanner 
Due to the natural similarity of human hand shape, hand geometry features are not highly unique. 
As a result, this technique can only be used to verify people but not to identify them. With its ease 
of use and stand-alone capability, it is widely deployed for many verification applications, such as 
physical access control and class attendance tracking (A.T.R. Systems, 2003). Furthermore, people 
find this technique is less intrusive than fingerprint recognition based approaches. The major 
downside of hand geometry based systems is that the technology is restricted for a wider spread 
of usage due to its bulky size (e.g. cannot be used on laptop computers). In addition, the system is 
not suitable for children as their hand shape changes quickly over time.   
Iris recognition identifies users by examining their iris. The iris is the coloured muscle surrounding 
the human eye pupil and it is highly unique to each individual person (Daugman, 1993) (shown in 
Figure 3.11). In order to obtain an iris image, one of the following types of camera is used: near 
infrared (NIR), high-resolution visual light and telescope-type. Once the iris image is acquired, 
locating the iris area can be a difficult task as a poorly selected iris area will reduce system 
performance. Iris recognition is a highly accurate and stable technique which is 10 times more 
accurate than fingerprint recognition based systems could get (EPIC, 2005). As a result, the 
technique can be deployed for both identification and verification. Also, this technique is less 
intrusive as the image can be taken from a distance of up to 3 metres (Du, 2006). As there is no 
physical contact with the camera, the iris scan can be performed safely and hygienically. However, 
the system does require users to align their eyes with the camera which may cause a certain level 
of inconvenience. Moreover, the initial cost for the equipment can be very expensive, especially 
for long range cameras. As a result, iris recognition technology should only be implemented for 
applications requiring high security. Indeed, one of these applications is the Iris Recognition 
Immigration System (IRIS) which is currently being deployed by the UK Border Agency in several 
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airports, such as Heathrow, Gatwick and Birmingham. Passengers can be quickly verified by IRIS 
and then pass the barriers within a couple of minutes, whereas the process is much longer without 
an IRIS implementation (UKBA, 2011). Furthermore, the market for iris recognition is expected to 
grow 25.4% between 2010 and 2015 (marketsandmarkets, 2011).  
 
                                                      Source: Itimes, 2011 
Figure 3.10: An example of a human eye  
Retina scanning: the retina is formed by the nerve tissues located at the back of the human eye (as 
shown in Figure 3.11). Retina scanning examines the unique pattern formed by the blood vessels 
of the retina. The pattern is so unique that retina scanning based identification systems can 
achieve an error rate of 1 in 10 million which is 10 times better than the performance of iris 
recognition based systems (Wisegeek, 2011). In addition, it is extremely difficult to replicate or 
forge the pattern of the retina. As a result, the technique is considered as the most secure 
biometric approach. However, retina scanning is a very intrusive process. A user has to remove 
their glasses (if they have any), put their eyes close to a scanner and stare at a specific point for 
approximately 10-15 seconds until the scanning process is completed. Also, as the technique 
requires a laser or infrared scanner to scan the human eyes, this may raise health and safety issues. 
Furthermore, due to the high cost of implementation, the technique is mainly deployed for 
maximum security requirement areas, such as governments, banks and the military (Biometric 
Newsportal, 2011).   
 
Palm print recognition relies on the patterns formed by the principal lines, wrinkles and ridges on 
the palm inner surface to identify individuals (Shu and Zhang, 1998). It works similarly to 
fingerprint recognition. Users are required to physically put their hands on a scanner in order to 
allow the palm print to be generated (as shown in Figure 3.12). Then the image is analysed mainly 
by one of the following methods: Line-based approaches, Subspace-based approaches and 
Statistical approaches (Kong et al, 2009). The advantages for palm print recognition are that rich 
discriminatory features can be extracted from the large palm area. Also the approach is accurate 
 56 
 
in performance and ease-of-use for users (Sun et al, 2005). Nonetheless, it is an intrusive approach 
as physical contact with the scanner is required from users. Currently, most of the palm print 
recognition work is still research based. Zhang et al (2003) and Fong and Fong (2008) suggested 
the technique can be used to identify people for online applications (e.g. e-banking) and consumer 
products (e.g. computers).    
 
                                                     Source: PolyU, 2009 
Figure 3.11: An example of palm scanner  
Apart from the aforementioned physiological biometrics techniques, other physiological 
characteristics such as body odour, fingernail bed and hand veins, have also been proposed and 
investigated as alternative discriminative methods to distinguish individuals in the future 
(Bhattacharyya et al, 2009).   
3.3.2 Behavioural biometrics 
Behavioural biometrics identifies a person based upon their unique behaviour, such as the way 
they walk. Human behaviour can change over time due to various reasons; aging, fitness, social 
networking environments and weather conditions are all examples. As a result, the discriminatory 
characteristics also tend to change, affecting the performance of any behavioural biometric 
system based upon these indicators. Nonetheless, the impact can be minimised if the template is 
regularly examined and updated. Compared with physiological biometric techniques, behavioural 
based methods are less unique but more flexible and user-friendly. In this section, a number of 
behavioural biometric approaches will be discussed in detail.  
Behaviour profiling identifies people based upon the way they interact with their computing 
devices and how they use their computing services/applications. For instance, a user’s identity can 
be verified through the way in which they utilise their mobile devices: which applications are 
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utilised and where and when the device is used (shown in Figure 3.13). In addition, other factors 
provide distinctive attributes contributing to the identification process, such as the  networking 
and processing activities of the device. In a behaviour profiling system, a current user’s 
behavioural activities are compared with an existing template (which is obtained from historical 
behavioural usage) by using various classification methods (e.g. a Neural Network). The user 
identity is determined based upon the comparison output. Behaviour profiling systems can 
provide continuous and transparent identification while users interact with various computing 
services or applications. However, compared with other behavioural biometrics, the template of a 
behaviour profiling system contains larger variations and requires a longer time to form. 
 
                                                                Source: Intomobile, 2010 
Figure 3.12: BlackBerry and iPhone average Application Usage comparison 
Gait recognition employs a sequence of human limb movement to identify an individual. Gait 
motion can be obtained using a camera or video recorder (images can be extracted from the video) 
in the form of a sequence of pictures (shown in Figure 3.14). Alternatively, the gait motion can be 
collected by utilising an accelerometer. Then, this gait information is analysed using one of 
following approaches: model based and motion based (Xu et al, 2006). In the model based 
approach, gait sequences are represented using model parameters, while in the motion based 
approach, body movement is considered as one entity without employing any models.  
 58 
 
 
                                                                       Source: Queen’s University, 2011 
Figure 3.13: Gait cycle  
In general, human gait contains a level of unique characteristics which can be used to discriminate 
individuals. As the gait images are obtained from a distance without any user physical contact, a 
gait recognition based system is a non-intrusive approach. However, a person’s gait could change 
over a long period of time due to their age, body weight or fitness. In addition, gait can be 
influenced by other factors, such as the weather, footwear, ground conditions and personal 
emotions. As a result, the performance of a gait recognition based system can vary. Gait 
recognition applications could potentially be used for video based intelligent surveillance systems 
to verify people’s identity in the future (Lu and Zhang, 2007).  
Handwriting recognition: Handwriting has been used as a means of identification for hundreds of 
years despite the identification process being manual. The handwriting recognition process was 
fully automated in the late 1980s (Plamondon and Lorette, 1989). For a handwriting recognition 
system, the identification process can be carried out in two distinct modes: dynamic (on line) or 
static (off line) (Das, 2007). A dynamic system approach examines how handwritten words are 
produced such as the stroke order, writing speed and pressure. Conversely a static system 
compares obtained handwriting images with existing templates. Forging static handwriting images 
can be easily done, however to dynamically replicate someone’s handwriting is extremely difficult. 
The majority of users find this technique nonintrusive as they sign documents all the time. 
Nonetheless, because people may change their handwriting over time, this method can only used 
for verification purposes. Currently, a number of commercial handwriting based applications are 
available, such as customers signing on Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) when goods are received 
and users authenticating themselves on a handwriting recognition enabled mobile device via a 
stylus (as shown in Figure 3.15).       
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Source: Canvas Solutions, 2011 
Figure 3.14: An example of a handwritten signature on a computing device  
Keystroke analysis: keystrokes describe the action when a person interacts with a computer 
keyboard. Robinson et al (1998) demonstrated that keystroke activities show a level of uniqueness 
between different users. Two main features can be extracted from keystroke activities: inter-
keystroke latency (the elapsed time between releasing the first key and pressing the second) and 
hold-time (the total amount of time that each key is pressed down) as demonstrated in Figure 3.16. 
The process of identifying people by their keystroke features is known as keystroke analysis (or 
keystroke dynamics). The identification can be performed in two modes: static (text dependent) 
and dynamic (text independent). In the static approach, a user’s typing pattern is examined when 
certain keys are pressed (e.g. when entering a password). A profile is obtained when they 
repeatedly enter the same characters several times until a satisfactory system performance is 
reached. In the dynamic approach, a user is verified based upon their overall typing pattern (e.g. 
the typing rhythm speed). A different method is used to acquire the profile for the dynamic 
approach: the user enters a number of typing samples with different text allowing a profile 
template to be formed.  
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                                                                     Source: BioPassword, 2007 
Figure 3.15: An example of keystroke analysis 
The advantage of keystroke analysis (static mode) is that it can provide an additional layer of 
protection to existing password based access control mechanisms. For instance, BioPassword, an 
existing commercial product, requires users to type their user names and passwords in a precise 
way to be logged into a system (Times Newspapers, 2007). As users are familiar with the password 
entering process, there is no additional requirement for them. The dynamic keystroke analysis 
approach can provide transparent and continuous verification of users while they work on such 
tasks as writing a report or composing an email message. Moreover, no additional hardware is 
required as the technique is embedded within the keyboard system. The major downside of 
keystroke analysis is that it is like other types of behaviour based approaches; it can only be used 
for verification purposes but is not unique enough to be considered as an identification solution.  
Voice verification is also known as speaker recognition. It is based upon the way people speak to 
identify individuals. Although the voice is a physiological trait that utilises a combination of several 
body vocal tracts (i.e. the mouth, nose and throat) to function, voice verification is mainly based 
upon the study of how individuals speak (i.e. voice speed and speaking accent). As a result, voice 
verification is commonly classified as a behavioural biometric (Woodward et al, 2003). Unlike voice 
recognition systems, voice verification systems focus on who is speaking rather than what a 
person says. In voice verification systems, the analogue human voice is converted into a digital 
format and various voice features (e.g. pitch, cadence and tone) that can then be extracted and 
formed into a voiceprint. Similar to keystroke dynamics, voice verification can also operate in two 
modes: static (word dependent) and dynamic (word independent). Static voice verification 
systems require a user to speak a predefined phrase which is also known as the “pass phrase”. As 
a result, it can be mainly used as a point-of-entry technique. Dynamic voice verification systems do 
not require any pass phrases to identify a user. Instead, systems continuously monitor their 
speech behavioural characteristics (e.g. rhythm). Hence, it can be deployed as a transparent 
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verification method: verifying a speaker’s identity during a telephone conversation. The advantage 
of voice verification is that it can be used for both verification and identification purposes 
(Campbell, 1997). Also, in most cases, no additional hardware is required for implementing voice 
verification technology as most mobile devices are equipped with microphones. Nevertheless, any 
changes in the human voice may impact upon the performance of a system, such as surrounding 
temperature, mood, medication and physical change of the vocal tracts. 
The above two sections discussed the majority of known biometric techniques to date. In general, 
the physiological biometric techniques provide more discriminative information but these 
methods are intrusive as they require some level of physical contact with users. In contrast, as 
behavioural biometrics characteristics tend to change over time, behavioural based approaches 
perform better in verification mode than they do in identification mode. Further, behavioural 
based techniques are user friendly and less intrusive and they could continuously and 
transparently verify people in the background.  
 
Based upon the biometric system requirements mentioned in section 3.2.3, Jain et al (2004) 
conducted a brief comparison of all the aforementioned biometric approaches as presented in 
Table 3.1 (H, M and L represent High, Medium and Low respectively). Table 3.1 shows that none of 
the biometric approaches outperforms any of the other approaches based upon all seven 
requirements. For instance, retina scanning is highly unique and extremely difficult to forge but 
people find it hard to accept this technology due to its level of intrusiveness. In comparison, the 
behaviour profiling based approach tends to have very high acceptability because of its 
transparent nature, however its permanence is much poorer as a user’s behaviour is likely to 
change over time.  
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Ear recognition M M H M M H M 
Facial recognition H L M H L H H 
Facial thermography H H L H M H L 
Fingerprint recognition M H H M H M M 
Hand geometry M L L H L H M 
Iris recognition H H H M H L L 
Retina scanning H H M L H L L 
Palm print recognition M H H M H M M 
Gait recognition M L L H L H M 
Keystroke analysis L L L M L M M 
Handwriting recognition L L L H L H H 
Voice verification M L L M L H H 
Behaviour profiling 
3
 M L L H L H H 
                                                                     Source: Jain et al, 2004 
Table 3.1: A brief comparison on biometrics approaches  
Figure 3.18 illustrates the biometric market share by revenue for various technologies in 2009. It 
clearly demonstrates that the physiological based technologies dominated the biometric 
marketplace while the behavioural based technologies had less than 5% of the total market share. 
With a total of 66.7% market share (38.3% for Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) 
and 28.4% for other fingerprint identification system), fingerprint based systems were found to be 
the most popular biometric technology in 2009. Face recognition and iris recognition technologies 
were also popular with 11.4% and 5.1% market share respectively.    
                                                          
3
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                                                                                           Source: International Biometric Group, 2009 
Figure 3.16: Biometric Revenues by Technology 
Figure 3.19 demonstrates the predicted revenues for the biometric industry from 2009 to 2017. 
With a forecasted Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 19.69%, the global biometric industry 
is anticipated to experience strong growth through 2017 and beyond. Also, according to 
Securitynewsdesk (2011), the forecast for revenue within the biometric market in 2015 is $14 
billion. Although the figures are slightly different from each other, the fact is that the biometric 
market is predicted to grow strongly year on year and that biometric techniques will play a 
significant role in the future. 
 
                                                                    Source: Acuity Market Intelligence, 2009 
Figure 3.17: Biometric Industry Revenues 
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3.4 Biometric approaches applicable for use on a mobile device  
As demonstrated in the last section, research into biometric approaches is rapidly maturing and 
commercial biometric development for access control (both behavioural and physical) grows 
significantly year on year. With increasing computational power and hardware availability, the 
chance to adopt biometric based access control approaches on mobile devices is becoming more 
realistic. As highlighted in Figure 3.20, some mobile devices already possess a number of inbuilt 
features capable of sensing a variety of user biometric traits, enabling several approaches to be 
easily deployed upon them.    
 
Figure 3.18: Biometric approaches on a mobile device  
Behaviour profiling as described in Chapter 2, the modern mobile device provides a variety of 
network and host based services. It is arguable that people utilise these mobile services differently. 
For example, when a user accesses their mobile calendar service to find out what their daily 
schedules are, the features related to this behaviour are the time of access (7:15 AM), the 
duration of access (1 minute) and the day of access (Monday). However, when an attacker 
accesses the same service, they are likely to choose a time when the owner does not normally use 
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the device (e.g. 3 AM) and the duration of access might be much longer (e.g. 5 minutes) as they 
want to explore as much information as possible. As the attacker’s activity deviates from the 
user’s normal behaviour profile, a security monitoring system could detect the incident. To the 
author’s best knowledge, there has not been any research conducted into behaviour profiling for 
mobile devices.   
Face recognition most modern mobile devices are equipped with an inbuilt camera which is 
designed for taking pictures, shooting videos and making video conference calls. This creates the 
opportunity to use facial recognition/ear recognition on the mobile device. In addition, by utilising 
an expensive infra-red camera, iris recognition and retina scanning could also be permitted. 
Weinstein et al (2002), Al-Baker (2005) and Clarke et al (2008) proposed a thin-client based 
topology for face recognition on mobile devices. A user’s facial image was captured using an 
inbuilt camera and then sent to a network server for further processing (i.e. comparison with the 
template and reviewing the user’s identity). Depending upon individual approaches and their 
datasets, their system accuracies fell in the range of 79%-95.6%, highlighting the potential of 
developing facial recognition for mobile devices.  
Fingerprint recognition: is the first biometric approach that has been deployed on mobile devices 
as an authentication method. In 1998, Siemens and Triodata developed a fingerprint recognition 
prototype by placing a sensor at the back of a mobile phone (Bromba, 2011). By utilising the 
prototype, a user can gain instant access to the phone by swiping their finger against the sensor 
instead of entering the password. Since then, many fingerprint recognition based authentication 
systems have been developed and implemented on various mobile devices by different 
manufacturers (Mainguet, 2011).   
Gait recognition: When a user carries their mobile device in their trouser pocket, their gait 
information can be collected as they walk. Derawi et al (2010) employed a Google G1 mobile 
phone with an inbuilt accelerometer to gather a carrier’s gait activities. Their experimental result 
was 20.1% EER when testing 51 volunteers’ gait activities. This indicates that gait recognition 
shows some level of discrimination for mobile device users. However, a substantial improvement 
is required in this technique before it can be considered for wider deployment.  
Handwriting recognition: a significant proportion of mobile devices have been equipped with a 
touch screen, enabling the handwriting verification technique to be deployed. A user’s identity can 
be verified when they perform their signature (static) or while they write a message by using a 
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stylus (dynamic). Clark and Mekala (2007) proposed a dynamic approach to verify a user when 
certain words were written. With a 1% EER, their system performance was better compared with 
other behavioural techniques. Despite their approach not being fully dynamic as the words were 
pre-chosen, their work demonstrated that it is possible to identify users based upon the way they 
write on a mobile device.  
Keystroke analysis: While people are typing a text/email message or entering a password, their 
keystroke activities can be used for keystroke analysis (both static and dynamic). Several research 
projects were proposed to explore the possibility of using keystroke analysis on mobile devices, 
such as Clarke and Furnell (2006) (both static and dynamic), Buchoux and Clarke (2008) (static) and 
Campisi et al (2009) (static). With an average 13% EER, keystroke analysis based authentication 
systems can be deployed in practice to provide an extra layer of security for mobile devices. 
Voice verification: Traditionally, mobile devices were primarily used for making telephone calls, 
during which a user’s voice sample can be captured for the purpose of voice verification. Woo et al 
(2006) examined the possibility of using static voice verification for the mobile device by using an 
ASR-dependent speaker verification approach. Despite the comparison process being carried out 
by a standard computer, their work achieved a 7.8% EER proving that a mobile device user’s 
identity can be verified by their voice, even in a noisy environment (e.g. in a busy office).  
 
By utilising various biometric techniques, the TAS authenticates mobile device users in a 
continuous and transparent manner as shown in Figure 3.21 (Clarke, 2011). The TAS chooses 
individual biometric techniques to verify a mobile user based upon the configuration of their 
mobile device. For instance, if a mobile device is not equipped with an inbuilt camera, the TAS will 
only choose keystroke analysis and voice verification to verify the user. One example for TAS is the 
Non-Intrusive and Continuous Authentication (NICA) (Karatzouni et al, 2007). By utilising the 
combination of various biometric techniques, NICA can achieve an EER less than 0.01%.  
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 Source: Clarke, 2011 
Figure 3.19: A generic TAS framework  
Many of the applicable biometric approaches have achieved a good level of performance and 
some of them have already been utilised by the mobile security industry. In general, based upon 
the way they provide security, they can be put into two categories: point-of-entry and transparent 
based systems (as shown in Table 3.2). For the point-of-entry based techniques, they only verify 
the users’ identity at the beginning of a session. Once the user obtains the initial trust from these 
techniques, their legitimacy will never be challenged again. In comparison, transparent based 
approaches work in a similar manner to IDSs; they constantly check the users’ identity throughout 
usage, even when a user has successfully passed point-of-entry authentication. As Chapter 2 
identified, a new security system needs to provide continuous protection throughout a usage 
session. As a result, the point-of-entry based biometric techniques will not be employed by core 
functions of the new security mechanism; but they might be used by the new security mechanism 
when a strong authentication technique is required. For transparent techniques there are 
behaviour profiling, face recognition, gait recognition, handwriting verification, keystroke analysis 
and voice verification; all of which can be implemented on mobile devices to provide continuous 
and transparent protection. Face recognition can easily verify users when they make a video call or 
partake in a video conference. However, on other occasions, the verification process cannot be 
easily performed because of the difficulty of capturing high quality facial images. Gait recognition 
authenticates users when they walk from one location to another but it is impossible to perform 
when they are stationary, such as sitting in front of an office desk or lying in bed. Keystroke 
 68 
 
analysis and handwriting recognition examine users when a message is composed or a document 
is modified. However, little protection can be provided if a user views a webpage or reads a 
document. For voice verification, a user can only be authenticated during a conversation. 
Therefore, with all these activity based techniques a user’s continuous protection will become 
exhausted when a particular activity does not occur. 
Biometric approaches Point-of-entry Transparent 
Behaviour profiling   
Face recognition   
Finger recognition   
Gait recognition   
Keystroke analysis   
Handwriting recognition    
Voice verification   
Table 3.2: Biometric approaches on mobile devices 
The behaviour profiling technique verifies users based upon the services/applications they use. As 
a result, this approach provides truly continuous protection to users unless they do not interact 
with the mobile device at all. Although little research has been conducted into the behaviour 
profiling technique within the mobile host environment, significant amounts of research suggest 
that mobile device users can be discriminated between each other via their calling behaviour and 
migration behaviour through service providers’ networks.  
3.5 Literature review on behaviour profiling 
The research into mobile behaviour profiling started around 1995, focusing mainly upon the area 
of IDS to detect telephony service fraud. Three mobile user activities have been studied so far: 
calling activity, migration mobility activity and migration itinerary activity (both the mobility 
activity and itinerary activity are user’s location activities and are defined in the following 
subsections). To date, all behaviour based mobile IDS systems are network based, as users’ 
behaviours are obtained and monitored by network services providers.  
3.5.1 Telephony service based mobile IDS  
The telephony based mobile IDS monitors a user’s calling attributes (e.g. international Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI), start date of call, start time of call, duration of call, dialled telephone 
number and National or International call) to detect service fraud, SIM card cloning and the loss or 
theft of devices (Moreau et al, 1997). By collecting these features over a period of time, a 
historical calling usage profile can be acquired. If the deviation between a current calling session 
and the historical profile exceeds a predefined threshold, an intrusion is identified. There are a 
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number of telephony based mobile IDS systems and they will be introduced in the following 
section.  
The earliest work on telephony service based detection systems was the European Advanced 
Security for Personal Communication Technologies (ASPECT) project on mobile security (Gosset, 
1998). The ASPECT project covered different security aspects within mobile communications such 
as authentication, encryption and service fraud detection. A number of techniques were used to 
study a user’s calling behaviour, such as supervised neural network and unsupervised neural 
network (Lerouge et al, 1999). The evaluation process was carried out by several experimental 
studies on a dataset which was collected from the Vodafone network. The dataset contains a total 
of 317 fraudulent and 20,212 legitimate users. Their experimental results were a detection rate of 
50% and a FAR of 0.02%.. 
Samfat and Molva (1997) proposed an Intrusion Detection Architecture for Mobile Networks 
(IDAMN) which provided multilevel protections for mobile GSM networks. The multilevel 
protection is applied to each user across three levels: velocity and clone verification, component 
wise verification and intrusion detection. The architecture monitors the user’s behaviour in terms 
of both telephony and migration activities. A mobile user’s telephony activity is divided into two 
statistical vectors, call vector and session vector. The call vector is a local parameter that measures 
all outgoing calls and the session vector is a global parameter that measures the following 
activities; total number of calls, total duration of calls, network connection duration and total 
number of handovers within a period of time. By using this information a profile and a threshold 
can be obtained. If a current vector value is bigger than the threshold an alert is raised to a 
network administrator. The IDAMN was evaluated by using a simulation method. Four types of 
users were simulated: domestic, business, corporate and roamer. In general, call vectors had a 
lower false alarm rate of 1% compared with a 2% false alarm rate for session vectors. However 
session vectors had a better detection rate of 90% compared with a 70% detection rate for call 
vectors. The session based approach had a better detection rate because over a long period of 
time, an intruder’s activity deviates more than a legitimate user’s behaviour. Among these four 
categories, business users had the best performance with an average detection rate of 89% and a 
false alarm rate of 1.5%.  
Boukerche and Notare (2002) described a service fraud detection model on the mobile phone 
system using a Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural network model. By using user calling features, 
the model can detect possible call service fraud. In addition, the model employed a smart 
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procedure: once a possible fraud is identified, an alert will be sent to both the individual user and 
network administrators immediately, rather than at the end of a billing month. The experiment 
dataset was collected by an unnamed telecommunication service provider and contains 4,255,973 
telephone calls. A variety of experiment configurations have been tested with combinations of call 
features and RBF neural network setups. Their lowest system error rate was 4.2% and was 
achieved using 110 neurons in the hidden layer of the RBF neural network. 
3.5.2 Migration based mobile IDS 
 
A user’s migration activity is the way that they travel from one location to another. There are two 
types of migration activities: mobility and itinerary. By calculating the possibility of a mobile user 
travelling from one mobile cell to another, migration mobility based mobile IDS systems could 
detect telephony service attacks. If the result exceeds a predefined threshold, a possible intrusion 
is detected. Whilst similar to migration mobility based mobile IDS, migration itinerary based 
mobile IDS systems also monitor cells to detect telephony service attacks. Instead of monitoring 
one cell at a time, migration itinerary based mobile IDS systems monitor all cells a user covers 
during their journey from one location to another. It is believed that people always have the 
destination in their mind when they travel and so certain routes will be chosen as regular or 
favourite routes. As a result, the probability of mobile users travelling over these routes is much 
higher than them travelling through other routes. To extend this, when an attacker carries other 
people’s mobile devices, the route they take is likely to be different to the owners’ route.  
3.5.2.1 Migration mobility based mobile IDS 
The IDAMN (Samfat and Molva, 1997) also monitors the user’s migration pattern to detect 
intrusions for the telephony service. A user’s migration mobility activity can be obtained when 
mobile users traverse from one cell to another. Using this information, their mobility profile can be 
generated and is maintained when the location updating procedure of the mobile device occurs. 
By using a mathematical formula, a predefined threshold is derived using historical mobility 
information. The architecture is evaluated via a simulation method for four categories of users: 
domestic, business, corporate and roamer. The results show that domestic users achieve the best 
system performance with a false alarm rate of 2% and a detection rate of 90%. In comparison, due 
to frequent travel plans, the roamers have the worst system performance with a false alarm rate 
of 7% and a detection rate of 65%.   
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Buschkes et al (1998) propose an anomaly detection method for GSM networks by using the Bayes 
decision rule. The Bayes decision rule is a mathematical model which calculates the probability of 
a current activity occurring based on prior activity. Another method is outlined in their work to aid 
comparison with the Bayes decision rule; the average algorithm. The average algorithm calculates 
the Mean Residence Times that a mobile carrier stays in one cell. Using the Mean Residence Times 
and when the mobile carrier enters the cell, a user’s mobility profile can be built. Two scenarios 
are analysed: town and motorway. The results show that: in the town scenario, the prediction rate 
for the Bayes rule model was more than 80% after 5 days and it reaches 83% after 15 days 
monitoring; for the motorway scenario, the prediction rate of the proposed model reached 94% 
after 5 days and was more than 95% after 15 days.  
Sun et al (2004) propose a mobility-based anomaly detection model for cellular mobile networks 
by utilising the combinations of the following techniques: high order Markov model, Ziv-Lempel 
data compression algorithm and Exponentially Weighted Moving Model (EWMA). The high order 
Markov model was used to calculate a mobile user’s mobility probability from one cell to another. 
In order to store this mobility information for each individual mobile user, the Ziv-Lempel data 
compression algorithm was employed to create a mobility profile. Also, the EWMA technique was 
utilised to efficiently update the mobility profile. Therefore, a more accurate user profile can be 
regularly updated. The system constantly compares a mobile user’s current mobility action with 
their mobility profile to detect possible intrusions. Once the comparison value exceeds the 
threshold, an alert is then generated to notify a network operator. The evaluation process of this 
model was created using a simulation method in the following environment: a cellular network 
containing 40 cells, each having six neighbours on average and the average distance between two 
cell towers is 1 mile. The simulation results show: the false alarm rates of the system were around 
25% and 5% when a user travels at a speed of 20 miles/hour and 60 miles/hour respectively. Also, 
when a user’s speed is 20 miles/hour, the system detection rate is 80% and this reaches almost 95% 
when a user travels at 60 miles/hour. At a higher speed, the mobile carrier covers more cells than 
at a lower speed and so the deviation between an attacker and the legitimate user will get 
accordingly larger.  
Two major questions are raised regarding their system performance: what are the detection and 
false alarm rates the system experiences when the mobile carrier’s speed is less than 20 
miles/hour? What kinds of people are suitable for the system to monitor? For the first question, 
their results indicate that both the detection rate and false alarm rate were poor if the speed was 
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less than 20 miles/hour. For the second question, the majority of pedestrians, if not all of them, 
experience an average speed of less than 2 miles/hour which is much less than 20 miles/hour; 
furthermore, when people drive in the city, the speed is limited to 30 miles/hour for most areas, 
with traffic lights and safety islands, the average driving speed would be around 20 miles/hour, 
which is the worst case in the simulation result. 
By aiming to improve the performance of the system, several modifications have been made to 
the existing model, such as adding Sharon’s entropy theory to adjust the system threshold (Sun et 
al, 2006). Therefore, the new system not only has a constantly updated profile but also a 
frequently modified threshold. Furthermore, two profiles were created for each mobile user: 
weekdays and weekends. The evaluation of the system is executed using a simulation method. The 
experiment results show that the average false positive rate for the adaptive mechanism is 
reduced by around 7% compared with the non-adaptive method. In general, the adaptive 
mechanism had a slightly better average detection rate than the non adaptive mechanism did. 
However, when a mobile carrier’s speed was at 20 miles/hour, the adaptive mechanism had a 
much higher detection rate with around 7% improvement over the non-adaptive mechanism. The 
advantages of the modified system are: a better detection rate and a lower false alarm rate due to 
adapted profile and threshold settings. On the other hand, the improved Intrusion Detection 
system still has a similar problem as the previous version: both the detection rate and false 
positive rate are uncertain when a mobile user traverses at a speed less than 20 miles/hour.  
3.5.2.2 Migration itinerary based mobile IDS  
Hall et al (2005) propose a method using public transportation users’ mobility profiles to detect 
intrusions by employing an instance based learning pattern classification technique. By collecting a 
user’s location information from location broadcast of their mobile device, a high level mapping of 
their location profile can be generated. The comparison process is carried out between a user’s 
current mobile sequence with their profile; if the deviation is larger than the threshold an alert will 
be raised. The proposed method was evaluated using a simulation method with 50 mobile users 
who took the public transport service in Los Angeles. All 50 mobile users’ location information was 
inserted into a MySQL database and the simulation process was conducted using the Matlab 
software package. However, the simulation result was not particularly promising. In addition, 
according to previous studies, around 50% of all mobile users take the public transport system, i.e. 
buses or trains (Markoulidakis et al, 1995; Wu et al, 2001) and so the other 50% of mobile device 
users who do not use the public transport system cannot be protected by this proposed method.  
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3.5.3 Comparison of behaviour based mobile IDS 
Table 3.3 illustrates the comparison for all the aforementioned behaviour based mobile IDS 
systems. By studying a user’s calling or location activities behaviour based IDS systems can achieve 
a high detection rate and offer the ability to detect unforeseen attacks. In addition, as the 
classification and identification procedures are processed by network service providers, it does not 
require any additional computational power from the mobile device. This has traditionally been 
critical for mobile devices as they have limited processing power and space compared with 
traditional desktop computers. Nonetheless, if these behaviour-based systems work together to 
monitor the mobile user’s action (e.g. calling a friend) while knowing where the action is occurring 
(e.g. at home), the overall system performance could arguably be increased.  
Name Behaviour  
Pattern classification 
model 
Detection 
rate 
FAR 
Samfat and Molva, 1997 
Itinerary Mathematical formula   82.5% 4% 
Calls Mathematical formula 80% 3% 
Boukerche and Notare, 2002 Calls RBF neural network model 97.5% 4.2% 
ASPECT project Calls neural networks 50% 0.02% 
Buschkes et al 1998 Mobility Bayes decision rule 87.5% NA4 
Sun et al 2004 Mobility High order Markov model 87.5% 15% 
Sun et al 2006 Mobility High order Markov model 89% 13% 
Hall et al, 2005 Itinerary Instance based learning 50% 50% 
Table 3.3: A review of mobile behaviour profiling 
3.6 Conclusion  
Among the three authentication methods, biometric technique outperforms the other two 
methods by identifying a person based upon their unique characteristics. The physiological based 
biometric approaches provide stronger protection: highly unique for individual users and 
extremely difficult to forge. The behavioural based biometric mechanisms tend to offer more 
transparent and continuous security throughout a user’s normal interaction with a device. To date, 
many biometric techniques, such as fingerprint recognition and face recognition have been 
deployed for the purposes of identification and access control. 
With more sophisticated mobile devices available, a number of biometric techniques can now be 
deployed on them to provide continuous and transparent protection, such as behavioural profiling, 
keystroke analysis and voice verification. Although various investigations have been carried out 
into these biometric techniques, the majority of them require certain user activities to occur to 
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ensure continuous protection, for instance a user has to press the keyboard to enable keystroke 
analysis and a voice call has to be made to allow voice verification to be performed. In comparison, 
the use of behaviour profiling on mobile devices presents an interesting proposal given that every 
mobile user has to utilise an application/service to perform tasks on their device. As a result, a 
user’s identity could be continuously verified while they are interacting with their mobile devices.  
Although little literature was available on behaviour profiling on mobile devices, a significant 
amount of research work on mobile user’s calling and migration behaviour has proved that by 
using a pattern classification method mobile users can be discriminated by the way they utilise 
telephony services or the way they carry devices around. However, in practice it can be seen that 
the mobile network operators can only monitor calling and migration behaviour rather than 
examining every single mobile service. Therefore, none of the current research in mobile 
behaviour security approaches provides a comprehensive and continuous protection against 
device misuse. Hence, a mobile behaviour profiling approach which can offer detection across a 
wider range of services and connections on the mobile device is needed. The next chapter 
presents the results of a series of experiments that were conducted to examine the feasibility of 
utilising behaviour profiling to verify users on mobile devices.   
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4 Behavioural Profiling on Mobile Devices 
4.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognised that users of mobile devices utilise mobile services to perform a variety of 
tasks when interacting with individual applications. Besides factory preinstalled mobile 
applications, there are more than 1 million mobile applications available for users to choose from, 
with more applications being added on a daily basis (Apple Inc, 2011; Androlib, 2011). Behaviour 
profiling has the potential to continuously verify a user in an easy and effective manner: a user is 
verified based upon which applications they utilise. If the verification of a user was possible while 
they interact with mobile applications, the verification process could be performed non-intrusively 
and continuously for the duration of usage.   
In order to thoroughly study the possibility of employing behaviour profiling techniques on mobile 
devices, two types of application behaviour will be examined: 
 Intra-standard applications: provide a basic level of information on how a mobile device user 
utilises the device, such as the name of the application, the time it was accessed and the 
location at which it was utilised.  
 Intra-extended applications: offer richer and more discriminatory information than intra-
standard applications do. Apart from providing the basic information, they also offer 
additional detail on what a user does with them. For example, a telephone call could contain 
the telephone number being called and the duration of the call.  
The literature in Chapter 3 has shown that the existing behavioural based mobile IDS systems can 
only monitor network-based services (e.g. telephony) through telecommunication service 
provider’s networks. As current mobile devices have the ability to access multiple networks 
simultaneously, a host based approach must be taken into consideration when investigating a new 
security mechanism. Little research has been published regarding how behaviour profiling 
techniques perform within the mobile host environment despite that the mobile application usage 
represents an overview of how the user interacts with the device (Miettinen et al, 2006). Hence, it 
is critical to identify the effectiveness of utilising the behaviour profiling technique to verify a 
user’s identity via their application usage within the mobile host environment. Although it is 
proved that the calling behaviour can be utilised to identify mobile users over telecommunication 
service provider’s networks, the calling service’s effectiveness towards verifying a user’s identity 
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within the mobile host environment is uncertain as its features have changed slightly, such as the 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) cannot be utilised anymore. Therefore, a series of 
experiments examine the aforementioned two types of applications by utilising the behaviour 
profiling technique within the mobile host environment: intra-standard and intra-extended 
applications.  
4.2 Methodology  
4.2.1 Dataset 
The experiment employed a publicly available dataset provided by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) Reality Mining project rather than create its own (Eagle et al, 2009). This is due 
to the MIT Reality Mining dataset containing a rich amount of information over a long period of 
time: 106 participants enrolled for the data collection process from September 2004 to June 2005; 
among these participants, 94 participants’ mobile usage activities were successfully logged and the 
other 12 participants were not. More importantly the MIT Reality Mining databases contain a 
mixture of mobile user’s activities, including the use of intra-standard and intra-extended 
applications; this meets the need for the behaviour profiling study within the mobile host 
environment. 
By using preinstalled logging software, the MIT Reality Mining dataset was formed by collecting 
application usage activities from participants’ Nokia 6600 mobile phones. An overview of the MIT 
Reality Mining dataset is presented in Table 4.1. Also, all collected information which may disclose 
the participants’ privacy was anonymised, including the telephone numbers being dialled and 
texted and the cell tower IDs visited. As shown in Table 4.1, the MIT Reality Mining dataset 
contains a large amount of information covering several activities: the application usage (intra-
standard and intra-extended applications), network usage (Bluetooth activities) and machine 
usage (when a device was charged). As the location information was collected separately from the 
applications’ usage, the location information was subsequently joined with each application usage 
record by their date and time stamps. 
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Activity Number of logs Information 
Location information 3,308,710 Date, time and cell ID 
Application 662,393 Application name, date and time of usage 
Bluetooth scanning 1,994,186 
Date, time of each scan along and MAC address of 
individual devices 
Charge 11,506 Date and time when the mobile was on charge 
Device usage 574,788 Date and time the mobile was in use 
On  13,012 Date and time when the phone was turned on 
SMS 5,607 Date, time and number of texting 
Voice 54,440 Date, time, number of calling and duration 
Table 4.1: The MIT Reality dataset 
For methodological reasons, the experiment utilised a subset of participants whose activities (both 
intra-standard and intra-extended applications) occurred during the period of 24/10/2004-
20/11/2004 to maximise the number of participants. If two users had different start and end dates, 
the date feature alone would provide the discriminatory information required and skew the 
results. These activities include intra-standard applications and two intra-extended applications 
(telephony and text messaging service). Despite several other intra-standard applications also 
being used by the participants, only a basic level of information was collected by the logging 
software for them. For instance, all information was gathered for web surfing usage except the 
web address being visited. As a result, these were treated as intra-standard applications rather 
than intra-extended applications for this experiment. Also, as the dataset was compiled in 2004, 
the available choice of mobile applications was limited for mobile users creating a high degree of 
similarity for intra-standard application usage. 
During the 28 days, a total of 105 unique intra-standard applications were used by the selected 
users. Among these applications, four were removed for this study; the reasons for removal are 
stated as below:  
 Menu: is the gateway to access the majority of applications. In isolation it does not 
provide much valuable information.  
 Context_log: was preinstalled on each participant’s phone for the automatic collection of 
usage information.  
 Screensaver: does not provide any information and could be triggered accidently without 
a mobile user noticing.    
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 Phone: although it was logged as an ‘application’, it is not in fact an application merely a 
button on the mobile phone keypad.  
Table 4.2 demonstrates the final dataset for intra-standard applications. Among these 76 
participants, 101 applications were utilised for a total of 30,428 times. For instance, user 1 used 
the camera application in cell_ID 135 at 09:39 am on 28/10/2004.  
Number of participants 76 
Number of unique applications 101 
Number of logs 30,428 
Information contained Application name, date, time and location of usage 
Table 4.2: The final dataset on intra-standard applications 
All of the 76 participants utilised the telephony service during the chosen period. However, five of 
them did not have sufficient data for generating a profile and they were excluded from the 
telephony service study. Therefore, 71 of them were finally employed for the experiment (as 
shown in Table 4.3). Between these users, 2,317 unique anonymised telephone numbers were 
dialled with a total of 13,599 times. For example, user 3 called the anonymised telephone number 
591 in cell 361 at 04:32 pm on 05/11/2004 and the conversation lasted for 16 minutes and 32 
seconds.  
Number of participants 71 
Number of unique dialled 
telephone numbers 
2,317 
Number of logs 13,599 
Information contained 
Anonymised telephone number, date, 
time, duration and location of usage 
Table 4.3: The final dataset on telephony service 
Among the 76 participants, 49 users utilised the text messaging service during the chosen period. 
Nevertheless, once again 27 of them did not have sufficient data for generating a profile and they 
were not selected for the text messaging service study. As a result, only 22 of them were included 
in this study and their text message usage is summarized in Table 4.4. There were 258 unique 
telephone numbers being texted accumulated 1,381 times. For instance, user 20 sent a text 
message to the anonymised telephone number 192 in cell 925 at 11:21 am on 17/11/2004.  
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Number of participants 22 
Number of unique telephone 
numbers 
258 
Number of logs 1,381 
Information contained 
Anonymised telephone number, date, 
time and location of texting 
Table 4.4: The final dataset on text messaging service 
4.2.2 Procedure  
The experiment employed the mathematical software package MATLAB developed by MathWorks 
as the investigation platform. The literature on behaviour profiling in Chapter 3 identified 
classification methods that performed well and they fall into two categories: statistical and neural 
network approaches. Based upon the “no free lunch” theorems, there is no single classification 
method that can solve all given problems (Wolpert and Macready, 1997), three classification 
methods were chosen from these categories to identify an optimal classifier to solve the 
behaviour profiling problem within the mobile host environment: the Radial Basis Function Neural 
Network, the Feed-Forward Multi-layered Perceptron Neural Network and a Rule-based approach.  
To investigate individual classifiers, a number of scripts were created to perform various tasks, 
such as data extraction and classifier selection. Several of these scripts were commonly employed 
for each classification approach and they are:   
 Data Extraction function: extracts users’ behaviour records from the MIT Reality Mining 
dataset into the MATLAB programming environment and return each record entry for 
each individual user respectively. 
 Feature Selection function: based upon individual behaviour, various features (e.g. 
telephone number) are selected from the records.  
 Normalisation function: normalises selected data into the range of 0-1. Sola and Sevilla 
(1997) suggested that input data normalisation is a critical procedure prior to a training 
process as well normalised input data can obtain good results and also accelerate 
significantly calculations.    
 Dataset Split function: splits a selected dataset into two halves; the first half is used for 
building a profile and training a classifier; the other half is used to validate the  
performance of a classifier.  
 Classifier Selection function: chooses a classifier and sets up the parameters of the 
classifier.   
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 Evaluation function: calculates the FAR, FRR and EER to evaluate the performance of a 
selected classifier.  
The calling sequence for each function is illustrated in Figure 4.1: users’ behaviour information 
flows from one function to another via the directional arrows. Figure 4.2 demonstrates three 
classifiers within the Classifier Selection function. Any mathematical solutions can be chosen for 
mathematical formulae classifiers such as a Rule-based classifier. The Multilayered Perceptron 
Network and RBF neural network were chosen for the neural network based classifiers because of 
their well-known abilities in the pattern classification domain.  
 
Figure 4.1: Behaviour profiling system functions flow diagram 
 
Figure 4.2: The three classifiers being employed 
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4.3 The results  
Three sets of experimental studies were formed: two preliminaries and one complete. The first 
preliminary study utilised a descriptive statistical approach to analyse the raw information 
presented by the datasets. It is well-known that the statistical method has the ability to determine 
potential positive applications’ features for forming unique patterns to discriminate individual 
users (Jain et al, 2000). Also, the selection of effective features is a critical process in pattern 
classification as the system performance is closely related to the features and large number of 
features will increase the complexity and the size of the classifier (Fu et al, 1970). The second set 
preliminary study was conducted to fulfil two purposes: to identify the most optimal classifier for 
solving the behaviour profiling issue in the mobile host environment and to determine positive 
behaviour profiling features through experiments. The complete study was proposed to examine 
the feasibility of employing behaviour profiling on mobile devices through application activities 
(intra-standard applications, intra-extended applications and multi-instance (combination of intra-
standard and intra-extended) applications). 
4.3.1 A Descriptive statistics study 
It is well known that the descriptive statistical method is capable of describing the main features 
of a dataset in quantitative manners. In order to examine potential positive features for behaviour 
profiling on intra-standard and intra-extended applications, two descriptive statistical studies were 
conducted. For the intra-standard applications, the following features were available and were 
examined: the name, time and location of an application being accessed. For the intra-extended 
applications, the following features were available and were analysed: the name, time and 
location of an application being utilised, plus the extra information the intra application offers.  
4.3.1.1 Descriptive statistics on intra-standard applications 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates that the participants utilised various applications during the chosen 
period. It is possible to identify users based upon the application name alone if no two users 
activated the same application. For instance, user 4 is identifiable among all users by uniquely 
utilising application 30 during the chosen period. However, as also presented in Figure 4.3, the 
participants did share a number of commonly used applications: the phonebook, call logs and 
camera were used by all 76 users; while the message centre application was used by 75 users (all 
apart from user 56). In addition, they cumulatively represented 72% of the total intra-standard 
applications usage (as shown in Figure 4.4). Therefore, it would be difficult to discriminate users 
solely based upon the applications they utilised over a chosen period. However, if the participants 
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did utilise a variety of applications, they could be easily discriminated from each other using the 
application name feature. 
 
Figure 4.3: Users with their applications 
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Figure 4.4: Overview of intra-standard application usage 
Apart from the application name feature, two other features were also examined: the location 
feature and the time feature. Four applications were chosen for the experiment as the majority of 
the participants utilised them and these applications were the camera, logs, message centre and 
phonebook.  
When a mobile application is utilised, the location details can be gathered via one of the following 
methods: coordinates (i.e. longitude, latitude and altitude) through a GPS service, mobile cell IDs 
through a telecommunication operator’s network, wireless network IDs through a Wi-Fi 
connection, and Bluetooth Media Access Control (MAC) addresses via a Bluetooth connection. The 
level of precision provided by these methods varies: a set of coordinates can be utilised to 
pinpoint a user within 1 square metre while a wireless network ID can cover up to 10,000 square 
metres. The application location information in the dataset is presented in the form of cell IDs. 
Depending upon the location of a cell tower, its coverage varies: larger in rural areas and smaller 
in urban districts. Nonetheless, these will generate a level of similarity in location usage for those 
who regularly work or study on the same site. As the MIT Reality Mining data was collected from a 
mixture of 106 MIT students and staff, similar location usage could occur during the data 
collection process.     
Figure 4.5 depicts all locations being utilised by all users for their camera application usage during 
the 4 week chosen period. Among these users, user 6, user 46 and user 63 did not share any cells 
with any other users. On average, all users only shared one cell between each other. As a result, 
22% 
6% 
28% 
16% 
28% 
Logs 
Camera 
Phonebook 
Message Centre  
Other apps 
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the majority of the users could be discriminated by using the cell ID feature despite them all 
utilising the same application. In the worst scenario, user 22 and user 40 shared the most number 
of cells (as shown in Table 4.5). Although they shared 5 cells, their usage on these locations were 
somewhat different: user 22 spent most of their usage in cell 20, logging 23 times, while user 40 
recorded only 3 times in the same location (i.e. cell 20). Therefore, a level of dissimilarity still exists 
between their usage within these 5 cells. In addition, as the similarity usage represented 41.5% 
and 39.1% of their total usage respectively, the rest of their location usage of the camera 
application could still be separated.  
 
Figure 4.5:  The location comparison for all users’ camera application usage 
 Cell ID 1 6 19 20 79 
Proportion of 
total usage 
Usage 
User 22 1 2 2 23 1 41.5% (65) 
User 40 1 2 2 3 1 39.1% (23) 
Table 4.5: The cell comparison for User 22 and User 40’s camera application usage 
The location for all users’ logs application usage is depicted in Figure 4.6. On average, each user 
only shared 2 cells with another user. For the best case, user 1, user 67 and user 46 only shared 1 
cell with some users. As the majority of users utilised their logs application in different locations, 
they could be discriminated between each other despite them all using the logs application. 
Further investigation was carried out on those who had similar location usage for the logs 
application. For instance, user 43 and user 50 shared 10 cells during the chosen period (as shown 
in Table 4.6). For the same locations they used, no distinct usage difference is shown apart from 
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user 43 utilising cell 12 significantly higher than user 50 did. This certainly would generate some 
obstacles to separating them on those usages. Nonetheless, as the amount of similar usage only 
represented 23.5% of user 50’s total usage, the other 76.5% of its usage could still be identified by 
employing cell IDs alone. In comparison, it would be difficult to identify user 43’s activities with 
user 50’s as the similarity usages represent almost 58% of their total usage.  
 
Figure 4.6: The location comparison for all users’ logs application usage 
 Cell ID 1 103 106 110 112 118 119 121 130 133 
Proportion of 
total usage 
Usage 
User 43 7 2 5 1 13 28 1 2 2 2 57.8% (109) 
User 50 9 1 1 3 2 33 1 1 1 1 23.5% (226) 
Table 4.6: The cell comparison for User 43 and User 50’s logs application usage 
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the comparison on the location for the users’ message centre application 
usage. In general, each user only shared 1 cell with another user during the chosen period. For the 
best scenario, user 71 did not share any cells with any other users. As a result, user 17 is 
identifiable among all users by using the cell ID feature alone. In the worst scenario, user 59 
shared 9 cells with user 73 and details are depicted in Table 4.7. Despite them both utilising 9 
identical locations, their usage on these cell IDs was somewhat different: user 59 spent the 
majority of their usage in cell 1 and cell 76 while user 73 utilised cell 41 as its major usage location. 
In addition, as the similar usage only represent 24.8% and 22.1% of their total usage for user 59 
and user 73 respectively, a large proportion of their location usages could still be separated using 
the cell ID feature.  
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Figure 4.7: The location comparison for all users’ message centre application usage 
 Cell IDs 1 31 40 41 66 75 76 77 110 
Proportion of 
total usage 
Usage 
User 59 11 1 1 1 2 1 8 1 3 24.8% (117) 
User 73 6 9 2 33 7 3 6 4 1 22.1% (321) 
Table 4.7: The cell comparison for User 59 and User 73’s message centre application usage 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates the location comparison for all users’ phonebook application usage 
during the chosen period. Among these users, user 71 did not share any cells with any other users. 
As a result, it could be identified based upon the location feature alone. On average, each user 
only shared 2 cells with another user. For the worst case, user 41 and user 66 shared 10 cells (as 
shown in Table 4.8) for location usage of their phonebook application. Although the usage on 
these 10 cells represent 70.8% and 62.5% of their total usage, they utilised these cells very 
differently: user 41 spent the majority of location usage in cells 1, 77 and 18; while user 66 utilised 
cell 49 most of their time. As a result, the majority of their usage could still be separated despite 
them sharing 10 cells during the chosen period.   
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Figure 4.8: The location comparison for all users’ phonebook application usage  
 Cell IDs 1 2 28 29 35 36 37 49 76 77 
Proportion of 
total usage 
Usage 
User 41 191 1 1 3 1 1 18 7 2 49 70.8% (387) 
User 66 4 8 1 1 3 2 2 31 2 1 62.5% (88) 
Table 4.8: The Cell comparison for User 41 and User 66’s phonebook application usage 
As demonstrated above, in general the location of an application being used provides positive 
information for discriminating mobile users. Although a number of users did share large numbers 
of cells during the chosen period, the data presented in Tables 4.5 – 4.8 have shown that the 
usage on each individual cell amongst different users can still vary significantly. As a result, a level 
of discrimination could still be obtained even for users who had been in similar locations when 
their devices were utilised. This could be potentially used for identifying misuse by friends and 
colleagues. 
The time of using an application can be logged when the application is started. For instance, a user 
makes a phone call (application) at 07:05:19 AM (time stamp). The time of accessing the camera, 
logs, message centre and phonebook from all users are depicted in Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10, Figure 
4.11 and Figure 4.12 respectively. In general, no clear patterns are shown between individual users’ 
access times on these four applications. However, the figures do highlight several usage 
differences between groups of users. For example, user 34 and user 36 used the logs application 
most of the time. On the other hand, little usage is shown by user 5 and user 71 for the same 
application. Another example, the time at which user 40 and user 75 utilised the phonebook 
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covered most of the time spectrum. In comparison, little usage was observed for user 46 and user 
68 for the same application. As a result, it is difficult to separate one heavy (light) usage user with 
another heavy (light) usage user due to the underlying similarity. Nonetheless, their usage 
patterns could be utilised in the following manner: for the heavy usage users, if their devices have 
not been used for a period of time, this could be a sign of intrusion and vice versa.  
 
Figure 4.9: The time of accessing comparison for users’ camera application usage 
 
Figure 4.10: The time of accessing comparison for users’ logs application usage 
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Figure 4.11: The time of accessing comparison for users’ message centre application usage 
 
Figure 4.12: The time of accessing comparison for users’ phonebook application usage 
4.3.1.2 Descriptive statistics on intra-extended applications 
4.3.1.2.1 Telephony 
For the 71 telephony users, a number of their telephony features were extracted from the dataset: 
the location, time and duration of calling, plus the telephone number being dialled.  
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The comparison for all these 71 users’ telephony location usage is depicted in Figure 4.13. Among 
these users, user 59 only shared 1 cell with a few other users despite it is difficult to visualise in 
Figure 4.13 due to the large cell IDs’ range in a relative small graph. On average, each individual 
user shared 1 cell ID with another user. As a result, most of the telephony users could be identified 
from each other based upon the location feature. Nonetheless, the identification process could be 
difficult for some users due to their high level of usage similarities. For instance, among all users, 
user 20 and user 36 had a maximum of 12 cells in common. As demonstrated in Table 4.9, 
although they have been to the same locations, their frequency of appearance in these cells were 
markedly different:  user 20 spent most of their usage in cells 113, 129 and 131, while user 36 
spent majority of their usage in cell 129. As a result, the majority of their similar activities could 
still be separated based upon their historical usage in these locations.  
 
Figure 4.13: Users telephony location usage comparison 
 
Cell 
IDs 
1 113 114 118 129 130 131 132 142 143 145 146 
Proportion 
of total 
usage 
 
Usage 
User 
20 
4 51 14 6 21 2 20 2 1 1 2 6 
41.8% 
(311) 
User 
36 
12 3 6 1 107 1 2 1 2 3 1 9 
46.7% 
(317) 
Table 4.9: Telephony location usage comparison for user 20 and user 36 
Figure 4.14 depicts all 71 users’ telephone number usage during the chosen period. Among these 
users, user 26, user 33 and user 59 did not share any telephone number with any other users. On 
average, each user only shared one telephone number with another user. Hence, based upon the 
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telephone number feature alone, the majority of the mobile device users could be discriminated 
from each other. However, some users did share a number of telephone numbers during the 
chosen period, which might increase the difficulty for the classification process. One of the 
reasons behind this could be that these users may have friends and/or colleagues in common and 
that is why they called the same telephone numbers. This could be used to evaluate the 
performance of a classifier in the scenario where friends misuse each other’s devices. For instance, 
user 34 and user 63 shared a maximum of 9 telephone numbers, as outlined in Table 4.10. 
Although these two users had similar usage on these 9 telephone numbers, distinct usage patterns 
still exist between them: user 34 used the anonymised telephone number 1237 heavily when 
compared with other telephone numbers. While user 63 employed the anonymised telephone 
number 1247 and anonymised telephone number 1271 most often. Therefore, they could still be 
discriminated between each other to a certain extent based upon their historical usages on these 
telephone numbers.   
 
Figure 4.14: Users telephony telephone number usage comparison 
 
Telephone 
number 
779 1071 1139 1237 1247 1269 1271 1287 1329 
Proportion 
of total 
usage 
Usage 
User 34 1 2 4 88 1 10 2 17 24 
19.2% 
(775) 
User 63 5 1 8 2 11 7 15 4 1 
31.8% 
(170) 
Table 4.10: Telephone number usage comparison for user 20 and user 36 
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The comparison for all these 71 users’ telephony time of calling is presented in Figure 4.15. The 
pattern presented by the time of calling feature of the telephony was similar to those 
demonstrated by the four applications’ time of usage in previous section. It is difficult to identify 
individual users by using the time of calling feature in isolation. However, how a person uses the 
telephone application can be obtained based upon their historical usage: when the telephone 
application is most likely to be used and when it is unlikely to be used. For instance, user 68 
frequently used the telephony application during the period from 2pm to 7am. If the telephony 
application is used outside this time frame, it could be a sign of misuse on user 68’s device. If less 
usage is observed for the telephony application inside the aforementioned time frame, it also 
could be a sign of abnormal activity (e.g. user 68’s device may be lost). 
 
Figure 4.15: Users telephony time of calling comparison 
All users’ telephony durations of calling are depicted in Figure 4.16. In general, no clear difference 
is shown by the figure apart from the majority of calls lasting less than 300 seconds. Indeed, as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.17, for all 13,719 calls, 95.7% of them lasted less than 10 and 50% of 
them lasted less than 30 seconds. There are many factors which may affect the duration of a 
telephone call, such as the relationship between calling parties, how often they communicate, 
what topic they discuss and even the surrounding environment. Despite the variety of reasons 
behind how long a call may last, with the observed percentages it is clear that it could be difficult 
to discriminate users from each other by using the duration of calling alone.    
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Figure 4.16: Users telephony duration of calling comparison 
 
Figure 4.17: A cumulative distribution for all users’ telephone call duration 
4.3.1.2.2 Text messaging  
For the 22 users’ who utilised the text message service, the following features were available and 
extracted from the text message dataset: the telephone number being texted, and the location 
and time of the text being sent. 
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Figure 4.18 depicts all the users’ text message location usage during the chosen period. The usage 
of text messaging was much less compared with other aforementioned applications’. For the best 
case, user 13 did not share any cells with any other users. On average, each user only shared one 
cell with another user. Therefore, in general the majority of these 22 users could be discriminated 
from each other based upon the location feature. Nonetheless, it may be difficult to identify 
several users due to their similar location usage. For instance, user 3 and user 12 shared a 
maximum 4 cells together as shown in Table 4.11. It is hard to separate their usage for these four 
locations because they did not exhibit significant usage difference. This similarity of usage could 
have little impact on user 3 as the usage only represents 11.1% of their total text messaging usage. 
In comparison, it could be more difficult to differentiate user 12’s activities from user 3’s due to 
the large proportion of similar usage.   
 
Figure 4.18: Location usage comparison of users’ text message 
 Cell ID 1 12 24 27 
Proportion of 
total usage 
Usage 
User 3 2 2 3 2 11.1%(81) 
User 12 4 1 1 5 40.7%(27) 
Table 4.11: The location usage comparison for user 3’s and user 12’s text messaging service 
All these 22 users’ text message telephone numbers usage is shown in Figure 4.19. The figure 
indicates that significant usage difference existed on the texted telephone numbers between each 
user. Indeed, a total of nine users did not share any telephone numbers with any other user. By 
using the number of texting feature alone, these nine users can easily be discriminated. For the 
worse case, user 6 and user 12 only shared 2 telephone numbers with each other and their usage 
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quantity for these two locations is shown in Table 4.12. As both users did not have significant 
usage in these two locations, it is difficult to separate their usage of these locations from their 
historical usage. Moreover, as the similar usage only represents 2.2% of user 6’s total usage, user 6 
can still be easily identified. In comparison, the verification process may not be so easy for user 12 
as the common usage represented 22.2% of their total usage.  
 
Figure 4.19: Users text message telephone number usage comparison 
 Telephone number 116 131 
Proportion of total 
usage 
Usage 
User 6 1 1 2.2% (91) 
User 12 3 3 22.2% (27) 
Table 4.12: Text message telephone number usage comparison for user 6 and user 12 
Figure 4.20 outlines all 22 users’ text message sending time during the chosen period. In general, 
based upon the time of the sending feature alone, it could be difficult to identify individual users 
from each other. However, this feature has the potential to be used for generating patterns on 
how a user utilises the text messaging service: when the service is more likely to be used and 
when it is not. For instance, apart from the period of from 4 am to 8 am, the chance of user 7 
sending a text message is much higher. As a result, any message sent by user 7 outside the 
aforementioned timeframe could be considered as normal. In comparison, if a message is sent at 5 
am, the chance that user 7’s device is being misused could be significantly higher.   
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Figure 4.20: Users text message time of sending comparison 
From the above analysis, it demonstrates that the chosen experimental dataset contains a huge 
amount of users’ mobile device activities represented by their applications usage. Although it 
could be seen that the majority of the users utilised their devices differently (especially for intra-
extended applications), a level of similarity was also observed for some users in the applications 
they used and also where and when they used those applications. Moreover, a number of features 
have the potential to be used for discriminating mobile users. For the intra-standard applications, 
users could be separated via individual applications’ names if they did not utilise the same 
applications. For those who utilised common applications, the utilisation location of an application 
could contribute information towards to successful individuation. By knowing where an 
application was used, the majority of the users could be discriminated. This indicates that the 
location of usage could be a positive feature for classifying mobile users. For the intra-extended 
applications: both telephony and text messaging services, apart from the location of usage, the 
telephone calling/texting feature could also be very useful in distinguishing mobile users.      
In comparison, by using the application activation time feature alone, it could be difficult to 
discriminate users from each other. This may be caused by there only being 24 hours in a day: the 
longer the chosen period (i.e. more days), the higher the chance that two users will activate the 
same application at the same time or within a similar time frame. However, these applications’ 
activation time figures do show certain patterns of when the devices are more likely to be used 
and in which periods they are less likely to be used. By using this information, certain abnormal 
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activities could be detected by a security system, such as during the periods a device is likely to be 
active and when there is no activity on the device and vice versa.   
4.3.2 A preliminary study on telephony activity 
The descriptive statistical study identified several features which may provide positive information 
for a classification process. Hence, a preliminary study was conducted to explore these features’ 
effectiveness towards behaviour profiling using a more scientific approach. As the full dataset 
contains large amount of information: more than 30,000 logs for intra-standard applications alone, 
it will require a huge amount of computational power and time to identity the usefulness of each 
application feature by employing the whole dataset. As a result, the preliminary study utilised a 
sub-dataset which was extracted from the main telephony service dataset. The sub-dataset 
contained a total of 3,836 call logs from 20 randomly selected users. In this way, the identification 
process on the impact that a feature of an application plays for a classification result can be 
carried out in a more efficient and less time consuming manner. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, there is no single classification method that can solve all given problems, three generic 
pattern classification approaches were employed for the behaviour profiling technique: RBF neural 
network, FF MLP neural network and a rule-based method. Therefore, the optimal classifier should 
have the best performance and require the least computational power. For the actual experiment, 
each user’s data was divided into two halves: the first half was used to generate a profile and the 
other half was used to evaluate the classifiers’ performance. The results for the preliminary study 
are presented in the following sections.  
4.3.2.1 Radial Basis Function Networks 
An RBF neural network has been one of most popular pattern classification methods used in the 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) field. By default, it has three network configurations: number of neurons, 
the performance goal and spread. For this preliminary study, only the number of neurons 
parameter was configured while the other network configurations remained at the default settings. 
Table 4.13 demonstrates the best selected RBF neural network configurations with several 
combinations of telephony features as the inputs. The full set of experimental results is presented 
in Appendix B. Table 4.13 demonstrates the average results for the FAR, FRR and EER from these 
20 chosen users. In general, the results show that by using an RBF neural network, the telephony 
application can be used to discriminate users within the mobile host environment. By employing 
the dialled telephone number and the location of calling features as the inputs with 75 neurons, 
the RBF network achieved the best performance with an EER of 10.5% (also shown in Figure 4.21). 
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By adding the time of calling and/or the duration of a call features as additional RBF neural 
network inputs in addition to the telephone number and location features, the users can still be 
discriminated from each other although the overall performance decreased rapidly. Therefore, 
both the time and duration of calling features cannot be considered as positive features to classify 
mobile users in this case.   
Features 
Features 
Employed 
Number of neurons FAR FRR EER 
Telephone number (1) 
, location (2),       
duration (3),              
time (4) 
1, 2, 3, 4 75 13.9% 15.8% 14.9% 
1, 2, 4 100 13.7% 15.3% 14.5% 
1, 2, 3 50 13% 13% 13% 
1, 2 75 10.7% 10.2% 10.5% 
Table 4.13: The best RBF network configurations with various features 
 
Figure 4.21: FAR-FRR plot for the RBF network performance (Inputs: telephone number and 
location with 75 neurons) 
4.3.2.2 Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron Network 
The Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron (FF MLP) Network is another widely employed AI 
technique utilised in the pattern classification domain for many years. With more network 
configuration variables available, the FF MLP neural network is a more complex classifier 
compared with the RBF neural network. Therefore, to solve the same problem, the FF MLP neural 
network should require more computational power than the RBF neural network does. Apart from 
modifying the number of neurons parameter, other configuration of the FF MLP neural network 
remained as default. Table 4.14 demonstrates the best FF MLP network configurations with 
various combinations of calling features as the inputs of the classifier. The full set of experimental 
results is presented in Appendix B. In general, these mobile users can be classified using the FF 
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MLP neural network although the performance was not as good as employing the RBF neural 
network. As shown in Table 4.14, by using the dialled telephone number and the location of calling 
as the inputs and applying 150 neurons for the FF LMP neural network, the classifier obtained its 
best performance producing an EER of 17.5% (also shown in Figure 4.22). However, with more 
features (adding the time and/or duration of calling) as the inputs, the performance of the 
classifier tended to decline. Therefore, the results demonstrate that both the time and duration of 
calling did not provide a positive contribution towards classification.  
Features Features Employed Number of neurons FAR FRR EER 
Telephone number (1) , 
location (2),       
duration (3),              
time (4) 
1, 2, 3, 4 125 11.9% 30.6% 21.3% 
1, 2, 4 100 11.5% 29.7% 20.6% 
1, 2, 3 150 10.5% 40% 24.7% 
1, 2 150 14.9% 20.1% 17.5% 
Table 4.14: The best FF MLP network configurations with various features 
 
Figure 4.22: FAR-FRR plot for the FF MLP network performance (Inputs: telephone number and 
location with 150 neurons) 
4.3.2.3 A rule-based approach  
The basis for this approach was derived from the descriptive statistics produced when analysing 
the data and the large variances observed. A dynamic approach therefore seemed sensible to cope 
with the changing nature of the profile. Based on the premise that the historical profile can be 
used to predict the probability of a current event, the rule-based approach illustrated in Equation 
1 was devised. The approach also includes a weighting factor (Wi) to allow more discriminative 
features to have a greater contribution within the resulting score than less discriminative features 
do. Moreover, the approach also provides a mechanism to ensure all outputs are bounded 
between 0 and 1 to assist in defining an appropriate threshold. 
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Equation 1: Alarm if:   
  
                       
                        
 
   
    
 
   
 
≥threshold 
Where: 
i=The features of one chosen application (e.g. dialled number for telephony application)  
x=The value of Featurei (e.g. office telephone number and home telephone number)  
M=Total number of values for Featurei 
N=Total number of features 
Wi=The weighting factor associated with Featurei (0< Wi ≤1) 
Threshold= A predefined value according to each individual user 
For example, a user uses an application with only the location feature (N=1). During the past 4 
weeks, the user utilised that application in location 1, 2 and 3 (M=3) for 50, 40 and 10 times 
respectively. According to the above approach, the probability when the user utilises that 
application in location 1 next time is 50% (50/(50+40+10)). A value obtained by 1-the probability 
will be compared with a pre-defined threshold and a decision will be made accordingly. When 
application has more than 1 feature, the average probability will be compared with the threshold.   
By employing the above approach, a number of experimental tests on the 20 users’ telephony 
activities were conducted. Apart from the weighting factor for each feature being set to 1, other 
parameters within the formula were chosen appropriately according to the selected telephony 
features. The results from the experiment are presented in Table 4.15. By using the dialled 
telephone number and location of calling features, the rule-based approach obtained a best result 
EER of 11% (also shown by Figure 4.23). By adding other calling features, such as time of calling 
and/or duration of calling, the performance of the classifier decreased significantly. This indicates 
that neither the time of calling nor the duration of calling is a positive feature for the telephony 
service for this particular dataset.  
Features Features Employed FAR FRR EER 
Telephone number (1) , 
location (2),       
duration (3),              
time (4) 
1, 2, 3, 4 18.3% 21.9% 20.1% 
1, 2, 4 8.1% 16.7% 12.4% 
1, 2, 3 17.8% 21.7% 19.7% 
1, 2 7.1% 14.8% 11% 
Table 4.15: Experimental results by employing the rule-based approach 
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Figure 4.23: FAR-FRR plot for the performance of the rule-based approach 
4.3.2.4 Discussion on the preliminary study 
Based upon the above three sets of results, the preliminary study demonstrates that mobile users 
can be discriminated by using the telephony service within the mobile host environment with a 
good level of performance. Also, the preliminary study identified the usefulness of each 
application feature towards to the classification result as illustrated in Table 4.16. Both the dialled 
telephone number and location of calling features proved to be positive calling features for 
discriminating the mobile users by each of the three classifiers. In comparison, by adding the time 
of calling and/or duration of calling features as additional inputs the classifiers’ performance got 
worse. This indicates that neither feature can be considered as contributing positive information 
towards the classification process. In addition, the previous statistical analysis also suggested that: 
both the dialled telephone number and location of calling features could contain strong 
discriminatory information to separate mobile users, while both the time and duration of calling 
features could contain less significant user classification information.  
Feature Contribution to the classification result 
Telephone number Positive 
Location of calling Positive 
Duration of calling Negative 
Time of calling Negative 
Table 4.16: Individual application features towards to the classification result 
Among the three chosen classifiers, the FF MLP neural network achieved the lowest performance 
despite more computational power (in terms of number of neurons) being employed. In addition, 
several other issues for the FF MLP neural network were observed from the experiment. For 
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instance, the FF MLP neural network stopped early during the training phase resulting in undesired 
output. In comparison to the FF MLP neural network, both the RBF neural network and the rule-
based approach achieved much better performances. Although the RBF neural network had a 
slightly higher performance (0.5% in terms of EER) than the rule-based approach, it also consumed 
a significantly greater amount of computational power than the rule-based approach did. This 
might be feasible if the classification process is undertaken in a desktop computer environment. 
Nonetheless, the rule-based approach is still favoured because of its simplicity and fast decision 
making. Also, as the classification process itself will be performed within the mobile host 
environment, an average mobile device will struggle to provide sufficient computing power to 
house an RBF neural network based classifier. Even if the mobile device could offer the required 
computing power; it is highly likely that it would take a longer time for the RBF neural network 
based classifier to process the same amount of data than it would for the rule-based approach. 
Furthermore, as the RBF neural network is considered as a black box approach, any implementer 
would have less control to the classifier apart from the three available network configurations; in 
comparison, the rule-based approach is more simple, dynamic, configurable and adaptive, such as 
each mobile application can be applied with its own weighting towards the classification process. 
As a result, the rule-based approach was employed as the classifier with which to progress the 
next step of the research.  
The three FAR-FRR plots (Figure 4.21, Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23) also demonstrate some insights 
for the preliminary study. As the majority of the FAR rates were smaller than 10% for all threshold 
settings, it indicates that a significant difference exists between mobile users in their telephony 
service usage. Therefore, this information will assist a classifier to discriminate mobile device users 
from each other more easily. In comparison, a significant proportion of the FRR rates were bigger 
than 10% for all threshold settings. Such a result suggests that a large variance may exist across 
each individual mobile user’s telephony usage, which is a common problem all behavioural based 
biometric systems have to anticipate. Nonetheless, the situation could be improved by employing 
a dynamic profiling technique for mobile users to minimise the impact caused by their irregular 
mobile usage. In addition, a smoothing function which utilises a number of application entries as 
one large event will also be considered to cope with the relevant high false rejection rate issue for 
the legitimate mobile users.  
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4.3.3 Behaviour profiling on mobile applications 
Based upon the findings from the descriptive statistics and preliminary studies, a complete 
experiment was undertaken on mobile users’ applications usage using the rule-based approach 
with the combination of the application name, location usage and specific features (i.e. telephone 
numbers). Two types of profile techniques were employed: static and dynamic. For static profiling, 
each individual dataset was divided into two halves: the first half was used for building the profile 
and the other half was used to test the performance of a classifier. For dynamic profiling, the 
profile contains 7/10/14 days of each user’s most recent activities and is updated on a daily basis. 
As a result, a classification result is made based upon the most recent user’s activities (within 
7/10/14 days) rather than some usage that occurred four months ago and is therefore not at all 
relevant to current user behaviour. The evaluation process was carried out on the same sub-
dataset as the static one. A smoothing function was also introduced to cope with the mobile users’ 
inconsistent usage behaviour observed in the preliminary study. The smoothing function treats a 
number of successive applications as one event; as a result, a decision is made based upon the 
combined event rather than each single application activity. The user’s acceptance of the 
behaviour profiling technique could also be increased: an alarm will not be raised when a user 
utilises a new application on their device for the first time but when a number of consecutive new 
behaviours have occurred. The following sections contain a complete behaviour profiling 
experimental study on a mobile user’s application usage: intra-standard, intra-extended and multi-
instance applications.   
4.3.3.1 Intra-standard applications profiling 
For intra-standard applications, the experiment employed the intra-standard applications dataset 
(as described in Table 4.2). The following features were extracted from the dataset: application 
name, date of initiation and location of usage. The date of initiation feature was used for 
generating the profile and evaluating data for the static and dynamic profiles. The profile of an 
application contains its location usage during the profile period. By using the rule-based classifier, 
a complete set of experimental results (in the form of EER) for users’ intra-standard application 
usage is presented in Table 4.17. The best performance (EER 13.5%) was obtained by utilising a 14 
day dynamic profile with the smoothing function of 6 application entries. In comparison, by 
employing a 7 day dynamic profile with the smoothing function of one application entry, the 
classifier obtained the worst performance with an EER of 24%.  
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Number of application entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Profile 
technique 
Static 14 days 21.1% 17.4% 16.3% 14.9% 14.2% 13.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 21.1% 17.3% 16.0% 14.5% 14.0% 13.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 22.1% 17.8% 16.2% 14.6% 14.4% 13.7% 
Dynamic 7 days 24.0% 19.4% 17.6% 15.9% 15.3% 14.4% 
Table 4.17: Experimental results for intra-standard applications 
Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25 illustrate the worst and best configuration FAR-FRR plots for the 14 
day dynamic profile on intra-standard applications. By utilising more application entries in the 
smoothing function, the performance improved significantly in the terms of a lower FRR and EER. 
In comparison, the average FAR increased slightly which means an imposter receives a greater 
opportunity to gain entry into the system.  
 
Figure 4.24: FAR-FRR plot for intra-standard applications with the dynamic 14 day profile with 1 
application entry 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
P
e
rf
o
rm
an
ce
 (
%
) 
Threshold (%) 
FAR 
FRR 
 105 
 
 
Figure 4.25: FAR-FRR plot for intra-standard applications with the dynamic 14 day profile with 6 
application entries 
Table 4.18 demonstrates the selected experimental results for the best classifier configuration of 
intra-standard applications. The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best and worst 
performance respectively. Also, by using the same configuration, 84.2% of all users had an EER less 
than 20%. 
User_ID EER 
71 0% 
46 0% 
12 0.5% 
66 37.5% 
2 39.3% 
68 51.6% 
Table 4.18: Selected users’ performance for intra-standard applications, employing the best 
classifier configurations 
4.3.3.2  Intra-extended applications 
4.3.3.2.1 Telephone call 
The telephone call experiment employed the telephony dataset (described in Table 4.3). The 
following features were extracted from the dataset for each log: the telephone number, date of 
calling and location of calling. The date of calling was utilised for generating the profile and 
evaluation data according to the profile configuration. For each user’s telephone profile, it 
contains the telephone number and location of usage during the profile covering period. By 
employing the rule-based classifier with the selected features, a complete set of experiment 
results for users’ telephone call usage is shown in Table 4.19. The best experimental result for the 
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users’ telephony activity is an EER of 5.4% and it was achieved by using the 14 day dynamic profile 
technique with the smoothing function of 6 telephone call entries. In contrast, the worst 
performance result (EER of 10.4%) is almost twice as high as the best one and it was obtained via 
the 7 day dynamic profile with the smoothing function of just one telephone call entry.   
 
Number of telephone call entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Profile 
technique 
Static 14 days 9.6% 9.1% 7.9% 7.2% 4.3% 6.4% 
Dynamic 14 days 8.8% 8.1% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 5.4% 
Dynamic 10 days 9.6% 8.6% 8.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.0% 
Dynamic 7 days 10.4% 8.8% 8.5% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2% 
Table 4.19: Experimental results for the telephone call application 
The FAR-FRR plots for the worst and best configurations, employing the 14 day dynamic profile on 
users’ telephony activities are illustrated in Figure 4.26 and Figure 4.27 respectively. These two 
figures demonstrate that significant improvement occurred for the overall performance by 
considering 6 telephone call entries as one user’s activity.  
 
Figure 4.26: FAR-FRR plot for the telephone call application with the dynamic 14 day profile with 
1 telephone call entry 
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Figure 4.27: FAR-FRR plot for the telephone call application with the dynamic 14 day profile with 
6 telephone call entries 
A selection of experimental results from the configuration of the best classifier for the telephone 
call application is presented in Table 4.20. The best and worst performances for the top 3 and 
bottom 3 users have been selected accordingly. Also, 81.7% of users have an EER less than 10% 
with the same configuration.  
User_ID EER 
23 0% 
43 0% 
61 0% 
64 20.6% 
50 23.1% 
8 39.5% 
Table 4.20: Selected users’ performance for the telephone call application by employing the best 
classifier configuration 
4.3.3.2.2 Text messaging  
The text messaging experiment utilised the dataset described in Table 4.4. For each text log entry, 
the following features were extracted from the dataset: texted telephone number, date and 
location of texting. The date feature was employed for creating the profile and evaluation data 
according to the individual profiling technique. For each user’s text message profile, it contains all 
usages for the texted telephone numbers and locations of texting during the profile period. Due to 
several participants texting a limited number of messages over the chosen 28 day period, a 
maximum of 3 log entries were utilised for the smoothing function. By employing the rule-based 
classifier and a combination of telephone number and location features, the complete result for 
user’s text messaging application usage is shown in Table 4.21. The best result is an EER of 2.2% 
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and it was acquired by the classifier utilising the 14 day dynamic profile with a smoothing function 
of 3 text message entries. Similar to the worst performance result obtained for the telephony 
service, the lowest performance for the text messaging application is an EER of 10.7% and it was 
obtained utilising a 7 day dynamic profile and smoothing function of just one text message entry. 
 
Number of text message entries 
1 2 3 
Profile 
technique 
Static 14 days 7.0% 4.3% 3.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 5.7% 2.6% 2.2% 
Dynamic 10 days 8.3% 4.1% 3.7% 
Dynamic 7 days 10.7% 5.7% 3.8% 
Table 4.21: Experimental results for the text messaging application 
Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29 demonstrates the FAR-FRR plots for the users’ text message worst and 
best performance with the 14 day dynamic profile configuration. By utilising more text messages 
within the smoothing function, the system performance improved significantly.  
 
Figure 4.28: FAR-FRR plot for the text messaging application with the dynamic 14 day profile 
with 1 text message entry 
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Figure 4.29: FAR-FRR plot for the text messaging application with the dynamic 14 day profile 
with 3 text message entries 
Table 4.22 demonstrate a group of users’ performance for the best classifier configuration of the 
text messaging application. The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best and worst 
performance respectively. Also, by utilising the same classifier configuration, 95.5% of all users 
exhibit an EER less than 10%. 
User_ID EER 
13 0% 
14 0% 
18 0.2% 
4 5.3% 
2 8.4% 
17 13.1% 
Table 4.22: Selected users’ performance for the text messaging application with the dynamic 14 
day profile and 3 log entries 
4.3.3.3 Multi-instance applications 
In daily life, mobile users utilise their applications in a chronological order. For instance, a user 
switches off the clock alarm (intra-standard application) at 6:05 AM, then visits a number of news 
websites (intra-extended application) at 6:20 AM, at 7:10 AM, they make several phone calls 
(intra-extended application) and start listening to music (intra-standard application) at 7:36 AM. 
As a result, the multi-instance applications can continuously present an image of what a user does 
on the whole, while either the intra-standard or intra-extended applications could only partially 
provide information on a user’s activity. Also, more importantly, it is envisaged the new security 
mechanism would verify the user’s identity based upon the multi-instance method. Hence, an 
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experiment was created to examine the performance of the multi-instance applications technique 
for constantly monitoring every single activity to identify abnormal mobile usage.   
For the multi-instance applications experiment, all 76 users’ applications activities which were 
employed separately in the intra-standard and intra-extended applications experiments were 
utilised. For each user, their intra-standard and intra-extended applications were joined together 
by using the time and day stamp in a chronological order. Also, features were selected according 
to their application categories. In total, 30,428 intra-standard applications logs and 15,101 intra-
extended applications logs were employed for this set of experiments. By employing the rule-
based approach, the experimental results for users’ multi-instance applications activities are 
demonstrated in Table 4.23. By utilising the dynamic profiling technique with 10 days of profiling 
data and a smoothing function with 6 log entries, the best result of EER 10% was obtained. In 
comparison, the worst result of EER 19% was acquired by employing the dynamic profiling 
technique with 7 day of profiling data and the smoothing function with 1 log entry.   
 
Number of log entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Profile technique 
Static 14 days 16.9% 13.6% 12.7% 12% 10.9% 11% 
Dynamic  7 days 19 % 15.2% 13.1% 12.4% 11.3% 10.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 17.4% 13.7% 12.3% 11.6% 10.6% 9.8% 
Dynamic 14 days 16.5% 13.5% 12.1% 11.6% 10.5% 10.1% 
Table 4.23: Experimental results for multi-instance applications 
Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31 illustrate the worst and best configuration FAR-FRR plots for the 10 
day dynamic profile on multi-instance applications. By utilising more application entries in the 
smoothing function, the performance improved significantly in the terms of a lower FRR and EER. 
In comparison, the average FAR increased slightly which means an imposter receives a greater 
opportunity to gain entry into the system.  
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Figure 4.30: FAR-FRR plot for multi-instance applications with the dynamic 10 day profile with 1 
application entry 
 
Figure 4.31: FAR-FRR plot for multi-instance applications with the dynamic 10 day profile with 6 
application entries 
Table 4.24 illustrates a group of users’ performance for the best configuration of the multi-
instance applications experiment. The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs present the best and worst 
performance respectively. Also, 55.3% of all users have an EER smaller than 10% and 80.2% of all 
users have an EER lower than 15%. 
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User_ID Performance 
46 0% 
71 0% 
63 0% 
68 20.2% 
69 25.4% 
8 28.8% 
Table 4.24: Selected users’ performance for multi-instance applications with the dynamic 10 day 
profile and 6 log entries 
4.4 Discussion 
The application name and location of usage are valuable features that can provide sufficient 
discriminatory information to identify mobile users. However, whilst this might identify many 
misuse scenarios, it would not necessarily identify all cases of misuse – particular those where a 
colleague might briefly misuse a device because the location information is likely to fall within the 
same profile as the authorised user. So care is required in interpreting these results. The intra-
extended application approach should also help to specifically identify this type of misuse. 
In general, the dynamic profiling technique achieved a slightly better performance than the static 
profiling technique did. This is reasonable as a dynamic profile contains a user’s most recent 
activities; hence it achieves more accurate detection. Furthermore, with a longer profile period, 
the performance is also improved. Hence, an increased number of days (e.g. 18/22 days) of user 
activities as a profile should be examined to find the optimum solution. Nonetheless, literature 
suggests users do change their usage pattern over a long period of time. Flurry (2009) suggests 
that users only keep 67% of new applications beyond a 30 day period. Moreover, storage and 
processing issues should also be taken into consideration with larger profile sizes. While a 
smoothing function treated more application entries as one incident, the performance also 
improved accordingly. The smoothing function reduces the impact any single event might have 
and seeks to take a more holistic approach to monitoring for misuse; this will provide a user-
friendly environment as fewer rejections occur and more convenient when a user changes their 
usage behaviour. The disadvantage of this approach is that it takes a longer time for the system to 
make a decision; hence, an intruder could have more opportunities to abuse a system and a 
degree of abuse might be missed by the security control.  
Limitations in the dataset are also likely to have created certain difficulties. As the dataset was 
collected in 2004, the number of mobile applications available for users to choose from was 
limited; this resulted in a large similarity of intra-standard applications usage between mobile 
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users and difficulty for any classification method. In contrast, in January 2012, there were more 
than 1 million applications available in the mobile applications market. As mobile users have a 
greater available choice their intra-standard applications usage would arguably differ more. 
Therefore, it would be easier to discriminate mobile users through their intra-standard 
applications usage.  
As shown by Table 4.19, the performance of the telephony application is very good – more than 
twice that of the intra-standard applications profiling. This reinforces the hypothesis that knowing 
both the application and what the user does with it, improves the chance of identifying individual 
users significantly. Moreover, mobile users had a far larger set of telephone contacts (the numbers 
they can dial) compared with the number of applications they had, making the classification 
process easier because there are more identifiable data points from which to discriminate. In 
comparison with other biometric authentication techniques as described in Chapter 3, the 
telephone experiment is within that category of performance.  
As presented in Table 4.21, the results from the text messaging application were even better than 
those achieved by the telephone call application, albeit with a smaller dataset. This may be caused 
by people only sending text messages to very close contacts. Although only 30% of the participants 
used the text messaging application in 2004, the situation has changed considerably: for the UK 
alone, the volume of text messaging traffic has increased by 290% since 2004 (Ofcom, 2010). This 
indicates that the text messaging based authentication method could serve a good proportion of 
the mobile user population.  
As demonstrated in Table 4.23, the experimental results for the multi-instance application are in 
between the results from the intra-standard and intra-extended applications; this is within the 
expectation as the experiment utilised the combination of both types of applications. Also, it is 
envisaged that the larger the proportion of intra-extended applications users have, the better the 
performance of a system. As a result, the process of differentiating whether an application belongs 
to the intra-extended category and extracting their features accordingly is mission-critical for a 
behaviour profiling system. 
As illustrated in Table 4.25, the performance of the behaviour profiling technique is within the 
expectation of the overall behavioural biometric category within the mobile device environment. 
In addition, although it is more difficult to profile certain users, more than 80% of all users’ 
performance was within the bounds of a behaviour-based biometrics. Dynamic-based profiling 
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techniques provide the opportunity to develop a more meaningful profile of user activities. This 
does however raise issues with regards to template ageing and ensuring the samples utilised in 
creating the template are all legitimate, which will need to be addressed. Furthermore, this 
approach employed a light weight rule-based approach which saves a significant amount of 
processing power and storage space; this is essential for handheld mobile devices as they are 
limited in these two areas. 
Behavioural techniques Performance (EER) 
Behaviour Profiling 10% 
Gait recognition (Derawi et al, 2010) 20.1% 
Keystroke analysis (Clarke and Furnell, 2006) 13% 
Handwriting recognition (Clark and Mekala, 2007) 1% 
Voice verification (Woo et al, 2006) 7.8% 
Table 4.25: The behavioural techniques performance within the mobile device environment 
4.5 Conclusion  
The results prove that mobile device users can be discriminated from each other based upon their 
application usage by a number of experimental studies. By using the descriptive statistics method, 
two major findings were obtained at the early stage of this investigation: mobile users can 
fundamentally access their applications differently, and the application name, location of usage 
and telephone number may provide more discriminatory information towards a classification 
process than other application features. A preliminary study was formed to examine the 
effectiveness of the applications features by employing three classifiers (the RBF, FF MLP and a 
rule-based approach) with a sub-dataset containing 20 random users’ telephony activity. Based 
upon the experimental results, the dialled telephone number and location of calling features have 
been proved to contain contributory information towards the classification results. Also, the 
experimental results show that the rule-based approach is the most suitable classifier to solve this 
problem because of its performance and efficiency. Larger FRR figures suggest that a dynamic 
profile should be employed to solve the template ageing problem and a smoothing function 
should be put in place to cope with the inconsistency of a user’s behaviour.        
By employing the combination of the rule-based approach, both the static and dynamic profiling 
techniques and a smoothing function, the complete experiment on users’ applications (intra-
standard, intra-extended and multi-instance) was conducted. Among a total of 60 sets of 
configurations, with a classifier configuration of the dynamic profile with 14 days5 most recent 
                                                          
5
 Multi-instance applications employed 10 days 
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user activities and the smoothing function of 6 entries, the rule-based approach obtained the best 
performance of an EER of 13.5%, 5.4%, 2.2% and 10% for the general application, telephony, text 
messaging and multi-instance applications usage respectively. Therefore, these techniques are 
viable as a behaviour profiling security mechanism within the mobile host environment. The 
verification process could be carried in the background while mobile users utilise their applications; 
if several abnormal activities occurred within a fixed time frame, further security processes would 
be initiated according to the level of the incident. Based upon the success of these experimental 
results, the next chapter will focus upon designing a behaviour profiling verification architecture 
that could accommodate the aforementioned behaviour profiling verification techniques.    
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5 A Novel Framework for Behaviour Profiling on Mobile Devices  
5.1 Introduction 
Having obtained a positive set of experimental results for users’ applications behaviour within the 
mobile host environment in Chapter 4, it is important to design a novel security framework to 
facilitate the behaviour profiling technique and provide transparent and continuous protection for 
services and data hosted by the mobile device. This chapter describes a novel behaviour profiling 
framework, its processes and algorithms that will provide the transparent and continuous security 
protection required by the mobile device.     
5.2 A Novel Behaviour Profiling Framework  
In order to provide high level security to the mobile device with minimum user’s inconvenience, a 
novel Behaviour Profiling framework which can provide transparent and continuous protection is 
proposed. The Behaviour Profiling framework primarily verifies a user’s identity based upon which 
mobile applications they utilise. They will gain access to the device if they pass the verification 
process; otherwise, their access to the device will be rejected temporarily until they verify 
themselves through a secret knowledge based approach (i.e. random selected security questions). 
In order to provide adequate protection for the mobile device, the Behaviour Profiling framework 
must work in the following fashion: 
 To improve the security for the mobile device beyond that offered by the knowledge 
based approach; 
 To continuously verify the user’s identity based upon which mobile applications they 
utilise; 
 To ensure the verification process is carried out in a user-friendly manner: the user is 
mainly verified in a transparent way rather than being verified intrusively; 
 To provide an architecture which can operate in one of three modes based upon the 
desired output implementation: as a standalone security countermeasure; within an IDS 
system as a misuse detector; or within a transparent authentication mechanism.  
 Also, the architecture would be suitable for every mobile device regardless of hardware 
configuration, processing power or network capability.     
These objectives have been achieved by utilising the combination of engines and processes within 
the novel Behaviour Profiling framework as illustrated in Figure 5.1. As mentioned earlier, the 
Behaviour Profiling framework verifies a user’s identity based upon their application activities; and 
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the entire verification procedure is carried out by the cooperation of the process engines and the 
Security Manager. First of all, the Data Collection Engine gathers a user’s application activities and 
transforms them into various behaviour input samples. Then, the Behaviour Classification Engine 
performs the verification process by comparing the input sample(s) with suitable profile(s) which 
is(are) generated by the Behaviour Profile Engine. Once the verification process is completed, the 
verification result will be processed appropriately by the Security Manager according to the mode 
in which the framework operates. When the framework operates in standalone mode, the Security 
Manager handles the verification result by itself and makes any necessary corresponding 
responses, such as associating appropriate labels for the verified input data (whether legitimate or 
illegitimate) and updating the SS level. When the framework operates in dependent mode, the 
Security Manager simply forwards the verification result to a more comprehensive security 
mechanism (e.g. TAS) and the corresponding security mechanism makes any final decisions 
accordingly. A detailed description of this process is thoroughly explained throughout the rest of 
this chapter.    
 
Figure 5.1: A novel Behaviour Profiling Framework 
5.3 Processing Engines 
The proposed Behaviour Profiling Framework relies on a number of processing engines: Data 
Collection Engine, Behaviour Profile Engine, Behaviour Classification Engine and Communication 
Engine to carry out various tasks, such as collecting data, generating profiles, verifying users’ 
activities and contacting other security mechanisms. Each of these engines and their 
functionalities will be fully discussed in this section.    
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5.3.1 Data Collection Engine 
The main duty of the Data Collection Engine is to capture mobile users’ applications activities. 
When an application is utilised by a user, the Data Collection Engine (as illustrated in Figure 5.2) 
automatically gathers the information associated with that application in the background of a 
mobile device OS. This information can be either related to the system level information of that 
application or personalised user data. The system level information of the application can be the  
name of the application, date, time and location of usage; while the user related application 
information can be any information entered by the user, such as telephone numbers, URLs and 
email recipients. According to applications feature details stored in the Application records table6 
(as demonstrated in Table 5.1) within the Application database, the Feature Identifier extracts 
information and form it into various features. For instance, when a web browser is utilised, the 
information associated with the name of the application, date and time of accessing, location of 
usage and the URL which the user enters will be extracted into features according to the 
information provided by the Application records table.  
 
Figure 5.2: Data Collection Engine 
ID App_Name 
Category
_ID 
Feature
_1 
Feature
_2 
Feature
_n 
Verification
_status  
Profile EER Collect 
1 Clock 1 1 - - 1 1 19% 1 
2 Calculator 2 1 - - 0 0 - 1 
3 Telephone 3 1 2 - 1 1 5% 1 
4 SMS 3 1 2 - 1 1 3% 1 
5 Safari 3 1 3 - 1 0 - 1 
: : : : : : : : : : 
Table 5.1: Applications record 
                                                          
6
 All the database tables in this thesis are created for illustration purposes. 
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The information about application features and categories is initially preloaded on the mobile 
device based upon their OS because different mobile platforms may host applications differently. 
As more than 15,000 new mobile applications are becoming available every month, the feature 
identification process that involves identifying which category an application belongs to and which 
features should be extracted from it can be a difficult task. It would be virtually impossible for 
each mobile user to manually carry out the identification process when a new application is 
installed on their device. Therefore, the feature identification process should be carried out by the 
Feature Identifier automatically without any user’s assistance. In order to achieve this, two 
possible solutions have been taken into consideration. The first solution is to employ a central 
network based application features repository. The repository will contain all necessary 
information to facilitate the feature extraction process and it will be managed by an independent 
source. When an application is downloaded and then installed, the framework will download the 
feature set information of that application from the repository and update the Application record 
table accordingly. As a result, the Feature Identifier can extract the information correctly when a 
new application is utilised. The second solution is to create an intelligent feature identification 
component within the proposed framework. The proposed feature identification component 
would identify which category an application belongs to and which features should be extracted 
from that application. However, it would require a certain amount of application information 
before establishing which category an application belongs to and what features are associated 
with it. As a result, verification processes for that application cannot be accurately performed 
during the feature identification period. In comparison, details of an application can be quickly 
updated in the Application Record table straight after that application is installed on the device by 
utilising the first method; then the Feature Identifier can exactly extract information of that 
application when the user uses it. As a result, the first method will be employed as the preferable 
solution for assisting application the feature identification and extraction process.   
Once the Feature Identifier extracts all necessary application features, the Data Collection Engine 
then proceeds to the next phase, pre-processing these application features into a biometric 
sample. The Data Collection Controller then sends the behaviour sample to the Temporary Storage 
for further processing. The actual size of the Temporary Storage varies depending upon the way in 
which the Behaviour Classification Engine performs the verification process (which is discussed in 
section 5.3.3). Once the verification process is performed, the data stored in the Temporary 
Storage will be removed accordingly. Nonetheless, Temporary Storage should have same structure 
for each mobile device regardless of hardware configurations; the Temporary Storage table 
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contains several data fields, such as the date, time, the name of the application and various 
features. Table 5.2 illustrates an example of the Temporary Storage with a number of application 
entries.  
ID Date Time Application_Name Feature_1 Feature_2 … Feature_N 
1 01/09/11 07:31 Clock 325.689 - … - 
2 01/09/11 08:55 Telephone 653.142 07875610456 … - 
3 01/09/11 13:23 Text_message 633.142 07773156895 … - 
4 01/09/11 14:55 Safari 639.145 www.bbc.co.uk … - 
: : : : : : : : 
Table 5.2: Temporary Storage 
When verification is required, the Temporary Storage forwards all input data to the Security 
Manager. According to the Application Features Record (as demonstrated in Table 5.3), the 
Security Manager replaces the raw information stored in the input data with appropriate IDs 
accordingly and then stores it in the Behaviour Input Data table (as shown in Table 5.4). In this way, 
a significant amount of data storage can be saved; also the process speed will be improved when 
the data is required by any subsequent usages. When any raw information could not find a match 
either within the Application_Name column in the Application Name (as demonstrated in Table 
5.6) or within the App_Feature_information column in the Application Features Table (as 
demonstrated in Table 5.7), such as when a new application is installed and new features 
associated with it, a new record will be created in the table accordingly to accommodate that raw 
information; both tables are stored in the Applications database. Depending upon whether an 
application is verifiable or not (as described in Table 5.4), the input data will be either forwarded 
to the verification process which is carried out by the Behaviour Classification Engine if its 
verification status is labelled with 1 (verifiable); or the information will be directly transferred to 
the Behaviour Profile database in the Behaviour Audit table for the archiving purpose if their 
verifiable status is labelled with 0 (not verifiable). All applications’ verifiable status is marked with 
1 by default. However, the verifiable status of an application can be modified through the Security 
Manager if necessary. For instance, the nature of the camera application is to take pictures of new 
things which are difficult to predict. If a user has not been verified by their camera usage for a 
period of time, a suggestion can be made to the user to change the verifiable status of the camera 
application to not verifiable.     
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ID App_Feature_ID App_Feature_information 
1 1 323.689 
2 1 563.485 
3 2 07852398652 
4 3 www.plymouth.ac.uk 
5 1 956.523 
6 3 www.bbc.co.uk 
: : : 
Table 5.3: Application Features Record 
ID Date Time 
Application 
Name 
Feature_1 Feature_2 
 
… 
 
Feature_N Verifiable 
1 01/09/11 07:31 1 1 - … - 1 
2 01/09/11 08:55 2 21 3 … - 1 
3 01/09/11 13:23 3 10 7 … - 1 
4 01/09/11 14:55 4 17 11 … - 1 
5 02/09/11 08:23 5 1 - … - 0 
: : : : : : : : : 
Table 5.4: Behavioural Input Data 
ID  App_category 
1 Inter 
2 Intra_standard 
3 Intra_extended 
: : 
Table 5.5: Application Category 
ID  Application_Name 
1 Clock 
2 Telephone 
3 Text_message 
4 Safari 
5 word 
: : 
Table 5.6: Application name 
ID Application_Feature 
1 Location 
2 Telephone number 
3 URL 
: : 
Table 5.7: Application Features 
5.3.2 Behaviour Profile Engine 
The primary function of the Behaviour Profile Engine (as illustrated in Figure 5.3) is to generate 
various behaviour profile templates. This is achieved by utilising a combination of the user’s 
historical behaviour data and a number of templates generation algorithms. 
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Figure 5.3: Behaviour Profile Engine 
The initial profile template generation process can be a tricky task for any biometric based security 
system. Due to the nature of the behaviour profiling technique, the proposed framework has to 
gradually collect a user’s behavioural data over a period of time rather than gather all information 
at the device registration stage. From the results and observations obtained by experiments of 
Chapter 4, it demonstrates that a reasonable level of system performance can be achieved by 
utilising profiling data containing 150 application activities. As a result, it suggests that the 
framework should collect a minimum of 150 application entries after the initial device registration 
phase. During the enrolment period, the framework will automatically gather a user’s application 
activities by utilising its Data Collection Engine in the device background. Also, during the same 
period, the framework will not be able to provide any security protections for the device due to 
incomplete profile templates. Therefore the device security has to rely upon other security 
mechanisms, such as PINs.  
Once a sufficient amount (i.e. more than 150 applications entries) of data is collected, the 
Behaviour Profile Engine will start to generate application profiles by utilising the three template 
generation algorithms for inter7, intra-standard and intra-extended applications accordingly. For 
inter applications, a generic profile containing all the applications’ location usage and dates of 
access will be created. In this way, when an application that has not got its own profile is utilised, 
such activity will not be simply rejected by the framework; thus, user convenience is improved. For 
intra-standard applications, each has their own profile containing locations of usage and dates on 
which they were accessed. For intra-extended applications, they also have their own profiles 
containing utilisation locations, dates of use and extra associated information. When the initial 
template generation phase is completed, all the generated application templates will be stored in 
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the Behaviour Template table (as demonstrated in Table 5.8) within the Behaviour Profile 
database. By utilising these templates and imposter’s data, the EER of each applicationcan be 
obtained accordingly. Also, these templates will be used by the Behaviour Classification Engine in 
any subsequent verification processes.  
ID 
Generation 
Date 
Application_ID ERR Freshness 
Template 
Storage 
Others 
1 11/09/11 1 5.3% 0.86 \\profile\ 1 - 
2 13/09/11 2 2% 0.95 \\profile\ 2 - 
3 15/09/11 3 7% 1 \\profile\ 3 - 
4 11/09/11 4 1% 0.86 \\profile\ 4 - 
5 12/09/11 5 17% 0.91 \\profile\ 5 - 
: : : : : : : 
Table 5.8: Behaviour Template 
The imposter data is preloaded when the proposed framework is implemented on a device. Also, 
the data needs to be updated regularly to ensure its quality. This can be achieved by downloading 
the latest imposter data from a central imposter data repository which is described in full detail in 
section 5.3.4. Alternatively, the imposter data can be automatically generated using traditional 
statistical tools by the proposed framework itself (Jain et al, 1999). For instance, the Behaviour 
Profiling framework can replicate the legitimate user’s data into artificial imposter data by utilising 
the bootstrapping method. In this way, a significant amount of imposter data downloading can be 
avoided. Nonetheless, the quality of the artificial imposter data is highly dependent upon the 
legitimate user’s data and the generation method utilised. 
All user application usage is stored in the Behaviour Audit Log table (as illustrated in Table 5.9) 
within the Behaviour Profile database. The details of the application usage includes: the date and 
time of utilisation, the application ID, the verification success (whether an activity passed the 
verification process (1), failed the verification process (0), or not available (-1); or an activity is 
collected during template generation process (2)) and a number of the application features. The 
Behaviour Audit Log table starts to populate its records as soon as the template generation 
process begins. During the template generation phase, the verification status of every application 
usage record is labelled with 2 as all user activities are assumed to be legitimate but they have 
never been verified. Once the initial template generation stage is completed, the framework will 
check the usage of each application based upon their verification status (as demonstrated in Table 
5.4). If their verification status is not verifiable, their verification success status will be marked with 
-1 straight away. If their verification status is verifiable, the verification success status of that 
usage record will be labelled with either 1 or 0 depending upon its verification result. The data 
Chapter 5: A Novel Framework for Behavioural Profiling on Mobile Devices  
124 
 
stored in the Behaviour Audit table can be utilised to provide general feedback to the user, such as 
showing how many applications were used and their verification results during a period of time. 
More importantly, all application activities being verified successfully will be utilised for the 
template re-generation process. As a result, the behaviour data will have to be stored for a 
minimum of the profile duration period. However, the maximum period of how long the behaviour 
data should be kept depends upon each individual user’s preference and the capability of their 
mobile device.  
ID Date Time Application_ID 
Verification 
Success 
Feature_1 Feature_2 Feature_n 
1 11/09/11 09:23  1 2 6 - - 
2 11/09/11 09:25 1 2 23 1 - 
: : : : : : : : 
103 11/10/11 10:15 4 0 15 - - 
104 11/10/11 11:22 2 -1 15 - - 
105 11/10/11 15:30 5 1 7 5 - 
: :  : : : : : 
Table 5.9: Behaviour Audit Log 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1), biometric systems rely on high quality generated 
templates to produce accurate verification outcomes. Also, behavioural biometric characteristics 
tend to change under various circumstances. In order to maintain templates of a mobile 
application at a high level of quality, a dynamic profiling technique is employed: application 
templates are generated by using the most recent n days of a user’s historical behaviour data. 
Accordingly to a user’s daily usage, all successful verified records will be included in the automatic 
application template regeneration process at the end of each day; while for those applications 
which did not get any successful verifications throughout the day, their templates will stay the 
same as the last time when they were updated/generated. In this way, users will always have an 
accurate profile containing their recent activities. Also, once templates of an application are 
regenerated, the Behaviour Template table will be updated accordingly with the latest template 
and EER status of the application. 
It is envisaged that the freshness of each template may have a differing impact upon the 
verification process: more recently generated templates should carry a bigger weighting towards 
the verification result while older templates should be given a smaller weighting for the 
verification result. Therefore, a numerical value for the freshness of the template is employed to 
improve the performance of the framework; the freshness of the template is obtained by utilising 
the following formula: 
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Freshness = (n - number of days since the template was generated)/n 
where n is the number of days employed in the template generation process  
The templates’ freshness is calculated on a daily basis straight after the template regeneration 
process. A template will be removed from the Behaviour Template table when its freshness equals 
zero (i.e. the template is out of date). When the Behaviour Template table is empty, the user has 
to perform the enrolment process to repopulate templates again. For instance, if 10 days is chosen 
for a user’s profile duration, after two weeks’ holiday (assume the mobile device is not in use 
during this period), that person will have to carry out the enrolment process once again to 
generate new profile templates as their existing templates are considered obsolete.  
As demonstrated by the experimental results presented in Chapter 4, system verification 
performance can be improved significantly by utilising more log entries. Therefore, the framework 
utilises a smoothing function by employing m (where m is an integer > 0) consecutive application 
activities as one verification input. Moreover, experimental results of Chapter 4 suggest that the 
larger the m value is, the better the system performance would be; this means that a long 
verification time might be needed if the framework chose a large value for m. Such an incident 
would provide opportunities for potential misuse. By employing the template of each individual 
application and the imposter’s data, an EER for verifying these m applications can be obtained for 
each of the smoothing techniques as shown in Table 5.10. 
ID Number of applications EER 
1 1 16.5% 
2 2 13.5% 
3 3 12.1% 
: : : 
Table 5.10: Smoothing Function 
Table 5.10 shows various system performances when a different number of applications’ activities 
are employed by the smoothing function. For instance, the system achieves an EER of 13.5% when 
the smoothing function utilises 2 applications’ activities as input data for the verification process. 
More importantly, these system performances (i.e. EER) will be utilised as threshold reference 
points when the Behaviour Classification Engine performs verification processes. For example, 
when the Behaviour Classification Engine verifies three applications it will use 12.1% as a threshold 
(according to Table 5.10).      
As described in Chapter 3, the threshold is a critical parameter for a biometric system as it 
determines the level of security the system provides versus the level of convenience a user gets: 
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higher levels of security would have legitimate users being rejected more often, while lower levels 
of security would allow imposters to gain access more easily. Therefore, the proposed framework 
employs a dynamic scaling threshold setting allowing users to flexibly choose their threshold 
setting based upon their security requirement.  
 
As shown above, the threshold includes five setting scales: more convenient, convenient, normal, 
secure and more secure represented by 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 on the scale respectively. Among these five 
scales, the normal scale represents a reference point for threshold settings. At the normal setting, 
the system threshold for each user is the EER of their smoothing function. When the threshold 
setting slides up or down by one point, the threshold will be increased or decreased by x% (where 
x>0, e.g. 5) of the EER value of the smoothing function accordingly. At the device registration 
phase, a user is required to select which security level they prefer to have for their devices in 
general, where the normal setting is chosen by default. Also, each option is accompanied with 
descriptions which allow the user to understand in non-technical terms what these options 
represent.  
5.3.3 Behaviour Classification Engine  
The Behaviour Classification Engine provides the main functionality for the verification process. 
When a verification requirement (as demonstrated in Figure 5.4) is met, the Behaviour 
Classification Engine calculates a temporary value for the input application activity (obtained from 
the Behavioural Input data table) by utilising their profile (stored in the Behaviour Template table). 
The temporary value will be compared with the predefined threshold: within the threshold, the 
activity will be assumed as legitimate; if exceeding the threshold, the activity will be classified as 
illegitimate. Then, the Behaviour Classification Controller sends the labelled activity data to the 
Behaviour Audit table and forwards the verification result to the Security Manager which will 
make a response based upon the operation modes of the framework, discussed in section 5.6.  
Threshold setting 
Increase convenience  Increase security  
1
  
2 4 5 3 
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Figure 5.4: Behaviour Classification Engine 
The Behaviour Classification Engine performs verifications based upon one of the following criteria 
and the checking processes are depicted in Figure 5.5: 
 The requirement of the smoothing function: the Behaviour Classification Engine utilises 
the smoothing function to verify a number of applications’ activities (e.g. six applications) 
as one input to achieve the best possible system performance. 
 The verification time: to gather a desired number of applications’ activities may be time 
consuming and this would open the potential for misuse. However, this problem can be 
minimised by employing the verification time requirement which forces the Behaviour 
Classification Engine to perform verifications even if the desired number of applications’ 
activities are not collected.   
 The sensitivity of the application: is used by the Behaviour Classification Engine to 
improve a user’s convenience when they require access to high value applications but the 
current SS level is below 2.   
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Figure 5.5: the verification requirement checking processes of the Behaviour Profiling Engine 
The experimental results presented in Chapter 4, demonstrate that the behaviour profiling system 
can achieve its best performance by utilising 6 applications for the smoothing function. Hence, the 
requirement of the smoothing function is that verification can be processed when 6 application 
activities are gathered. When an application is utilised, the Behaviour Classification Engine will not 
perform verification but wait for the user to access another application; when the total number of 
applications reaches 6, the Behaviour Classification Engine will verify these 6 applications’ 
activities.  
The verification time is the time period that controls how long the Behaviour Classification Engine 
can take to perform verification on a number of applications; it is chosen by the user at the 
registration phase. As soon as an application is utilised, a verification timer will be automatically 
started. When the timer is smaller than the verification time, the Behaviour Classification 
Controller compares the total number of applications with the requirement of the smoothing 
function (i.e. requires 6 application activities); when the requirement of the smoothing function is 
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met, these application activities will be verified by the Behaviour Classification Engine; otherwise, 
the Behaviour Classification Engine will have to wait until the total number of application activities 
reaches to 6. When the timer equals the verification time, the Behaviour Classification Engine will 
verify the application activities even if the requirement of the smoothing function is not met. By 
employing the verification time as a reference, this forces the framework to make a security 
decision within the reference timeframe even though the total number of applications has not 
met the requirement of the Smoothing Function. Therefore, the framework will always provide 
security within a reasonable timeframe. 
The third requirement that enables the Behaviour Classification Engine to perform verification is 
the sensitivity of the application. When a user requests access to a high value mobile application 
but the SS level is below 2, the Behaviour Classification Engine will verify any applications which 
have not been verified before and update the SS level even though the total number of 
applications has not met the requirement of the smoothing function or the timer is less than the 
verification time. If the updated SS level meets the security requirement for access to the high 
value application, the user will be granted access. Otherwise, the user will be challenged with a 
randomly selected security question. In this way, a level of user’s inconvenience will be reduced.  
5.3.4 Communication Engine 
The Communication Engine acts as an interface between the framework and the application 
features repository, the imposter behaviour database and other security controls (as 
demonstrated in Figure 5.6). By utilising the Communication Engine, the framework can easily 
update the application information and the imposter data through a wireless link (e.g. a Wi-Fi 
connection), and communicate with other mobile security controls internally within the mobile 
device when the framework operates in dependent mode. 
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Figure 5.6: Communication Engine 
The online application features repository (as described in section 5.3.1) contains the category of 
each application (either inter, intra-standard or intra-extended) and the details of their features. 
The online application features repository updates itself regularly as new mobile applications 
become available on a daily basis. When a new application is installed by a user, the framework 
checks if the details of that application are already stored in the Application records; if not, the 
framework will utilise the Communication Engine to communicate with the online application 
features repository and request information for that application. By utilising the application 
information updated in the Application record, the framework will be able to determine which 
information should be extracted into various features for this new application when it is used by 
the user.   
The imposter behaviour database is a collection of anonymous users’ mobile applications activities. 
These activities can be utilised as imposter data for obtaining the EER of the system for individual 
mobile users: obviously one user’s normal applications usage will become abnormal activity on 
another user’s mobile device. Be default, the framework is equipped with imposter data for 
calculating the EER of the system at the template generation/regeneration stages. According to 
Flurry (2009), a user’s mobile application activities tend to change after a period of time; 
depending upon individual users, some may change in a shorter period (e.g. 10 days) while others 
may take a longer period (e.g. 30 days). As a result, some elements of the imposter data could 
become less relevant to the user’s current application activities and may result in a lower system 
FAR; this will potentially affect system performance by increasingly rejecting legitimate user’s 
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application usage. Therefore, when the system FAR rate exhibits a steady decrease over a period 
of time, it is a good indication that the framework should update its imposter data. At that 
moment, the Communication Engine will send a request to the imposter behaviour database to 
obtain the latest relevant imposter data samples and update the existing imposter behaviour 
dataset.  
As demonstrated in Figure 5.6, apart from the Applications Update and Imposter Data Update 
functions, the Communication Engine has another function: Behaviour Profiling Notification. The 
Behaviour Profiling Notification function has two sub functions: sending lockdown codes and 
outputting verification results. Only one of them will be utilised according to the operation mode 
of the framework which is discussed in section 5.6. In standalone mode, the framework locks 
down the device after several security breaches. Then the Security Manager generates a lockdown 
code. Depending upon the nature of the ownership of the device, the Communication Controller 
will send the code to an appropriate destination. If the device is owned by a company, the code 
will be sent to the system administrator of the company; if the device is for personal use, the code 
will be sent to the user’s appointed destination, obtained from the owner at the device 
registration phase. When the framework operates in dependent mode, the framework works as a 
component for a more comprehensive security management system (e.g. TAS). As a result, the 
Communication Engine functions in a simpler manner: it forwards verification results provided by 
the Security Manager to the corresponding system. How the security management system treats 
the result depends upon its own configuration which is not covered by the proposed framework; 
however, examples of corresponding systems are discussed in section 5.6.2. 
5.4 Security Status Module 
The Security Status Module has two major functions: providing general feedback information to 
the user and calculating the SS level. For general feedback information, it includes: when, where 
and which application(s) the user used over a period of time and the verification results from this 
usage (whether passed or failed). Despite not every user viewing the information offered by the 
Security Status Module, it does provide a useful insight which may show the user how their device 
is utilised and therefore help them to identify possible misuse. 
The SS level constantly indicates what security setting the system is at. The SS level is used by the 
framework to monitor how secure a system is and provide or deny access to a user accordingly. 
When the SS level meets security requirements, access to the mobile device will be granted. The 
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SS level is a numeric value in the range of -3 to +3: -3 indicates low security whilst +3 indicates high 
security8. When the device is initially used, the SS level is set to 0, the normal security level. 
Subsequently the SS level will fluctuate based upon two critical factors: the application 
performance factor and the verification result. The application performance factor is dynamically 
allocated to each application based upon their performance in terms of EER. As demonstrated in 
Table 5.11, applications with better performance are given bigger factors, while applications with 
poorer performance are allocated smaller factors. Also, if the performance of an application 
changes, the performance factor of that application is altered accordingly. Moreover, due to 
different usage patterns, users might get different performance factors even for the same 
application.   
Application Performance (EER) Factor  
0-2% 1 
2-4% 0.9 
4-6% 0.8 
6-8% 0.7 
8-10% 0.6 
10-12% 0.5 
12-14% 0.4 
14-16% 0.3 
16-18% 0.2 
>18% 0.1 
Table 5.11: Application Performance Factor 
After the activity of an application is verified, a temporary value will be allocated to the 
performance factor of that application. When a verification process involves more than one 
application, the temporary value will be obtained by adding the performance factor of each 
individual application together. For instance, if three applications A, B and C are utilised by the 
Smoothing function and their performance factors are 0.5, 0.7 and 0.6 respectively, the temporary 
value equals the summation of these three applications’ performance factors (i.e. 1.8). Depending 
upon the verification result, the temporary value is then added to (verified successfully) or 
subtracted from (verified unsuccessfully) the existing SS level to derive the current SS level as 
shown in Figure 5.7.     
                     
 
   
                       
Where VR=Verification result, APF= Application Performance Factor, m= number of applications 
                                                          
8
 The boundaries defined on the numerical scale are only provided as a suggestion. In practice, these values 
may be redefined. 
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Figure 5.7: The SS level calculation process 
The time that has elapsed between two verification processes also affects the SS level. It is 
important that when a device is not used for a period of time, its SS level should be reduced 
accordingly. In this way, the opportunity of a device being abused would reduce significantly when 
the device was left with a high SS level for a while. The formula for degrading the current SS level 
when the device is not used for a period of time is illustrated in Figure 5.8. The Time Period is an 
average duration between two applications being utilised by a normal mobile device user. Based 
upon users’ activities presented in Chapter 4, analysis was carried out and found that a typical 
Time Period is around 50 minutes, meaning an application is utilised by a mobile user every 50 
minutes on average (care should be taken on this suggestion as the figures were obtained in 2004; 
it is highly likely that people now interact more often with their mobile devices compared with a 
few years ago). Hence, it is suggested that the actual Time Period employed by the framework 
should be smaller than 50 minutes. The time factor does not have any influence on a negative 
Current SS level. The negative Current SS level can only be changed when a user’s behaviour is 
verified or an Unlock code is entered.   
 
Figure 5.8: The SS level degradation function 
By utilising this formula, two types of mobile users will receive more benefits from two different 
aspects: frequent users (convenient aspect) and infrequent users (security aspect). For the 
frequent users, their SS level should be kept at a high level most of the time as their SS level is 
updated regularly preventing the level dropping to 0; hence this provides more convenience if 
they want to access high value mobile resources which require with a high level system security 
(this is discussed fully in section 5.6.1). For infrequent users, their SS level should degrade to 0 well 
before they utilise another application. In this way, their systems are not left with a high SS level 
for a long time, preventing abuse of valuable mobile resources. The Time Period does play a 
significant role in the formula and it is not easy to define a universal time period for all mobile 
users; the actual Time Period depends upon what level of security an individual user requires and 
how often they utilise their devices. Nonetheless, the degradation function potentially opens an 
opportunity for misuse despite the one that is minimised by this process. Improving security in this 
 
Where Current SS level > 0;  
When (Current SS level * Time period) <Time elapsed, SS level equals 0; 
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fashion will always have a trade-off and the improvement in user convenience does introduce this 
issue. However, this process of degradation helps to minimise it.     
5.5 Inventory database 
The Inventory database contains a number of tables which can be utilised by the system 
administrator for various purposes, such as checking the intrusive verification interface occurrence 
and updating the user’s information. These data storage areas are the SS levels and user’s 
information tables. 
All changes of the SS level are stored in the System Security levels table as demonstrated in Table 
5.12. Normally, the date, time, current SS level, updated SS level after an application is utilised and 
the application being utilised are stored in the System Security levels table. When the current SS 
level does not meet the security requirement (i.e. smaller than 2 when the user requests access to 
high value applications or smaller than -2 when the user tries to access normal applications), a 
randomly selected security question will be employed to verify the user’s identity. For these 
scenarios, in addition to the normal details, the security question being utilised and the challenge 
outcome will also be stored in the table. When the user fails to answer the security question three 
times in a row, the device will be locked. As a result, an unlock code is required from the user 
before they can access any applications on the mobile device. The full details of this occurrence 
will be accordingly recorded in the System Security levels table. 
ID Date Time 
Current 
SS_Level 
Updated 
SS_Level 
App Security_Question Result 
1 22/09/2011 22:45:31 0.1 -0.12 Clock - - 
2 22/09/2011 23:10:50 1.5 2.2 Telephone SQ_1 Pass 
3 23/09/2011 10:36:10 -0.1 -0.05 Internet - - 
4 24/09/2011 11:15:22 -2.1 -2.1 Files SQ_5 Fail 
5 27/09/2011 15:52:16 -2.1 0.51 Telephone Unlock code Pass  
6 27/09/2011 18:53:12 0 0.3 Games - - 
: : : : : : : : 
Table 5.12: System Security levels 
By using the information stored in the System Security levels table, a graphical overview of the 
security status of the device during a period of time can be obtained. Also, possible intrusion can 
be identified by utilising the graphical feedback. Moreover, when the security question is 
frequently asked within a particular duration (e.g. 50 minutes) and the answer is provided 
correctly, a number of suggestions regarding potential problems can be provided by the 
framework to the system administrator:  
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 Problem with the template: the template for certain applications may not contain unique 
characteristics; therefore the template of the application should be regenerated. 
  Problem with the threshold: the threshold may not be set properly; a re-adjusted 
threshold may prevent the question being asked frequently. 
 Problem with an application: an application may not be classifiable after all; that 
application should not be considered for performing the classification process. 
A user’s information that is collected at the device registration phase is stored in the user’s 
information table (as shown in Table 5.13). The information includes the user’s name, a means of 
contact (e.g. email address) and a number of security questions. The user’s name is utilised by the 
framework to generate greetings for each individual mobile device user. Also, from the 
administrator’s perspective (when the device is deployed by a private organisation), they can 
generate a log of which users utilise what devices; the actual number of users will depend upon 
each individual private organisations and each user may have more than one mobile device. At the 
device registration stage, users are asked to complete a number of security questions (the actual 
number can vary depending upon the individual’s preference). These security questions are 
employed to intrusively verify a user when the current SS level does not meet the security 
requirement. Also at the registration stage, a means of contact is required for the user which will 
be utilised to communicate a code to the user when the device is locked down. A user’s contact 
could be either a mobile telephone number or an email address; texting can be used for sending 
the lockdown code if a device does not support the email service. Depending upon the ownership 
of the device, the lockdown code will either be sent to the user’s pre-appointed contact address if 
the device is privately owned by the user; or the lockdown code will be sent to an administrator if 
the device is deployed by a company. By using the lockdown code, the user can unlock their device 
and start utilising the device again.  
 
Table 5.13: User’s information 
User Name Andy 
Email Address (telephone number) Andy@li.com (07777123456) 
1: What is your favourite colour? Blue 
2: Name your favourite restaurant  KFC 
3: Memorable date  23011999 
: : 
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5.6 Security Manager  
The Security Manager is the brain of the framework as it controls all other elements. Based upon 
the working mode of the framework, the Security Manager has a variety of operational modes. 
These modes are discussed fully in the following section.  
5.6.1 Standalone mode 
In standalone mode, the role of the Security Manager includes: 
 Continuously verifying the user’s identity through their application activities 
 Performing profile generation and re-generation on a daily basis 
 Updating an application performance and the requirement of the smoothing function 
 Calculating and maintaining the SS level 
 Requesting an intrusive verification when the SS level falls below the security 
requirements and dealing with subsequent actions based upon the verification result. 
The key task of the Security Manager is to monitor the current SS level and make subsequent 
decisions accordingly when a user requests access to an application. This is achieved by utilising 
the Process Algorithm as illustrated in Figure 5.9. The Process Algorithm is the core security 
component of the proposed framework. The Process Algorithm contains three main checking 
stages (as illustrated in Table 5.14) before the device is locked down (requiring a lockdown code 
from a system administrator or a PUK code from a cellular network provider to enable further use 
of the device). These checking stages were chosen to provide a high level of user convenience and 
improved security. The Process Algorithm employs a mixture of transparent and intrusive methods 
to verify a user’s identity. The majority of legitimate users will experience transparent phases; 
while intrusive verification challenges are utilised to ensure users’ legitimacy in the event of access 
being required to the mobile device but the SS level is below the set security requirements.  
Checking Stage Description 
1 Check whether an application is protected 
2 Check the current SS level 
3 Intrusive verification if the current SS level does not meet requirements 
Table 5.14: Three main checking stages 
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Figure 5.9: Security Manager: Process Algorithm 
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The Security Manager carries out a number of checks when a user requests access to an 
application.  First of all, the Security Manager examines whether the application is a high value 
mobile resource. According to Ledermuller and Clarke (2011), a high value mobile resource is an 
application associated with high risk levels, such as corporate emails and e-banking applications. In 
order to protect high value applications, a security requirement is set: high value applications 
cannot be accessed when the SS level is below 2 unless the user passes an intrusive verification. In 
comparison, the security requirement for normal applications is more relaxed: users can gain 
access to them when the SS level is greater or equal to -2 unless the user is successfully verified 
through a randomly selected security question. 
For the second checking stage, the Security Manger compares the current SS level with the 
security requirements for high value and normal applications. If the current SS level meets the 
requirements, the users will be granted access to that application. Otherwise, further checking will 
be performed based upon the nature of the application (whether it is a high value application or a 
normal application). If the application is a normal application, the user will be challenged with a 
randomly selected security question. If the application is associated with high value information, 
the Security Manger will make further examination of the situation: to check whether there is(are) 
any application(s) that has(have) not been verified before this high value application. If there are 
any unprotected applications, they will be verified first and the SS level will be updated 
accordingly. Then the user will be given access to the high value application if the update SS level 
is greater or equal to 2; and the user will be intrusively checked by a randomly selected security 
question if the update SS level is still less than 2. If there are not any unprotected applications 
being used before the high value application, the user will be intrusively verified by the randomly 
chosen security question.  
For the final checking stage, the Security Manger utilises a randomly selected security question as 
the intrusive verification method to verify the user’s identity. An intrusive flag that indicates how 
many times the intrusive verification method is utilised increases by 1 when the user answers the 
question; by default, the value of the intrusive flag is 0. The user will be granted access to the 
application if the question is correctly answered. Also, the current SS level will be increased by 1 
and the intrusive flag will be set to 0. When the user fails to answer the security question correctly, 
the intrusive flag remains the same. Then the user will be challenged again if the value of the 
intrusive flag is not greater than 2. When the intrusive flag equals 3, the device will be locked 
down and only an administrative security password can unlock it. When a correct unlock code is 
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entered, the Security Manager will set both the intrusive flag and the SS level to 0 and the user will 
be able to access the device once again.  
It is envisaged that if the system is working correctly, the SS level should be high enough to permit 
automatic access for legitimate users and their experience of intrusive security challenges will be 
minimised.   
5.6.2 Dependent mode 
The Behaviour Profiling framework is designed for two security purposes, either authentication or 
IDS. As a result, when it works in the dependent mode, it can become a component for an 
authentication security mechanism (e.g. the TAS) or an IDS security mechanism (e.g. the 
Knowledge-based Temporal Abstraction (KBTA) method (Shabtai et al, 2010)). In the dependent 
working mode, the Behaviour Profiling framework only provides a verification result and the final 
decision will be made by the other security mechanism.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, TAS is an authentication system utilising a number of biometrics to 
provide transparent and continuous authentication for mobile users. This has been achieved by 
employing a two-tier approach: Tier 1 selects various biometric techniques and Tier 2 combines a 
number of multibiometric methods together (as shown in Figure 5.9). The Behaviour Profiling 
framework can be used as one of the biometric techniques in Tier 1 by TAS as it employs the way 
users utilise mobile applications to verify them; also, the Behaviour Profiling framework can 
provide unique contributions in operations of the Tier 2 to the TAS system. As the Behaviour 
Profiling framework verifies mobile users based upon their application usage, TAS can utilise its 
verification output alone in pass-through mode to provide transparent and continuous 
authentication. The Behaviour Profiling framework can also be used in multimodal mode when the 
Behaviour Profiling framework utilises the smoothing function with more than one application 
usage. In this case, the performance of the TAS system will be improved despite the 
authentication process requiring a longer time to complete. Moreover, the Behaviour Profiling 
framework can work with other biometric techniques to form a fusion mode in the TAS system. 
For instance, when a user sends a text message, their keystroke activities (i.e. how each character 
is typed into the message) and their behaviour profiling activities (i.e. where and who the message 
is sent) can be used in one fusion function. In this way, TAS can provide the authentication 
decision more confidently.       
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Source: Clarke, 2011 
Figure 5.10: TAS two tier authentication approach 
As described in Chapter 2, there are a number of IDS systems proposed to detect malware 
presence within the mobile device environment, such as the KBTA method. The Knowledge-based 
Temporal Abstraction method is a host based IDS. In addition, Shabtai et al (2010) proposed a host 
based IDS architecture to accommodate the aforementioned method (as depicted in Figure 5.10). 
Their evaluation indicates that the architecture works well for detecting mobile malware. 
Nonetheless, the architecture cannot detect any user related misuse. Therefore, the Behaviour 
Profiling framework and the architecture could work together to form a new host based IDS for 
mobile devices which can provide comprehensive detection of user misuse and also mobile 
malware. As a result, an alert will be raised not only when a device is infected by malware but also 
when it is misused by a user. Also, more accurate alerts would be generated when an application 
is infected by malware. For instance, when the text messaging service is infected by malware, it 
may send messages to a premium number without the owner’s knowledge. If any messages were 
sent to the premium number, the Behaviour Profiling framework should detect the abnormal 
activity as it deviated from the user’s normal behaviour. In addition, as the messages were 
generated by malware, the malware detection part of the IDS can also pick up the abnormal 
activity. Therefore, two alerts would be raised by the IDS system after an unauthorised text 
message was sent. This will improve the performance of the IDS system significantly.  
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Source: Shabtai et al, 2010 
Figure 5.11: The Android HIDS architecture  
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a novel Behaviour Profiling framework which provides robust, transparent and 
continuous protection for mobile devices by verifying mobile users’ application usage activities has 
been designed and the components and functionalities of the framework described in detail. By 
employing the dynamic profiling technique, the framework can generate a fresh user’s profile 
allowing more accurate verification results to be obtained. By utilising the smoothing function, the 
framework reduces the impact of the high false rejection problem which every single behavioural 
biometric technique experiences; hence, the performance of the framework can be improved 
despite decision making taking longer to process. By assigning various security risk scores to 
different applications, the impact for each application towards the overall system security is 
controlled by the framework. As a scaled threshold setting was employed by the framework, a 
system administrator will be able to configure individual deployment based upon their security 
requirements. In order to improve a user’s convenience as well as protecting the security of the 
device, the framework provides an additional level of verification by monitoring the SS level of the 
device. When the SS level is high, all mobile applications can be accessed; however when the SS 
level is low, only unprotected applications can be utilised. Also, a user’s identity is not verified 
based upon a single pass or fail but a number of consecutive verification results. The framework 
can operate in different modes to serve a variety of purposes. When the framework operates in 
standalone mode, it verifies a user’s identity and responds accordingly in isolation. When the 
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framework works in dependent mode, it provides verification results based upon user’s activities, 
with the final decision being made by another security mechanism (either an authentication 
system or an IDS system).   In the next chapter, the Behaviour Profiling framework will be 
evaluated in various scenarios via a simulation. 
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6 Evaluation of the Behaviour Profiling Framework 
6.1 Introduction  
This purpose of this chapter is to describe the evaluation process for the Behaviour Profiling 
framework proposed in Chapter 5. The performance was evaluated through a simulation approach 
utilising the MatLab environment rather than by developing a prototype on a mobile device. This 
enabled a complete validation of the processes and mechanisms over a far wider range of 
variables than would have been possible with an implemented prototype. The simulation process 
involved implementing the core functions of the Behaviour Profiling framework in standalone 
mode and verifying mobile users’ applications activities utilising the same dataset identified in 
Chapter 4. This was a partial limitation on obtaining a realistic dataset. However, it offered the 
opportunity to directly compare the performance of the framework over the base experimental 
results.  In order to examine the Behaviour Profiling framework, the following objectives were 
created: 
 Examine the performance and effectiveness of the Behaviour Profiling framework 
towards verifying the user’s identity and making subsequent decisions according to 
the verification output in a number of scenarios. The performance and effectiveness 
of the framework is then compared with the counterpart offered by the most widely 
used PIN authentication technique.    
 Explore the relationship upon the level of security and usability when various variables 
within the framework are modified. Factors such as the smoothing function and  
verification time will be modelled to understand what effect they have upon system 
operation.  
6.2 Simulation Implementation  
For the simulation system, the majority components of the framework were implemented in the 
Matlab environment as illustrated in Figure 6.1. By utilising these components, the core functions 
of the framework, such as verifying a user’s application activities, updating the SS level and making 
security decisions, can be thoroughly examined. Figure 6.1 also includes the Communication 
Engine which was not created due to time constraints. Nonetheless, this did not affect the 
simulation result at all, because the engine was not required due to: 
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 The simulation system was created for examining the framework functions within a 
standalone mode rather than in the dependent mode which requires the framework to 
communicate with other security mechanisms;  
 All the application feature identification information was available as it was obtained in 
the experiments conducted in Chapter 4;  
 The imposter data also existed within the MIT dataset since one user’s applications 
activities can be utilised as the imposter data for another user.   
 
Figure 6.1: Simulation Implementation 
In general, the simulation system contains five main components and two databases and they are 
the Data Collection Engine, Behaviour Profile Engine, Behaviour Classification Engine, Security 
Status module, Security Manager, Behaviour Profile database and Inventory database. The Data 
Collection Engine gathers users’ applications activities, extracts various features accordingly to 
each application and converts these features into input data. The Behaviour Profile Engine 
employs the dynamic profiling technique as described both in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5: generating 
the user’s profile by utilising their most recent 14-day applications activities and also the profile is 
updated on a daily basis. The 14-day profile duration was chosen as the experimental studies of 
Chapter 4 suggested that the best system performance can be obtained by utilising 14-day 
profiling data. The Behaviour Classification Engine employs the rule-based approach which was 
proposed and tested in Chapter 4 due to its outstanding performance and low computational 
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requirements. When any of the three verification requirements (the smoothing function, the 
verification time and the status of the application (whether an application is a normal or protected 
application)) proposed in Chapter 5 is met, the Behaviour Classification Engine compares input 
data with the profile of an appropriate application by utilising the rule-based approach. On the 
basis of the verification results and the performance factor of an individual application, the 
Security Status Module updates the current SS level accordingly; also, the user’s input application 
activity will be either labelled with “legitimate user” or “imposter” according to the verification 
result and will be stored in the Behaviour Profile database for generating and/or updating a user’s 
profile and updating the performance of an individual application. The Security Manager 
constantly examines the classification criteria and orders the Behaviour Classification Engine to 
perform the classification process accordingly. The Security Manager also continuously monitors 
the current SS level and assesses whether to grant the user’s permission to access the mobile 
device or not. The Behaviour Profile database is employed for storing a user’s application activities 
and profiles; while the Inventory database is mainly utilised for storing changes occurred for the SS 
level.  
6.3 Simulation process 
The entire simulation process was conducted within the Matlab environment. The simulation 
system employed the same 76 users’ 4 weeks mobile activities which were utilised in Chapter 4’s 
experiments as the simulation data. For each user, their activities were divided into two halves: 
the first half contains first two-week activities while the other half includes the last two-week 
activities. A user’s profile was initially generated by utilising their first two-week activities and the 
profile was then updated on a daily basis. The second two weeks of users’ activities were 
employed to evaluate the performance of the Behaviour Profiling framework for both legitimate 
users and imposters. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Behaviour Profiling framework has several 
key parameters: the smoothing function, the verification time and the degradation function. The 
performance factor of each application also contributes to the SS level calculation process and 
plays an import role in the Behaviour Profiling framework as it directly affects the fluctuation of 
the SS level. Furthermore, the performance factor of the same application may vary for each 
individual user. Therefore, for the simulation process, each mobile user’s applications 
performance was dynamically allocated based upon their experimental results presented in 
Chapter 4. The proposed Behaviour Profiling framework can also provide an extra layer of security 
for highly valuable applications by adding an additional security requirement (the current SS level 
should be greater than 2) when users require access to these applications. In order to evaluate the 
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effect of the Behaviour Profiling framework upon protected applications, the text message 
application was chosen to simulate one of the protected applications. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
22 users utilised the text message application during the chosen 4 week period and for the 
purpose of evaluation they have been selected as representing those mobile users who would like 
to add an extra layer of protection to their valuable mobile applications. Also, these 22 users’ text 
usage represents 4.3% of the 76 users’ total application usage.  
Based upon the above simulation requirements, four scenarios were set up to evaluate the 
performance of the Behaviour Profiling framework. The performance is presented in terms of the 
probability of a legitimate user being asked a security question (and hence being falsely rejected 
(FRR)) and the probability of an imposter NOT being asked a security question (and therefore 
being falsely accepted (FAR)). For each scenario, their settings for the smoothing function and the 
verification time are illustrated in Table 6.1. In order to examine the roles in which the smoothing 
function and the verification time play, only one of them was changed between the two scenarios. 
Time periods for the degradation function were set between 1-60 minutes with a 10-minute 
interval for all four scenarios. The full sets of simulation results are presented in the next section.    
Scenario A Smoothing function: 1 application; Verification time: NA 
Scenario B Smoothing function: 3 applications; Verification time: 3 minutes 
Scenario C Smoothing function: 3 applications; Verification time: 6 minutes 
Scenario D Smoothing function: 6 applications; Verification time: 6 minutes 
Table 6.1: Four scenarios for the simulation process 
6.3.1 Simulation results – Scenario A 
In Table 6.1, the framework was configured in the following manner for simulation scenario A: 
smoothing function: 1 application and verification time: not applicable. Based upon the 
verification requirement of the Behaviour Classification Engine (in Chapter 5), a user’s application 
activity will be verified as soon as one application is utilised; therefore, the verification time is not 
applicable. For the same reason, none of the application activities were classified based upon the 
clause introduced by the Process Algorithm of the Security Manager (in Chapter 5 section 5.6.1): 
check if there are any applications not being processed before the protected application.  
The simulation results for legitimate users and imposters in scenario A are presented in Table 6.2 
and Table 6.3 respectively. By utilising 60 minutes as the time period for the degradation function, 
the best system performances for legitimate users are FRR of 8.6%, 74.8% and 11.45% for normal 
applications, the protected application and overall applications correspondingly; the high FRR for 
the protected application is due to the high security requirement for them which is the current SS 
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level needs to be larger than or equals 2. With the same set up, the system performance for 
imposters are FAR of 4.36%, 0% and 4.17% for their counterparts.  
 The probability (%) of a legitimate user being asked by a security 
question (FRR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal 
and protected applications) 
1 min 9.05 98.89 12.91 
10 mins 8.97 91.76 12.53 
20 mins 8.88 85.9 12.19 
30 mins 8.82 83.04 12.01 
40 mins 8.71 79.87 11.77 
50 mins 8.66 76.86 11.59 
60 mins 8.6 74.8 11.45 
Table 6.2: Simulation results of scenario A for legitimate users 
 The probability (%) of an imposter NOT being asked by a security 
question (FAR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal 
and protected applications) 
1 min 4.35 0 4.17 
10 mins 4.35 0 4.17 
20 mins 4.36 0 4.17 
30 mins 4.36 0 4.17 
40 mins 4.36 0 4.17 
50 mins 4.36 0 4.17 
60 mins 4.36 0 4.17 
Table 6.3: Simulation results of scenario A for imposters 
6.3.2 Simulation results – Scenario B 
As demonstrated in Table 6.1, the Behaviour Profiling framework was set up in the following 
fashion for scenario B: smoothing function set to 3 applications and verification time equal to 3 
minutes. In comparison with the configuration of scenario A, scenario B employed more 
applications for the smoothing function; this provides the opportunity of allowing the smoothing 
function to work with up to 3 application activities. According to the requirements of performing 
verification by the Behaviour Classification Engine, within the 3 minutes verification time window, 
applications will be classified when the total number being utilised reaches 3. As soon as the 
verification time exceeds 3 minutes, even the total number of utilised applications is smaller than 
3, these utilised applications will be verified by the Behaviour Classification Engine. As the 
smoothing function utilises a maximum of 3 applications, this provides an opportunity to improve 
user convenience if there are any applications not being processed before a protected application 
is utilised when the current SS level is smaller than 2.  
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Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 demonstrate the results for legitimate users and imposters from the 
simulation of scenario B. To maintain consistency between scenarios the degradation function 
utilises the same time period. Scenario B obtained the best system performance for legitimate 
users’ normal, protected and overall application usage and they are FRR of 7.57%, 77% and 11.24% 
accordingly. By utilising the same configuration, the system performances for imposters’ 
counterparts are FAR of 3.42%, 15.29% and 4.09% respectively. The FAR of 15.29% for the 
protected application is significantly higher compared with the result obtained by utilising the 
configuration of scenario A. This was due to using the smoothing function (to verify a number of 
application activities as one input) and the imposter gains the equal opportunity to reach a higher 
SS level as the legitimate users do despite the performance was improved on normal applications 
classifications.  
 The probability (%) of a legitimate user being asked by a security 
question (FRR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal and 
protected applications) 
1 min 8.05 100 13.06 
10 mins 7.87 94.28 12.53 
20 mins 7.75 88.8 12.08 
30 mins 7.72 85.95 11.88 
40 mins 7.64 81.89 11.58 
50 mins 7.62 78.57 11.38 
60 mins 7.57 77 11.24 
Table 6.4: Simulation results of scenario B for legitimate users 
 The probability (%) of an imposter NOT being asked by a security 
question (FAR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal and 
protected applications) 
1 min 3.41 15.29 4.07 
10 mins 3.42 15.29 4.08 
20 mins 3.42 15.29 4.08 
30 mins 3.42 15.29 4.08 
40 mins 3.42 15.29 4.08 
50 mins 3.42 15.29 4.09 
60 mins 3.42 15.29 4.09 
Table 6.5: Simulation results of scenario B for imposters 
6.3.3 Simulation results – Scenario C 
For scenario C, as illustrated in Table 6.1, the Behaviour Profiling framework was configured in the 
following way:  smoothing function set to 3 applications and verification time equal to 6 minutes. 
In comparison with the setup of scenario B, scenario C utilised a longer verification time; this 
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increases the potential for allowing more application activities to be processed within one 
smoothing function. Based upon the requirement of the Behaviour Classification Engine, 
application activities will be classified as soon as the total number of them reaches 3 within the 6 
minutes verification time window; when the 6 minutes verification time window is surpassed, 
even if the total number of application activities is smaller than 3, they will be processed by the 
Behaviour Classification Engine. Similarly to the setup of the scenario B for the protected 
application, scenario C also offers an opportunity to improve user convenience when they access a 
protected application when the current SS level is smaller than 2. 
Simulation results of scenario C for legitimate users and imposters are presented in Table 6.6 and 
Table 6.7 accordingly. Again, by employing a time window of 60 minutes for the degradation 
function, the best system performance for legitimate users’ normal, protected and overall 
application usages were achieved and they are FRR of 7.45%, 79.26% and 11.43% respectively. 
With the same framework setup, the system performances for imposters’ equivalents are FAR of 
2.47%, 26.39 and 3.97%.  
 The probability (%) of a legitimate user being asked by a security 
question (FRR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal and 
protected applications) 
1 min 7.96 100 13.3 
10 mins 7.83 96.23 12.89 
20 mins 7.66 90.64 12.36 
30 mins 7.63 87.8 12.15 
40 mins 7.54 84.07 11.79 
50 mins 7.51 80.85 11.58 
60 mins 7.45 79.26 11.43 
Table 6.6: Simulation results of scenario C for legitimate users 
 The probability (%) of an imposter NOT being asked by a security 
question (FAR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal and 
protected applications) 
1 min 2.45 26.39 3.95 
10 mins 2.46 26.39 3.96 
20 mins 2.46 26.39 3.96 
30 mins 2.46 26.39 3.96 
40 mins 2.47 26.39 3.96 
50 mins 2.47 26.39 3.97 
60 mins 2.47 26.39 3.97 
Table 6.7: Simulation results of scenario C for imposters 
Chapter 6: Evaluation of the Behaviour Profiling Framework 
150 
 
6.3.4 Simulation results – Scenario D 
According to Table 6.1, the Behaviour Profiling framework was configured in the following manner 
for scenario D: smoothing function set to 6 applications and verification time equal to 6 minutes. 
Compared with the setup for scenario C, scenario D employed a higher number of applications for 
the smoothing function; this allows the smoothing function to potentially work with up to 6 
application activities. According to the verification requirements for the Behaviour Classification 
Engine, within the 6 minutes verification time, application activities will be classified once there 
are 6 applications being utilised. When the 6 minutes verification time is exceeded, application 
activities will be processed by the Behaviour Classification Engine even though the total number of 
activities is less than 6. In comparison with the configuration for scenario C, the setting for 
scenario D provides the opportunity to improve user convenience when they request access for a 
protected application when the current SS level does not meet the security requirement.  
The simulation results for legitimate users and imposters in scenario D are presented in Table 6.8 
and Table 6.9 accordingly. Once again, by setting the time period of the degradation function to 60 
minutes, the best system for legitimate users’ normal, protected and overall application usages 
were obtained and they are FRR of 7.49%, 78.86% and 11.63% accordingly. By utilising the same 
configuration for the framework, the system performance for imposters’ counterparts are a FAR of 
2.5%, 26.73% and 4.05% respectively.  
 The probability (%) of a legitimate user being asked by a security 
question (FRR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal and 
protected applications) 
1 min 7.97 100 13.58 
10 mins 7.85 96.19 13.2 
20 mins 7.77 90.71 12.7 
30 mins 7.69 87.46 12.42 
40 mins 7.58 84.08 12.03 
50 mins 7.57 80.76 11.82 
60 mins 7.49 78.86 11.63 
Table 6.8: Simulation results of scenario D for legitimate users 
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 The probability (%) of an imposter NOT being asked by a security 
question (FAR) 
Degradation 
function 
Normal 
applications 
Protected 
application 
Overall ( including normal and 
protected applications) 
1 min 2.48 26.73 4.04 
10 mins 2.49 26.73 4.04 
20 mins 2.49 26.73 4.05 
30 mins 2.49 26.73 4.05 
40 mins 2.49 26.73 4.05 
50 mins 2.5 26.73 4.05 
60 mins 2.5 26.73 4.05 
Table 6.9: Simulation results of scenario D for imposters 
Table 6.10 demonstrates the smoothing function usage’s statistics for all scenarios. As scenario A 
only utilised 1 application for the smoothing function, it has got 100% for the smoothing function 
utilising 1 application. As the other scenarios employed a maximum number of applications for the 
smoothing function with 3, 3 and 6 applications respectively, they all had a mixture of smoothing 
function usage.   
Smoothing function Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
1 application 100% 57.5% 45.13% 44.45% 
2 applications - 32.53% 32.43% 31.51% 
3 applications - 9.97% 22.44% 14.24% 
4 applications - - - 6.65% 
5 applications - - - 2.21% 
6 applications - - - 0.94% 
Table 6.10: The statistic on the smoothing function usage for all four scenarios 
Table 6.11 presents the statistic on the usage of the “check if there are any applications not being 
processed before the protected application” clause for each scenario with the degradation 
function set to 60 minutes. For instance, for legitimate users, there were some cases that 
applications not being processed before the protected application, and the usage of these 
protected applications is 6.18% of the total protected application usage for scenario B; despite the 
initial SS level smaller than 2, 10.26% of this 6.18% protected application usage did not need the 
legitimate user to answer a randomly selected security question because after processing those 
unprocessed applications, the current SS level is greater or equal to 2.  
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 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
Answer ‘yes’ to the clause for 
legitimate users 
- 6.18% 6.18% 10.14% 
The percentage of saving the 
legitimate user to answer a security 
question because of this clause 
- 10.26% 5.13% 17.19% 
Answer ‘yes’ to the clause for 
imposters 
- 0.29% 0.29% 0.36% 
The percentage of saving the 
imposter to answer a security 
question because of this clause 
- 0% 0% 0% 
Table 6.11: The statistic on the usage of the “check if there are any applications not being 
processed before the protected application” clause 
6.4 Discussion  
Based upon the simulation result, it demonstrates that the Behaviour Profiling framework 
outperforms the PIN based authentication method in several aspects: security, convenience and 
extra protection on protected applications (high value applications). In order to illustrate this 
point, the most secure way of deploying a PIN on a mobile device is utilised which requires a PIN 
after the mobile device has been idle for more than one minute. By utilising this setting, the PIN 
based method was applied to the same simulation data; it required users to enter a PIN for every 
single application usage (100% intrusive authentication) regardless the status of the application. 
Therefore, the PIN based authentication method is not user friendly after all. From a security point 
of view, people cannot rely on the PIN based authentication technique as their weakness was well 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 section 2.4.1. To compare with the PIN based authentication technique 
performance, the results of simulation scenario A is used because the way that how scenario A 
simulates is the most closed set up to how the PIN based method operates. As demonstrated in 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, by utilising 60 minutes for the degradation function, the Behaviour 
Profiling framework achieved the best system performance with an overall FRR of 11.46% and FAR 
of 4.17%. For the 11.46% of FRR, it indicates that there is a 11.46% of chance that a legitimate user 
will be challenged by a security question. At the same time, this shows that with 88.54% the 
chance the legitimate user will be transparently verified through their application activities and 
automatically obtain access to the device. In addition, the chance for the legitimate user to be 
transparently verified is boosted to 91.4% (1-8.6%(FRR)) when the legitimate user only requests 
access for normal applications. Despite the FRR for the protected application being significantly 
higher in comparison with the normal applications’ counterpart, the legitimate user still has a 
25.2% chance to access the protected application without needing answering a randomly selected 
security question. In addition, the usage of the protected application only represents 4.3% of the 
Chapter 6: Evaluation of the Behaviour Profiling Framework 
153 
 
total application usage. This indicates that the legitimate users will be mainly verified 
transparently. For the 4.17% of FAR, it reveals that the imposter has only got 4.17% of the chance 
to misuse an application and 95.83% of the time they will be denied access to an application. The 
4.3% of overall FAR was obtained by utilising the simulation programme to continuously classify 
the imposter’s data only; the imposter’s application usage was permitted even though they could 
not answer the randomly selected security question. In reality, it is highly likely the imposter will 
be intrusively prompted with a randomly selected security question; if they fail to answer the 
question three times in a row, the device will be locked down and they will not be able to access 
the mobile device anymore. By utilising the same configuration, the chance for an imposter to 
misuse a normal application is a 4.36% as the opportunity for them to abuse the protected 
application is none. This demonstrates that in comparison with the PIN based authentication 
technique, by utilising the Behaviour Profiling framework, the chance for the imposter to abuse 
the mobile device is minimised and extra protection is offered to high value applications. Based 
upon the above discussion, it suggest that the Behaviour Profiling framework is capable of 
providing continuous and transparent protection (for the majority of the time) for mobile devices 
by utilising user application activities and it outperforms the PIN based authentication technique 
in the areas of security and user convenience.    
The impact of the smoothing function and verification time were examined through the simulation 
scenarios. As demonstrated by the simulation results (from Table 6.2 to Table 6.9), the best 
system performance (11.24% for overall FRR and 4.09% for overall FAR) was obtained by utilising a 
combination of the smoothing function of 3 applications and the verification time of 3 minutes. 
With the other configuration of the smoothing function and settings of the verification time, the 
overall system performance decreased slightly.  
The effectiveness of the degradation function was also evaluated by the simulation. As illustrated 
by the simulation results (form Table 6.2 to Table 6.9), when the time period of the degradation 
function gets longer, the FRR reduces which allows the legitimate users to gain access more easily. 
On the other hand, the impact on the FAR is not significant due to the imposter’s activities were 
verified in a continuous fashion and hence most of the imposters experienced a negative SS value 
which the degradation function has no influence on. However, in real life, an imposter could pick 
up a mobile device with a high SS level if the time period was set too long and the device was left 
with a high level SS initially.  This would increase the chance for the imposter to abuse both the 
normal and protected applications.  
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As demonstrated by Table 6.11, by utilising the “check if there are any applications not being 
processed before the protected application” clause, a small portion of the access request on the 
protected applications was automatically permitted to legitimate users and this improves user 
convenience. However, none of the imposter’s activities on the protected applications were 
bypassed by utilising the same clause. This may be caused by the imposter’s activities that were 
classified in a continuous manner and hence the chance for an imposter to get a positive SS level is 
relative small.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The simulation results demonstrate that the Behaviour Profiling framework outperforms the PIN 
based authentication technique in terms of security and user convenience. By utilising the 
smoothing function of three applications, verification time of 3 minutes and a 60 minute time 
period of the degradation function, the Behaviour Profiling framework achieved the best 
performance with FRR rates of 7.57%, 77% and 11.24% for the normal, protected and overall 
applications accordingly and with FAR rates of 3.42%, 15.29% and 4.09% for their counterparts. It 
is clearly from these results, that the Behaviour Profiling framework is able to provide continuous 
and transparent verification to protect mobile devices and the research project makes a valuable 
contribution to the area of mobile security.  
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7 Conclusions and Future Work  
This chapter summaries the thesis by reviewing the project’s main achievements and discussing 
the project’s limitations. The chapter then highlights the future research directions within the 
mobile device security field.  
7.1 Achievements of the research 
Overall, the project has achieved all the objectives initially set out in Chapter 1, with a series of 
experimental studies and simulations undertaken for the development of a behaviour profiling 
technique. The full achievements are:     
1. A thorough investigation of the current security challenges that mobile devices experience 
(Chapter 2). By reviewing the complex environment that mobile devices operate in, the 
sensitive information that they possess, the numerous security threats that lead to misuse 
and the lack of protection that is offered, the need for a robust security mechanism which 
can offer continuous protection is identified. 
2. A comprehensive review of biometric authentication techniques (Chapter 3). By 
presenting a solid background for biometric authentication mechanisms, focus was then 
given for those which have the potential of providing security on mobile devices. 
Contributions of previous behavioural related mobile security projects (both 
authentication (host based) and IDS (network based)) have been studied, determining the 
scope and requirement for studying the feasibility of utilising a behaviour profiling 
technique within the mobile host environment.  
3. An experimental investigation and evaluation of the behaviour profiling technique through 
mobile user application activities (Chapter 4). A series of experimental studies were 
conducted on real user application usages from the MIT Reality dataset. Firstly, by utilising 
the descriptive statistical method, several application features demonstrated the potential 
for a successful behaviour profiling classification. This was then evaluated by employing 
more complex solutions (i.e. Neural Networks and a rule based approach) for a preliminary 
study; more importantly, the study demonstrated the most optimal classifier (i.e. the rule 
based approach) to behaviour profiling within the mobile host environment. The feasibility 
of the behavioural profiling technique was investigated on mobile users’ intra-standard 
applications, telephony, text message and multi-instance applications, utilising a 
combination of the rule based approach, a dynamic profiling technique and a smoothing 
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function. In comparison with other biometric techniques, the  result of the investigation is 
within a level of acceptance. This successfully demonstrates the behaviour profiling 
technique’s potential to verify mobile user via their application usages. 
4. The proposal and completion of a novel mobile security verification framework by utilising 
the behaviour profiling technique (Chapter 5). The proposed architecture continuously 
verifies user application usage based upon three criteria: the smoothing function (for 
improving performance), the verification time (for ensuring security within certain 
timeframes) and the application nature (offering better convenience). By utilising the 
verification result, a dynamic contribution towards current SS level is allocated depending 
upon individual users and applications. The SS level adds a layer of intelligence to the 
verification process, providing the possibility level presenting how secure the mobile 
device is rather than one-off pass or fail verification for the user’s identity. With high level 
system security, automatic access will be granted to users; while, with low level system 
security, users would have to verify themselves through a knowledge based approach 
before they can access the device. The proposed framework was also designed to 
collaborate with other security controls (i.e. authentication and IDS systems) for providing 
enhanced mobile security.  
5. The evaluation of the Behaviour Profiling framework via a simulation approach (Chapter 
6). A number of configurations of the proposed framework were evaluated by utilising the 
MIT Reality dataset. System performance was calculated for both legitimate users and 
imposters based up their application usage. By utilising the smoothing function of three 
applications, verification time of 3 minutes and a time period of 60 minutes of the  
degradation function, the Behaviour Profiling framework obtained the best performance 
with FRR rates of 7.57%, 77% and 11.24% for the normal, protected and overall 
applications respectively and with FAR rates of 3.42%, 15.29% and 4.09% for their 
counterparts.  
A number of papers related to the research project have been presented and published in 
refereed journal and conferences (the papers are demonstrated in Appendix (F)). In particular, 
the author was awarded a best PhD paper prize at the 10th European Conference on 
Information Warfare and Security (ECIW). As a result, it is deemed that the research has made 
positive contributions to the mobile security domain, and especially in the field of biometric 
verification.   
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7.2 Limitations of the research project 
Despite the research objectives having been met, a number of limitations associated with the 
project can be identified. The key limitations of the research are summarised below.   
1. The MIT Reality dataset was collected during the period of 2004 -2005. At that time, the 
number of applications available to users to choose was limited; this resulted in a large 
similarity of intra-standard application usage between mobile users and hence increased 
difficulty for any classification methods. Also, the dataset only contained two intra-
extended applications’ (i.e. telephony and text message) activities; although other intra-
extended applications (e.g. web browsing) were utilised by users the logging software was 
not designed to collect the extra unique information (e.g. web address) from those intra-
extended applications. Having said this, the experiment was able to utilise the MIT dataset 
to demonstrate that the intra-extended application contains far more discriminate 
information than the intra-standard application does.  
2. In order to maximise the number of participants, the experiment dataset only contained 
one month of overlapping user activities. As a result, the performance of the behaviour 
profiling technique was not examined by utilising a longer profile period despite the 
experimental results of Chapter 4 suggesting that the longer the profiling period is, the 
better the performance would be.     
3. The chosen one month dataset contains a large amount of information (more than 45,000 
application activities) and it requires significant amount of computer resource to be 
processed within the Matlab environment. This limitation restrains computational greedy 
classifiers (e.g. RBF neural network) to be employed on the full one month dataset but a 
small proportion of activities extracted from the one month dataset. Therefore, the best 
theoretical performance for a behaviour profile technique was arguably unable to be 
obtained although none of current mobile devices would be capable of accommodating 
such a classifier.   
4. Due to limited resources that were available, only the core functions of the standalone 
mode of the Behaviour Profiling framework were evaluated through the developed 
simulation system, but the performance for the dependent mode of the Behaviour 
Profiling framework (i.e. collaboratively working with an authentication or IDS system) was 
un-examined. Given the successful investigation of the standalone mode of the Behaviour 
Profiling framework, it was deemed that when the Behaviour Profiling framework 
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operates in dependent mode, it would arguably make a positive contribution towards the 
overall performance of an authentication or IDS system.         
7.3 Suggestions & Scope for Future Work 
This research project has improved the domain of end user verification for mobile devices. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of areas in which future work could be carried out to advance 
upon what has been achieved in this research. The details of future work are listed below:  
1. Design a universal application collection software package. This would meet the first 
requirement allowing the Behaviour Profiling framework to be deployed on real mobile 
devices. It will be necessary that the application collection software has a small footprint 
without any substantial degradation of mobile system performance. 
2. Development of a Behaviour Profiling Framework prototype on real mobile devices. This 
would allow a comprehensive evaluation of the behaviour profiling technique on live user 
application interactions to be proceeded and real participant feedbacks to be collected. 
3. Research in identifying positive application features. It is evidenced by the Chapter 4 
experiments that positive application features can improve the classification result while 
other application features will downgrade the classification result and also consume more 
computational power. By examining the uniqueness of intra-extended applications 
features, such as the web address for a web service, the performance of the behaviour 
profiling technique could be arguably improved. Therefore, the process of identifying 
positive features is mission critical for a wider deployment of the behaviour profiling 
technique.   
4. Further research and development of the dependent working mode of the Behaviour 
Profiling framework. In particular, cooperating with the TAS authentication system or the 
KBTA IDS architecture within the mobile host environment. Then, it is envisaged that the 
performance of the TAS system will be improved in a number of scenarios, such as when a 
user composes a text message, the user’s identity is verified based upon their keystroke 
activities (i.e. original TAS setting) and also to whom and where the message is compiled 
(i.e. the behaviour profiling technique). The KBTA architecture will also benefit from the 
behaviour profiling technique, as it will not only be able to detect mobile malware but also 
user related misuse.   
5. Further investigation of the data storage for the Behaviour Profiling framework. As the 
simulation system was implemented on a normal PC, data storage was never an issue. 
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However, the storage space in where the Behaviour Profiling framework will occupy 
should be taken into consideration when implementing the framework on a mobile 
device. Whilst it is not envisaged to be a particular problem, given the storage of all 
application usage, issues within regards to data retention and privacy need to be 
considered. 
7.4 The Future of Verification for Mobile Devices  
The popularity and development of mobile devices increase significantly year after year. People 
rely on their devices to complete personal and business tasks on a daily basis, from storing private 
information to accessing corporate emails, from paying goods at superstores to connecting 
corporate networks. It is highly likely that these activities involve a certain degree of sensitive and 
confidential information. As more mobile services are being developed and mobile hardware 
capability is being enhanced, such a trend will continue to exist. However, the potential damage 
associated to the device is also magnified should the device be misused. It can be deemed that at 
this point the need for verifying a user’s identity is more essential than ever before.       
Despite many controls that are currently being utilised for verifying users’ identity and detecting 
device misuse, this project has emphasised the need for a robust and reliable security mechanism 
which should operate in a continuous and transparent manner to offer both the security and user 
convenience. To this end, this research project has designed and developed a host based novel 
Behaviour Profiling framework capable of providing continuous and user friendly verification of 
the user in its own right or collaborating with other security controls (e.g. TAS or KBTA) to offer 
enhanced security. 
To conclude, verifying a mobile user’s identity will be crucial in the near future due to the financial 
services the mobile device provides and the sensitive information it carries. It is envisaged these 
services and information could become the main motivation towards device misuse. In order to 
provide adequate protection on mobile devices, mechanisms will have to utilise multiple security 
techniques and operate in a continuous and user friendly fashion.       
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1. IntroductIon
With more than 5 billion users globally, mobile 
devices have become ubiquitous in our daily life. 
The modern mobile handheld device is capable 
of providing many services through a wide range 
of applications over multiple networks as well 
as on the handheld itself, such as: voice calling 
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AbstrAct
Mobile	devices	have	become	essential	to	modern	society;	however,	as	their	popularity	has	grown,	so	has	the	
requirement	to	ensure	devices	remain	secure.	This	paper	proposes	a	behaviour-based	profiling	technique	using	
a	mobile	user’s	application	usage	to	detect	abnormal	activities.	Through	operating	transparently	to	the	user,	
the	approach	offers	significant	advantages	over	traditional	point-of-entry	authentication	and	can	provide	
continuous	protection.	The	experiment	employed	the	MIT	Reality	dataset	and	a	total	of	45,529	log	entries.	
Four	experiments	were	devised	based	on	an	inter-application	dataset	containing	the	general	application;	
two	intra-application	datasets	combined	with	telephony	and	text	message	data;	and	a	combined	dataset	that	
included	both	inter-application	and	intra-application.	Based	on	the	experiments,	a	user’s	profile	was	built	
using	either	static	or	dynamic	profiles	and	the	best	experimental	results	for	the	application-level	applications,	
telephone,	text	message,	and	multi-instance	applications	were	an	EER	(Equal	Error	Rate)	of	13.5%,	5.4%,	
2.2%,	and	10%,	respectively.
through service provider’s network, Internet 
surfing via Wi-Fi hotspots, video conferencing 
through a 3G connection, road navigating by 
GPS (Global Positioning System), picture shar-
ing by using Bluetooth pairing, data synchronis-
ing with laptop/desktop computers, document 
creation and modification, and entertainment 
(i.e., playing music). Indeed, the functionality 
and interconnectivity of mobile devices only 
tends to increase with time.DOI: 10.4018/ijcwt.2011010105
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While people enjoy the convenience pro-
vided by mobile devices, there are also threats 
which could make their life less comfortable, 
such as the loss or theft of the device, service 
fraud, information disclosure, mobile malware, 
Smishing (SMS [Short Message Service] phish-
ing) and Vishing (Voice phishing). According 
to the metropolitan police website, there are 
around 10,000 mobile devices lost or stolen 
in London every month (Metropolitan Police 
Service, 2011). When a mobile device is lost or 
stolen, there is an initial cost of replacement; 
however, more damage could occur if the at-
tacker accesses the mobile services and informa-
tion. According to the Communications Fraud 
Control Association’s (CFCA) Global Fraud 
Loss Survey 2009, service fraud is estimated 
to cost telecom service providers $72-$80 bil-
lion every year (CFCA, 2009). Also, a survey 
shows that 32% of all information disclosure 
incidents were related to lost or stolen mobile 
devices (Ponemon Institute, 2011). Moreover, 
the McAfee mobile and security report indi-
cated that “Four in 10 organizations have had 
mobile devices lost or stolen and half of lost/
stolen devices contain business critical data”, 
such as customer data, corporate intellectual 
property and financial information (McAfee, 
2011, p. 12).
Mobile malware can also harm the mobile 
phone in a variety of ways, such as: infect-
ing files and damaging user data. Since first 
discovered in 2004, there are more than 106 
malware families with 514 variants (Securelist, 
2009). Furthermore, the number of new mobile 
malware being found in 2010 has increased 
considerably (by 46% compared with those 
occurring in 2009) (McAfee, 2010). Smishing 
and Vishing are new types of phishing attacks 
which are performed by utilising text messaging 
and telephone calls (FBI, 2010). If the phone 
owner is fooled, its personal information can 
be exposed and abused.
With the aim to counter mobile threats, 
a number of security mechanisms have been 
developed both on the mobile device and the 
service provider’s network. The PIN (Personal 
Identification Number) based authentication 
method is the most widely deployed approach 
on mobile devices. Although widely used, many 
users do not employ the technique properly 
(i.e., never changing the PIN) (Clarke & Fur-
nell, 2005; Kurkovsky & Syta, 2010). Mobile 
antivirus software and firewall applications are 
mainly deployed for detecting malware presence 
and blocking unwanted network traffic. None-
theless, obtaining the latest virus signatures 
and updating rules for network traffic are not 
easy tasks; furthermore, their ability to detect 
user related activities is limited. As a mobile 
device has limited computing power, more so-
phisticated mechanisms, such as IDS (Intrusion 
Detection System), are primarily deployed on 
the service provider’s network. These systems 
continuously monitor the mobile users’ calling 
and migration activities to detect telephony 
service fraud. However, given the modern 
mobile device has the ability to access several 
networks simultaneously and accommodate a 
wide range of services, existing network-based 
security mechanisms are unable to provide com-
prehensive protection for the mobile handset. 
Therefore, a new security mechanism which 
can ensure a user’s legitimacy (authentica-
tion function) in a continuous manner (IDS 
function) is needed. This paper focuses upon 
presenting the findings from a feasibility study 
into utilising a host-based behavioural profiling 
approach to identify mobile device misuse, and 
providing continued and transparent protection 
for mobile devices.
This paper begins by introducing various 
mobile device applications, mobile threats, and 
general security mechanisms and continues to 
describe the current state-of-the-art. A series of 
experimental studies on three aspects of user’s 
applications usage (application-level, appli-
cation-specific and overall) are presented in 
Section 3, with the following section describing 
the results. The paper then proceeds to discuss 
the results and conclude with highlighting the 
future direction of the research.
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2. behAVIour-bAsed 
MobIle deVIce securIty 
MechAnIsMs
Research in mobile device security has been an 
established area for more than 10 years with a 
substantial amount of activity focused upon 
the areas of authentication, antivirus, firewalls, 
and IDS. Of particular interest however is the 
research that has been undertaken in behaviour-
based mechanisms. This research falls primarily 
into two behaviour-based categories: network 
and host mechanisms.
behaviour-based Network 
Mobile security Mechanisms
The research for studying mobile behaviour-
based mechanisms started around 1995 mainly 
focusing upon the area of fraud detection. 
These mobile IDSs monitor user calling and 
migration behaviour over the service pro-
vider’s network, and detect telephony service 
fraud (Gosset, 1998; Samfat & Molva, 1997; 
Boukerche & Nitare, 2002). One particularly 
successful approach is based upon developing 
a profile of users calling history over a period 
of time and comparing this historical profile 
against current usage, with deviations above 
a predefined threshold resulting in an alarm. 
Various supervised and unsupervised clas-
sifiers were successfully developed to deal 
with various attributes of the problem-space 
(known and unknown attack vectors) and the 
resulting systems were combined so that the 
strengths of each approach can be capitalised 
upon (Gosset, 1998).
Research has also focused on the use of 
geo-location information as a basis for detect-
ing misuse. Based upon the hypothesis that 
people have a predictable travelling pattern, the 
migration based mobile IDS monitors a user’s 
location activities to detect abnormal behaviour. 
The user’s location information can be obtained 
either from the mobile cellular network (i.e., cell 
ID) or via a GPS link (i.e., longitude, latitude). 
By recording the users’ location information 
over a time period, a mobility profile can be 
generated. When a mobile user carries their 
device from one location to another, the prob-
ability of the event will be calculated. If this 
surpasses a threshold, then the current event 
will be considered as an intrusion. A number 
of studies have been carried out by profiling 
user migration activities (Buschkes, Kesdogan, 
& Reichl, 1998; Hall, Barbeau, & Kranakis, 
2005; Sun, Chen, Wang, Yu, & Leung, 2006).
By studying a user’s calling or location 
activities, behaviour based IDSs can achieve 
a high detection rate and offer the ability to 
detect unforeseen attacks. In addition, as the 
classification and identification procedures are 
processed by the network service provider, it 
does not require any additional computational 
power from the mobile device. This has tradi-
tionally been critical for mobile devices, as they 
have limited processing power and storage when 
compared with traditional desktop computers.
behaviour-based Host Mobile 
security Mechanisms
Existing host behaviour-based mobile security 
systems are mainly authentication-based sys-
tems being studied in the research field. These 
systems usually employ one or more characteris-
tics of a user’s behaviour to assess the legitimacy 
of the current user – techniques include and gait 
recognition, handwriting verification, keystroke 
analysis and voice verification.
Gait recognition is based upon the theory 
that people can be discriminated by how people 
walk when they carry their mobile device (Boyd 
& Little, 2005). When a user carries their mobile 
device in their trouser pocket, the user’s gait 
information can be collected (Derawi, Nickel, 
Bours, & Busch, 2010). The user’s gait data can 
then be compared with an existing template. If 
it matches, the user is considered legitimate; 
otherwise, they are an intruder. The experi-
ment result shows that an EER (Equal Error 
Rate) of 20.1% can be achieved. It shows the 
possibility to deploy this method on a mobile 
handset. However, as the authentication process 
is heavily reliant on user’s gait information, this 
could leave the mobile device unprotected when 
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gait information is not available – for example 
when the user sits in the office.
Handwriting verification: it is widely be-
lieved that each person has a unique handwrit-
ing style. Currently, a significant proportion of 
mobile devices have been equipped with a touch 
screen, enabling the handwriting verification 
technique to be deployed. A user’s identity can 
be verified when they perform their signature 
(static) or while they write a message by using 
a stylus (dynamic). Clarke and Mekala (2007) 
proposed a dynamic approach to verify a user 
when certain words were written. With a 1% 
EER, their system performance was excellent. 
Despite their approach not being fully dynamic 
as the words were pre-chosen, their work dem-
onstrated that it is possible to identify users 
based upon the way they write on a mobile 
device. Nonetheless, as the verification process 
is fully dependent upon user’s handwriting 
activities, little protection can be provided if 
a user views a webpage or reads a document.
Keystroke analysis based authentication 
systems monitor users’ keystroke patterns, typi-
cally monitoring the inter-keystroke latency and 
hold-time. The authentication can be performed 
in two modes: static (text dependent) and dy-
namic (text independent). In the static mode, 
users will be authenticated when a specific 
word or phrase has been entered. For instance, 
the system will authenticate the user when they 
enter a PIN to unlock their mobile devices. In 
the dynamic mode, a user’s legitimacy will be 
checked based upon their typing speed and 
rhythm independent of what they type. For 
example, authentication will transparently oc-
cur while the user composes a text message. 
Previous work in this area includes Clarke and 
Furnell (2006), Buchoux and Clarke (2008), 
and Campisi, Maiorana, Bosco, and Neri 
(2009). With an average experimental EER of 
13%, keystroke analysis based authentication 
systems can be deployed in practice to provide 
extra security for a mobile device. However, 
this method is only practical in scenarios with 
sufficient keystroke activity (i.e., activities such 
as reading a document or viewing a picture 
would be unlikely to generate sufficient data to 
successfully validate a users’ identity).
Voice verification, also known as speaker 
recognition is based upon the way people speak. 
Traditionally, mobile devices were primarily 
used for making telephone calls, during which 
a user’s voice sample can be captured for the 
purpose of voice verification. Woo, Park, and 
Hazen (2006) examined the possibility of 
using static voice verification for the mobile 
device by using an ASR-dependent speaker 
verification approach. Despite the comparison 
process being carried out by a standard com-
puter, their work achieved a 7.8% EER proving 
that a user’s identity can be verified by their 
voice, even in a noisy environment (i.e., in an 
office). Nevertheless, again, a user can only be 
authenticated during a conversation but not for 
other occasions.
summary of current Mobile 
behaviour security Mechanisms
The aforementioned literature suggests that 
existing behaviour-based network IDSs can 
detect calling service fraud attacks. However, 
in practice it can be seen that the mobile net-
work operator can only monitor calling and 
migration behaviours, rather than examining 
every single mobile service. For the existing 
host-based behaviour authentication system, it 
could only provide periodically security when 
the user interacts with the device in the desired 
manner (e.g., when the keypad is touched or the 
device is carried in the back pocket). Therefore, 
none of the current research in mobile behaviour 
security mechanisms provides a comprehen-
sive and continuous protection against device 
misuse. Hence, a mobile security mechanism 
which can offer continuous detection across a 
wider range of services and connections on the 
mobile device is needed.
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3. behAVIour profIlIng 
for trAnspArent 
AuthentIcAtIon for 
MobIle deVIces
The previous section shows that the network-
based behavioural security mechanisms can 
only monitor network-based services through 
the service provider’s network. As current mo-
bile devices have the ability to access multiple 
networks simultaneously, a host based approach 
must be taken into consideration when design-
ing the new system. Furthermore, with the dif-
ficulty of obtaining and updating the signatures 
and the lack of the ability to detect unforeseen 
threats, a behaviour profiling technique would 
be prudent. As application usage represents an 
overview of how the user interacts with the 
device (Miettinen, Halonen, & Hatonen, 2006), 
and due to the lack of research regarding the dis-
criminatory nature of application usage within a 
mobile device environment, an experiment was 
developed focused on three aspects: application-
level, application-specific and multi-instance 
(or fused) applications interactions.
experiment procedure
The experiment employed a publicly available 
dataset provided by the MIT Reality Mining 
project (Eagle, Pentland, & Lazer, 2009). 
The dataset contains 106 participants’ mobile 
phone activities from September 2004 to June 
2005. By using preinstalled logging software, 
various mobile data attributes were collected 
from participants’ using Nokia 6600 mobile 
phones. As shown in Table 1, the MIT Reality 
dataset contains a large and varied selection 
of information which covers two levels of ap-
plication usage: application-level information 
(general applications) and application-specific 
information (voice call and text message).
Application-level Analysis
By default, a number of common applications 
are preinstalled on the mobile device by the 
manufacture, such as: phonebook, clock and 
voice calling. With increased computing pro-
cessing power and storage space and almost 
15,000 new mobile applications becoming 
available on the market every month, mobile 
users have the freedom of installing any ad-
ditional applications on the device (Distimo, 
2010); this option completely changed the way 
that people utilise their mobile devices: from a 
dummy handset into a personalised computing 
gadget. From a high-level perspective the gen-
eral use of applications can provide a basic level 
of information on how the mobile user utilises 
the device. Such basic information could be the 
name of the application, time, and location of 
usage. Given the hypothesis that mobile users 
utilise their mobile applications differently (i.e., 
two users utilise different applications in differ-
ent time periods and at different locations), an 
experiment was devised to explore the possibil-
ity of utilising application-level information for 
discriminating mobile device users.
Application-specific Analysis
The second experiment focused on utilising 
further information about the applications. 
Within many applications the user connects to 
data that could provide additional discrimina-
tory information. For instance, when surfing the 
Internet, the Internet browser can capture all the 
Table	1.	The	MIT	reality	dataset	
Activity Number of Logs Information Contains
General Applications 662,393 Application name, date, time of usage and cell ID
Voice Call 54,440 Date, time, number of calling, duration and cell ID
Text Message 5,607 Date, time, number of texting and cell ID
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URLs an individual accesses. Unfortunately, 
due to limitations on the dataset (collected prior 
to data-based applications becoming prevalent), 
the range of application-specific analysis that 
could be undertaken were limited to telephony 
and text messaging.
The prior literature shows that calling 
behaviour has been studied several times in a 
network-based environment with results dem-
onstrating the ability to discriminate mobile 
phone users. Within a mobile host environment, 
the availability of calling features does change 
slightly – for example, the IMSI (International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity) is not a useful 
feature in a host-based solution. Furthermore, 
although several studies suggested utilising a 
user’s location information, it was never been 
treated as a calling feature. Therefore, it was 
interesting to identify the effectiveness of a 
new set of calling features, which included the 
user’s location information.
Due to the enormous use of text messag-
ing, with the UK alone sending more than 100 
billion text messages in 2010 (Ofcom, 2010), 
the application is amongst the most widely 
used application on a mobile device. Despite 
the high volume of text message usage, little 
research has been undertaken to show how text 
messages may be used to detect abnormal usage 
in the mobile environment. Hence, it was also 
deemed important to discover the possibility 
and usefulness of employing text messaging 
to detect anomalous mobile user’s behaviours.
Multi-Instance Analysis
The final experiment aimed at employing the 
multi-instance application usage to discriminate 
individual mobile users. In the experiment, 
all applications will be put in a chronological 
order – replaying what a user did with their 
mobile devices in the real time. For instance, a 
user switched off the clock alarm (application-
level) at 6:05 AM, then visited a number of 
news websites (application-specific) at 6:20 
AM, at 7:10 AM, he/she made several phone 
calls (application-specific), and started listening 
to the music (application-level) at 7:36 AM. 
Hence, the multi-instance applications can con-
tinuously present an image of what a user does 
on the whole, while either the application-level 
or application-specific applications could only 
partially provide information on user’s activity. 
As a result, it is critical to explore the feasibil-
ity of utilising multi-instance applications for 
constantly monitoring every single activity to 
identify abnormal mobile usages.
For methodological reasons: to maximise 
the number of participants within a reasonable 
timeframe, the experiment employed 76 par-
ticipants whose activities occurred during the 
period of 24/10/2004-20/11/2004. As not all 
participants started or finished the experiment 
at the same time, it was imperative to isolate a 
sub-section of the dataset that maximised the 
number of participants and available data. The 
methodology employed two types of profile 
techniques: static and dynamic. For the static 
profiling, each individual dataset was divided 
into two halves: the first half was used for 
building the profile, and the other half was 
utilised for testing. For the dynamic profiling, 
the profile contained 7/10/14 days of the user’s 
most recent activities; the evaluation process 
was carried out on the same sub-dataset as 
for the static experiment in order to provide 
a meaningful comparison. Given the highly 
variable nature of the input data a smooth-
ing function was applied. Rather than taking 
each individual result, the smoothing function 
permitted the system to make a decision after 
a number of results were present (similar to a 
winner-takes-all decision-based biometric fu-
sion model). The basis for this approach was 
derived from the descriptive statistics produced 
when analysing the data and the large variances 
observed. A dynamic approach therefore seemed 
sensible to cope with the changing nature of the 
profile. Based on the premise that the historical 
profile can be used to predict the probability of 
a current event, the following formula illustrated 
in Equation 1 was devised. The equation also 
includes a weighting factor to allow for more 
discriminative features to have a greater contri-
bution (W
i
) within the resulting score than less 
discriminative features. Moreover, the equation 
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also provides a mechanism to ensure all outputs 
are bounded between 0 and 1 to assist in defin-
ing an appropriate threshold.
Equation 1: Alarm if:
1
1
1−
=
=
∑
∑i
N ixOccurannce of Feature
Occurannce of Feature
x
M
ix
iW×






N
³ threshold  
Where:
i=The features of one chosen application (i.e., 
dialled number for telephony applica-
tion) x=The value of Feature
i
 (i.e., office 
telephone number and home telephone 
number)
M=Total number of values for Feature
i
N=Total number of features
W
i
=The weighting factor associated with Fea-
ture
i
 ( 0 1< ≤Wi )
Threshold= A predefined value according to 
each individual user
4. experIMentAl results
Application-level profiling
For the general applications, the following 
features were extracted from the dataset: ap-
plication name, date of initiation, and location 
of usage. As a total of 101 individual applica-
tions were used among the chosen 76 users 
during the chosen period, a final sub-dataset for 
application-level applications with 30,428 entry 
logs was formed. Among these 101 applications, 
the phonebook, call logs and camera were used 
by all participants. By using the proposed math-
ematical formula, a final set of EERs for users’ 
application-level usage is presented in Table 2. 
The best EER is 13.5% and it was obtained by 
using the dynamic profile technique with 14 
days of profiling data and a smoothing function 
with 6 log entries. In comparison, the worst 
performance was achieved by using the dynamic 
profile technique with 7 days of profiling data 
and the smoothing function with 1 log entry.
Selected results for the best configuration 
of the application-level applications experiment 
are shown in Table 3. The top 3 and bottom 3 
users’ EERs represent the best and worst per-
formance respectively. Also, by using the same 
configuration, 84.2% of all users have an EER 
less than 20%.
Application-specific profiling
Telephony
For the telephone call application, a subset of 71 
users from the 76 participants used the applica-
tion during the aforementioned chosen period as 
other 5 users did not make any telephone calls. 
During the same period, 2,317 unique telephone 
numbers were dialled and the total number of 
calls made was 13,719. From iteration and op-
timisation, the following features were chosen 
for each log: the telephone number, date and 
location of call. By using the proposed math-
ematical formula with the selected features (all 
features were given the same weighting factor), 
a final set of experiment results is shown in 
Table 4. The best result is an EER of 5.4% and 
Table	2.	Experimental	results	for	application-level	applications	
Number of Log Entries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Profile Technique
Static 14 days 21.1% 17.4% 16.3% 14.9% 14.2% 13.6%
Dynamic 14 days 21.1% 17.3% 16.0% 14.5% 13.9% 13.5%
Dynamic 10 days 22.1% 17.8% 16.2% 14.6% 14.4% 13.7%
Dynamic 7 days 24.0% 19.4% 17.6% 15.9% 15.3% 14.4%
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it was achieved by using the dynamic profile 
technique with user’s most recent 14 days of 
profiling data and a smoothing function with 6 
log entries. While the worst EER if 10.4% and it 
was obtained by employing the dynamic profile 
with 7 days of profiling data and the smoothing 
function of 1 log entry.
A selection of results for the best set up of 
the telephone call application experiment is 
presented in Table 5. The best and worst per-
formances for selected users are the top 3 and 
bottom 3 users accordingly. Also, 81.7% of 
users have an EER less than 10% with the same 
configuration.
text Messaging
For the text messaging experiment, 22 users’ 
text messaging activities were available from 
the 76 participants, while other 54 users did 
Table	3.	Selected	users’	performance	for	application-level	applications	with	Dynamic	14	days	
and	6	log	entries	
User_ID EER
71 0%
46 0%
12 0.5%
66 37.5%
2 39.3%
68 51.6%%
Table	4.	Experimental	results	for	telephone	call	application	
Number of Log Entries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Profile Technique
Static 14 days 9.6% 9.1% 7.9% 7.2% 4.3% 6.4%
Dynamic 14 days 8.8% 8.1% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 5.4%
Dynamic 10 days 9.6% 8.6% 8.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.0%
Dynamic 7 days 10.4% 8.8% 8.5% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2%
Table	5.	Selected	users’	performance	for	telephone	call	application	with	Dynamic	14	days	and	
6	log	entries	
User_ID Performance
23 0%
43 0%
61 0%
64 20.6%
50 23.1%
8 39.5%
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not send any text messages during the chosen 
period. The text messaging dataset contains 
1,382 logs and 258 unique texting numbers. 
For each text log, the following features were 
extracted: receiver’s telephone number, date and 
location of texting. Due to certain participants 
having limited numbers of text messaging 
logs; a maximum of 3 log entries were treated 
as one incident. By employing the proposed 
mathematical formula and all text message’s 
features (all features were given the same 
weighting factor), the final result for user’s 
text messaging application is shown in Table 
6. The best result was an EER of 2.2% and it 
was acquired by utilising the dynamic profile 
method with 14 days of profiling data and a 
smoothing function with 3 log entries. Also, by 
increasing the smoothing function with 1 log 
entry to 2 log entries, the performance improves 
considerably across all profiling techniques.
Table 7 shows a group of users’ perfor-
mance for the best configuration of the text 
messaging application experiment. The top 3 
and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best 
and worst performance respectively. In addi-
tion, 95.5% of all users have an EER smaller 
than 10%.
Multi-Instance profiling
For the multi-instance applications experiment, 
all 76 users’ overall applications activities were 
utilised. For each user, its application-level ap-
plications and application-specific applications 
were joined together by using the time and day 
stamp in a chronological order. Also, features 
were selected according for the application-level 
and application-specific applications. In total, 
30,428 application-level applications logs and 
15,101 application-specific applications logs 
were employed for this set of experiment. By 
employing the proposed mathematical formula 
and various applications, the final results for 
users’ multi-instance applications experiment 
are demonstrated in Table 8. By utilising the 
dynamic profiling technique with 10 days of 
Table	6.	Experimental	results	for	text	messaging	application	
Number of Log Entries
1 2 3
Profile Technique
Static 14 days 7.0% 4.3% 3.6%
Dynamic 14 days 5.7% 2.6% 2.2%
Dynamic 10 days 8.3% 4.1% 3.7%
Dynamic 7 days 10.7% 5.7% 3.8%
Table	7.	Selected	users’	performance	for	text	messaging	application	with	Dynamic	14	days	and	
3	log	entries	
User_ID Performance
13 0%
14 0%
18 0.2%
4 5.3%
2 8.4%
17 13.1%
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profiling data and a smoothing function with 
6 log entries, the best result of EER 10% was 
obtained. In comparison, the worst result of EER 
19% was acquired by employing the dynamic 
profiling technique with 14 days of profiling 
data and the smoothing function with 1 log entry.
Table 9 illustrates a group of users’ perfor-
mance for the best configuration of the multi-
instance applications experiment. The top 3 and 
bottom 3 users’ EERs present the best and worst 
performance respectively. Also, 55.3% of all 
users have an EER smaller than 10% and 80.2% 
of all users have an EER lower than 15%.
5. dIscussIon
The application name and location have proved 
valuable features that can provide sufficient 
discriminatory information to prove useful 
in authentication. However, whilst this might 
identify many misuse scenarios, it would not 
necessarily identify all cases of misuse – particu-
lar those where a colleague might temporarily 
misuse your device as the location information 
is likely to fall within the same profile as the 
authorised user. So care is required in interpret-
ing these results. The application-specific and 
multi-instance approaches should also help to 
specifically identify this type of misuse.
In general, the dynamic profiling technique 
achieved a slightly better performance than the 
static profiling technique did. This is reason-
able as a dynamic profile contains a user’s 
most recent activities; hence it obtains a more 
accurate detection. With a longer training set 
period, the performance for application-level 
and application-specific application experi-
ments is also improved. Hence, an increased 
number of days (i.e., 18/22 days) of user ac-
tivities as the training set should be examined 
to find the optimum solution for these two 
sets of activities if a security system employs 
them individually. Nonetheless, literature sug-
gests users do change their usage pattern over 
a long period of time. Farago (2009) suggests 
that users only keep 67% of the applications 
over a 30-day period. Moreover, storage and 
Table	8.	Experimental	results	for	multi-instance	applications	
Number of Log Entries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Profile Technique
Static 14 days 16.9% 13.6% 12.7% 12% 10.9% 11%
Dynamic 14 days 19% 15.2% 13.1% 12.4% 11.3% 10.5%
Dynamic 10 days 17.1% 13.7% 12.3% 11.6% 10.6% 10%
Dynamic 7 days 16.5% 13.5% 12.1% 11.6% 10.5% 10.1%
Table	9.	Selected	users’	performance	for	multi-instance	applications	with	Dynamic	10	days	and	
6	log	entries	
User_ID Performance
46 0%
71 0%
63 0%
68 20.2%
69 25.4%
8 28.8%
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processing issues should also be taken into 
consideration with larger training. In compari-
son, the multi-instance applications experiment 
obtained the best performance by using a train-
ing set period with 10 days of user’s profiling 
data. As 10 days of user’s profiling data might 
contain less information than a longer period 
of user’s activities (i.e., 14 days), lower storage 
and processing power might be required when 
a security mechanism utilises multi-instance 
applications to verify a user. Nonetheless, as 
being based upon a period of days: some users 
have a lot of data while others potentially have 
very little, future work is required in order to 
determine what the optimum level of training 
profiling data is for the multi-instance activities. 
While a smoothing function treated more log 
entries as one incident, the performance also 
improved accordingly. The smoothing func-
tion reduces the impact any single event might 
have and seeks to take a more holistic approach 
to monitoring for misuse; this will provide a 
user-friendly environment as fewer rejections 
would occur and it would be more convenient 
when a user changes their usage behaviour. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it takes 
more time for the system to make a decision; 
hence, an intruder could have more opportuni-
ties to abuse a system and a certain amount of 
abuse could be missed by the security control.
Limitations in the dataset are also likely to 
have created certain difficulties. As the dataset 
was collected in 2004, the number of mobile 
applications available for users to choose was 
limited; this resulted in a large similarity of 
application-level application usage between 
mobile users and hence increased difficulty for 
any classification methods. In contrast, in June 
2011, there were around 1 million mobile ap-
plications available. As mobile users have more 
options, their application-level usage would 
arguably differ to a greater extent. Therefore, 
it would be easier to discriminate mobile users 
through their application-level usage.
As shown in Table 4, the performance of the 
telephony application experiment is very good 
– more than twice that of the application-level 
profiling. This reinforces the hypothesis that 
knowing both the application and what the user 
does with it, improves the chance of identifying 
individual users significantly. Moreover, mobile 
users had a far larger set of telephone contacts 
(the numbers they can dial) compared with the 
number of applications they had which also 
makes the classification process easier because 
there are more identifiable data points from 
which to discriminate. In comparison with other 
biometric authentication techniques (described 
in Section 2), the telephone experiment is within 
that category of performance.
As presented in Table 6, the results from 
the text messaging application experiment were 
even better than those achieved by the telephone 
call application, albeit with a smaller dataset. 
This may be caused by people only sending text 
messages to very close contacts. Although only 
30% of the participants used the text messaging 
application in 2004, the situation has changed 
considerably: in the UK alone, the volume of 
text messaging traffic has increased by 290% 
since 2004 (Ofcom, 2010). This indicates that 
the text messaging based authentication method 
could serve a good proportion of the mobile 
users’ population.
As demonstrated in Table 8, the experi-
mental results for the multi-instance application 
are in between the results from the application-
level and application-specific applications; this 
is within the expectation as the experiment 
utilised the combination of application-level 
and application-specific applications. Also, it 
is envisaged that the larger the proportion of 
application-specific applications users have, 
the better a system’s performance. Hence, the 
process of differentiating whether an application 
belongs to the application-specific category and 
extracting its features accordingly is mission-
critical for a behaviour profiling system.
From the results presented in this paper, 
it can be shown that both application-level, 
application-specific and multi-instance in-
formation can be used to authenticate mobile 
users. In addition, although it is more difficult 
to profile certain users, more than 80% of all 
users’ performance was within the bounds of a 
behaviour-based biometric. The dynamic-based 
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profiling technique provides the opportunity 
to develop a more meaningful profile of user 
activities. This does however raise issues with 
regards to template ageing and ensuring the 
samples utilised in creating the template are 
all legitimate. Furthermore, in comparison with 
previous research, which used computationally 
complicated neural networks as the classifica-
tion method (Li, Clarke, & Papadaki, 2009; 
Li, Clarke, Papadaki, & Dowland, 2010), this 
approach employed a light weight mathematical 
formula which saves a significant amount of 
processing power and storage space; this is es-
sential for handheld mobile devices as they have 
limited processing power and storage space.
6. conclusIon
The experiment shows that with an EER of 
13.5%, 5.4%, 2.2% and 10% for the general 
application, telephony, text messaging and 
multi-instance application usage respectively, 
these techniques are viable for a behaviour-
based authentication mechanism within the 
mobile environment. The authentication process 
could be conducted in the background while 
mobile users utilise their applications; if several 
abnormal activities occurred within a fixed 
time frame, further security methods would be 
initiated according to the level of the incident.
Future work will focus upon designing an 
authentication architecture that could accom-
modate the aforementioned behaviour based 
authentication techniques. As the architecture 
works transparently in the background, little 
attention would be required from the mobile 
user and an intervention would only be needed 
when anomalous application usage occurs. 
Hence, such an architecture would provide a 
transparent and continuous protection for us-
ers. Furthermore, an operational system, which 
supports identity verification, will be developed 
for the purpose of evaluation.
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Abstract: Since the first handheld cellular phone was introduced in 1970s, the mobile phone has changed 
significantly both in terms of popularity and functionality. With more than 4.6 billion subscribers around the world, it 
has become a ubiquitous device in our daily life. Apart from the traditional telephony and text messaging services, 
people are enjoying a much wider range of mobile services over a variety of network connections in the form of 
mobile applications. Although a number of security mechanisms such as authentication, antivirus, and firewall 
applications are available, it is still difficult to keep up with various mobile threats (i.e. service fraud, mobile malware 
and SMS phishing); hence, additional security measures should be taken into consideration. This paper proposes a 
novel behaviour-based profiling technique by using a mobile user’s application usage to detect abnormal mobile 
activities. The experiment employed the MIT Reality dataset. For data processing purposes and also to maximise the 
number of participants, one month (24/10/2004-20/11/2004) of users’ application usage with a total number of 44,529 
log entries was extracted from the original dataset. It was further divided to form three subsets: two intra-application 
datasets compiled with telephone and message data; and an inter-application dataset containing the rest of the 
mobile applications. Based upon the experiment plan, a user’s profile was built using either static and dynamic 
profiles and the best experimental results for the telephone, text message, and application-level applications were an 
EER (Equal Error Rate) of: 5.4%, 2.2% and 13.5% respectively. Whilst some users were difficult to classify, a 
significant proportion fell within the performance expectations of a behavioural biometric and therefore a behaviour 
profiling system on mobile devices is able to detect anomalies during the use of the mobile device. Incorporated 
within a wider authentication system, this biometric would enable transparent and continuous authentication of the 
user, thereby maximising user acceptance and security. 
 
Keywords: mobile device, behaviour profiling, applications, transparent authentication 
1. Introduction 
The modern mobile handheld device is capable of providing many services through a wide range of 
applications over multiple networks as well as on the handheld itself, such as: voice calling through 
service provider’s network, Internet surfing via Wi-Fi hotspots, video conferencing through a 3G 
connection, road navigating by GPS (Global Positioning System), picture sharing by using Bluetooth 
pairing, data synchronising with laptop/desktop computers, document creation and modification, and 
entertainment (i.e. playing music). Indeed, the functionality and interconnectivity of mobile devices only 
tends to increase with time. 
 
While people enjoy the convenience provided by mobile devices, there are also threats which could make 
their life less comfortable, such as the loss or theft of the device, service fraud, SIM (Subscriber Identity 
Module) card cloning, mobile malware, information disclosure, DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks, Smishing 
(SMS (Short Message Service) phishing) and Vishing (Voice phishing). Mobile malware could harm the 
mobile phone in a variety of ways, such as: infecting files and damaging user data. Since discovered in 
2004, there are more than 106 malware families with 514 variants having been identified (Securelist 
2010). Smishing and Vishing are new types of phishing attacks which are performed by utilising text 
messaging and telephone calls (FBI 2010). If the phone owner is fooled, its personal information can be 
exposed and abused.   
 
With the aim to counter mobile threats, a number of security mechanisms have been developed both on 
the mobile device and the service provider’s network. The PIN (Personal Identification Number) based 
authentication method is the most widely deployed approach on mobile devices. Although widely used, 
many users do not employ the technique properly (i.e. never changing the PIN) (Clarke and Furnell 2005; 
Kurkovsky and Syta 2010). Mobile antivirus software and firewall applications are mainly deployed for 
detecting malware presence and blocking unwanted network traffic. Nonetheless, obtaining the latest 
virus signatures and updating rules for network traffic are not easy tasks; furthermore, their ability to 
detect user related activities is limited. As a mobile device has limited computing power, more 
sophisticated mechanisms, such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System), are primarily deployed on the 
service provider’s network. These systems monitor the mobile users’ calling and migration activities to 
detect telephony service fraud. However, given the modern mobile device has the ability to access 
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several networks simultaneously and accommodate a wide range of services, existing network-based 
security mechanisms are unable to provide comprehensive protection for the mobile handset. This paper 
focuses upon presenting the findings from a feasibility study into utilising a host-based behavioural 
profiling approach to identify mobile device misuse, and providing continued and transparent protection 
for mobile devices.   
 
This paper begins by introducing various mobile device applications, mobile threats, and general security 
mechanisms and continues to describe the current state-of-the-art. A series of experimental studies on 
two aspects of user’s applications usage (application-level and application-specific) are presented in 
Section 3, with the following section describing the results. The paper then proceeds to discuss the 
results and conclude with highlighting the future direction of the research.  
2. Behaviour-based mobile device security mechanisms    
Research in mobile device security has been an established area for more than 10 years with a 
substantial amount of activity focused upon the areas of authentication, antivirus, firewalls, and IDS. Of 
particular interest however is the research that has been undertaken in behaviour-based mechanisms. 
This research falls primarily into two categories: behaviour-based network and behaviour-based host 
mechanisms. 
2.1 Behaviour-based network mobile security mechanisms  
The research for studying mobile behaviour-based mechanisms started around 1995 mainly focusing 
upon the area of IDS. These mobile IDSs monitor user calling and migration behaviour over the service 
provider’s network, and detect telephony service fraud (Gosset 1998; Samfat and Molva 1997; 
Boukerche and Nitare 2002). One particularly successful approach is based upon developing a profile of 
users calling history over a period of time and comparing this historical profile against current usage, with 
deviations above a predefined threshold resulting in an alarm. Various supervised and unsupervised 
classifiers were successfully developed to deal with various attributes of the problem-space (known and 
unknown attack vectors) and the resulting systems were combined so that the strengths of each 
approach can be capitalised upon (Gosset 1998).  
 
Research has also focused on the use of geo-location information as a basis for detecting misuse. Based 
upon the hypothesis that people have a predictable travelling pattern, the migration based mobile IDS 
monitors a user’s location activities to detect abnormal behaviour. The user’s location information can be 
obtained either from the mobile cellular network (i.e. cell ID) or via a GPS link (i.e. longitude, latitude). By 
recording the users’ location information over a time period, a mobility profile can be generated. When a 
mobile user carries their device from one location to another, the probability of the event will be 
calculated. If this surpasses a threshold, then the current event will be considered as an intrusion. A 
number of studies have been carried out by profiling user migration activities, such as: Buschkes et al 
1998, Hall et al 2005, and Sun et al 2006. 
 
By studying a user’s calling or location activities, behaviour based IDSs can achieve a high detection rate 
and offer the ability to detect unforeseen attacks. In addition, as the classification and identification 
procedures are processed by the network service provider, it does not require any additional 
computational power from the mobile device. This has traditionally been critical for mobile devices, as 
they have limited processing power and space comparing with traditional desktop computers. 
Nonetheless, if these behaviour-based systems work together to monitor the mobile user’s action (i.e. 
calling a friend) while knowing where the action is taken (i.e. at home), an overall system performance 
could arguably be increased.  
2.2 Behaviour-based host mobile security mechanisms 
Existing host behaviour-based mobile security systems are mainly authentication-based systems. These 
systems usually employ one or more characteristics of a user’s behaviour to assess the legitimacy of the 
current user – techniques include keystroke analysis and gait recognition. 
 
Keystroke analysis based authentication systems monitor users’ keystroke patterns, typically monitoring 
the inter-keystroke latency and hold-time. The authentication can be performed in two modes: static (text 
dependent) and dynamic (text independent). In the static mode, users will be authenticated when a 
specific word or phrase has been entered. For instance, the system will authenticate the user when they 
enter a PIN to unlock their mobile devices. In the dynamic mode, a user’s legitimacy will be checked 
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based upon their typing speed and rhythm independent of what they type. For example, authentication 
will transparently occur while the user composes a text message. Previous work in this area include 
Clarke and Furnell (2006), Buchoux and Clarke (2008), and Campisi et al. (2009). With an average 
experimental EER of 13%, keystroke analysis based authentication systems can be deployed in practice 
to provide extra security for a mobile device. However, this method is only practical in scenarios with 
sufficient keystroke activity (i.e. activities such as reading a document or viewing a picture would be 
unlikely to generate sufficient data to successfully validate a users’ identity). 
 
Gait recognition is based upon the theory that people can be discriminated by how people walk when 
they carry their mobile device (Boyd and Little, 2005). When a user carries their mobile device in their 
trouser pocket, the user’s gait information can be collected (Derawi et al 2010). The user’s gait data can 
then be compared with an existing template. If it matches, the user is considered legitimate; otherwise, 
they are an intruder. The experiment result shows that an EER of 20.1% can be achieved. It shows the 
possibility to deploy this method on a mobile handset. However, as the authentication process is heavily 
reliant on user’s gait information, this could leave the mobile device unprotected when gait information is 
not available – for example when the user sits in the office.  
2.3 Summary of current mobile behaviour security mechanisms  
The aforementioned literature suggests that existing behaviour-based network IDSs can detect calling 
service fraud attacks. However, in practice it can be seen that the mobile network operator can only 
monitor calling and migration behaviours, rather than examining every single mobile service. For the 
existing host-based behaviour authentication system, it could only provide periodically security when the 
user interacts with the device in the desired manner (e.g. when the keypad is touched or the device is 
carried in the back pocket). Therefore, none of the current research in mobile behaviour security 
mechanisms provides a comprehensive and continuous protection against device misuse. Hence, a 
mobile security mechanism which can offer detection across a wider range of services and connections 
on the mobile device is needed. 
3. Behaviour profiling for transparent authentication for mobile devices 
The previous section shows that the network-based behavioural security mechanisms can only monitor 
network-based services through the service provider’s network. As current mobile devices have the 
ability to access multiple networks simultaneously, a host based approach must be taken into 
consideration when designing the new system. With the difficulty of obtaining and updating the signatures 
and the lack of the ability to detect unforeseen threats, a behaviour profiling technique should be taken. 
As application usage represents an overview of how the user interacts with the device (Miettinen et al 
2006), and due to the lack of research regarding the discriminatory nature of application usage within a 
mobile device environment, an experiment was developed focussing upon two aspects: application-level 
and application-specific user interactions. 
3.1 Experiment procedure 
The experiment employed a publicly available dataset provided by the MIT Reality Mining project (Eagle 
et al 2009). The dataset contains 106 participants’ mobile phone activities from September 2004 to June 
2005. By using preinstalled logging software, various mobile data attributes were collected from 
participants’ using Nokia 6600 mobile phones. As shown in Table 1, the MIT Reality dataset contains a 
large and varied selection of information which covers two levels of application usage: application-level 
information (general applications) and application-specific information (voice call and Text message). 
Table 1: The MIT Reality dataset 
Activity Number of logs Information contains 
General applications 662,393 Application name, date, time of usage and cell ID 
Voice call 54,440 Date, time, number of calling, duration and cell ID 
Text message 5,607 Date, time, number of texting and cell ID 
3.1.1 Application-level analysis 
By default, a number of common applications are preinstalled on the mobile device by the manufacture, 
such as: phonebook, clock and voice calling. With increased computing processing power and storage 
space and almost 15,000 new mobile applications becoming available on the market every month, mobile 
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users have the freedom of installing any additional applications on the device (Distimo 2010). From a 
high-level perspective the general use of applications can provide a basic level of information on how the 
mobile user utilises the device. Such basic information could be the name of the application, time, and 
location of usage. Given the hypothesis that mobile users utilise their mobile applications differently (i.e. 
two users utilise different applications in different time periods and at different locations), an experiment 
was devised to explore the possibility of utilising application-level information for discriminating mobile 
device users.  
3.1.2 Application-specific analysis  
The second experiment focussed upon utilising further information about the applications. Within many 
applications the user connects to data that could provide additional discriminatory information. For 
instance, when surfing the Internet, the Internet browser can capture all the URLs an individual accesses. 
Unfortunately, due to limitations on the dataset (collected prior to data-based applications becoming 
prevalent), the range of application-specific analysis that could be undertaken were limited to telephony 
and text messaging.  
 
The prior literature shows that calling behaviour has been studied several times in a network-based 
environment with results demonstrating the ability to discriminate mobile phone users. Within a mobile 
host environment, the availability of calling features does change slightly – for example, the IMSI 
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is not a useful feature in a host-based solution. Furthermore, 
although several studies suggested utilising a user’s location information, it was never been treated as a 
calling feature. Therefore, it was interesting to identify the effectiveness of a new set of calling features, 
which included the user’s location information. 
 
Due to the enormous use of text messaging, with the UK alone sending more than 100 billion text 
messages in 2010 (Ofcom 2010), the application is amongst the most widely used application on a 
mobile device. Despite the high volume of text message usage, little research has been undertaken to 
show how text messages may be used to detect abnormal usage in the mobile environment. Hence, it 
was also deemed important to discover the possibility and usefulness of employing text messaging to 
detect anomalous mobile user’s behaviours.  
 
For methodological reasons: to maximise the number of participants within a reasonable timeframe, the 
experiment employed 76 participants whose activities occurred during the period of 24/10/2004-
20/11/2004. As not all participants started or finished the experiment at the same time, it was imperative 
to isolate a sub-section of the dataset that maximised the number of participants and available data. The 
methodology employed two types of profile techniques: static and dynamic. For the static profiling, each 
individual dataset was divided into two halves: the first half was used for building the profile, and the 
other half was utilised for testing. For the dynamic profiling, the profile contained 7/10/14 days of the 
user’s most recent activities; the evaluation process was carried out on the same sub-dataset as for the 
static experiment in order to provide a meaningful comparison. Given the highly variable nature of the 
input data a smoothing function was applied. Rather than taking each individual result, the smoothing 
function permitted the system to make a decision after a number of results were present (similar to a 
winner-takes-all decision-based biometric fusion model). The basis for this approach was derived from 
the descriptive statistics produced when analysing the data and the large variances observed. A dynamic 
approach therefore seemed sensible to cope with the changing nature of the profile. Based on the 
premise that the historical profile can be used to predict the probability of a current event, the following 
formula illustrated in Equation 1 was devised. The equation also includes a weighting factor to allow for 
more discriminative features to have a greater contribution (Wi) within the resulting score than less 
discriminative features. Moreover, the equation also provides a mechanism to ensure all outputs are 
bounded between 0 and 1 to assist in defining an appropriate threshold. 
 
Equation 1: Alarm if: ≥threshold 
 
Where: 
 
 i=The features of one chosen application (i.e. dialled number for telephony application) 
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 x=The value of Featurei (i.e. office telephone number and home telephone number)  
 
 M=Total number of values for Featurei 
 
N=Total number of features 
 
Wi=The weighting factor associated with Featurei ( ) 
 
Threshold= A predefined value according to each individual user 
4. Experimental results 
4.1 Application-level profiling 
For the general applications, the following features were extracted from the dataset: application name, 
date of initiation, and location of usage. As a total of 101 individual applications were used among the 
chosen 76 users during the chosen period, a final sub-dataset for application-level applications with 
30,428 entry logs was formed. Among these 101 applications, the phonebook, call logs and camera were 
used by all participants. By using the proposed mathematical equation, a final set of EER’s (Equal Error 
Rate) for users’ application-level usage is presented in Table 2. The best EER is 13.5% and it was 
obtained by using the dynamic profile technique with 14 days of user activity with 6 log entries. In 
comparison, the worst performance was achieved by using the dynamic profile technique with 7 days of 
user activities with 1 log entry.  
Table 2: Experimental results for application-level applications 
Number of log entries  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Static 14 days 21.1% 17.4% 16.3% 14.9% 14.2% 13.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 21.1% 17.3% 16.0% 14.5% 13.9% 13.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 22.1% 17.8% 16.2% 14.6% 14.4% 13.7% 
Profile 
technique 
Dynamic 7 days 24.0% 19.4% 17.6% 15.9% 15.3% 14.4% 
Selected experimental results for the best configuration of application-level usage are shown in Table 3. 
The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best and worst performance respectively. Further 
analyses of the results show that 84% of all users have an EER less than 20%. 
Table 3: Selected users’ performance for application-level applications with dynamic 14 days and 6 log 
entries 
User_ID EER 
71 0% 
46 0% 
12 0.5% 
66 37.5% 
2 39.3% 
68 51.6%% 
4.2 Application-specific profiling 
4.2.1 Telephony 
For the telephone call application, a subset of 71 users from the 76 participants used the application 
during the aforementioned chosen period. During the same period, 2,317 unique telephone numbers 
were dialled and the total number of calls made was 13,719. From iteration and optimisation, the 
following features were chosen for each log: the telephone number, date and location of call. By using 
the aforementioned mathematical formula with the selected features (all features were given the same 
weighting factor), a final set of experiment results is shown in Table 4. The best result is an EER of 5.4% 
and it was achieved by using the dynamic profile technique with user’s most recent 14 days activity and 6 
log entries. 
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Table 4: Experimental results for telephone call application 
Number of log entries  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Static 14 days 9.6% 9.1% 7.9% 7.2% 4.3% 6.4% 
Dynamic 14 days 8.8% 8.1% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 5.4% 
Dynamic 10 days 9.6% 8.6% 8.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.0% 
Profile technique 
Dynamic 7 days 10.4% 8.8% 8.5% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2% 
A selection of experimental results for the best set up of the telephone call application is presented in 
Table 5. The best and worst performances for selected users are the top 3 and bottom 3 users 
accordingly. Furthermore, 81.7% of users have an EER less than 10%.  
Table 5: Selected users’ performance for telephone call application with Dynamic 14 days and 6 log 
entries 
User_ID Performance 
23 0% 
43 0% 
61 0% 
64 20.6% 
50 23.1% 
8 39.5% 
4.2.2 Text messaging  
For the text messaging experiment, 22 users’ text messaging activities were available from the 76 
participants, during the chosen period. The text messaging dataset contains 1,382 logs and 258 unique 
texting numbers. For each text log, the following features were extracted: receiver’s telephone number, 
date and location of texting. Due to certain participants having limited numbers of text messaging logs; a 
maximum of 3 log entries were treated as one incident. By employing the aforementioned mathematical 
formula and all text message’s features (all features were given the same weighting factor), the final 
result for user’s text messaging application is shown in Table 6. The best result was an EER of 2.2% and 
it was acquired by utilising the dynamic profile method with 14 days of user’s activities and 3 log entries. 
Also, the performance improves considerably from 1 log entry to 2 log entries across all profiling 
techniques. 
Table 6: Experimental results for text messaging application 
Number of log entries  
1 2 3 
Static 14 days 7.0% 4.3% 3.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 5.7% 2.6% 2.2% 
Dynamic 10 days 8.3% 4.1% 3.7% 
Profile technique 
Dynamic 7 days 10.7% 5.7% 3.8% 
Table 7 shows a group of users’ performance for the best configuration of the text messaging application. 
The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best and worst performance respectively. In addition, 
95.5% of all users have an EER smaller than 10%. 
Table 7: Selected users’ performance for text messaging application with Dynamic 14 days and 6 log 
entries 
User_ID Performance 
13 0% 
14 0% 
18 0.2% 
4 5.3% 
2 8.4% 
17 13.1% 
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5. Discussion 
The application name and location have proved valuable features that can provide sufficient 
discriminatory information to prove useful in authentication. However, whilst this might identify many 
misuse scenarios, it would not necessary identify all cases of misuse – particular those where a 
colleague might temporarily misuse your device as the location information is likely to fall within the same 
profile as the authorised user. So care is required in interrupting these results. The intra-application 
approach should also help to specifically identify this type of misuse. 
 
In general, dynamic profiling achieved a slightly better performance than the static profiling did. This is 
reasonable as a dynamic profile contains a user’s most recent activities; hence it obtains a more accurate 
detection. Furthermore, with a longer training set period, the performance is also improved. Hence, an 
increased number of days (i.e. 18/22 days) of user activities as the training set should be examined to 
find the optimum solution. Nonetheless, literature suggests users do change their usage pattern over a 
long period of. A study by Flurry (2009) states that users only keep 67% of the applications over a 30 
days period. Moreover, storage and processing issues should also be taken into consideration with larger 
training. While a smoothing function treated more log entries as one incident, the performance also 
improved accordingly. The smoothing function reduces the impact any single event might have and 
seeks to take a more holistic approach to monitoring for misuse. The disadvantage of this approach is 
that it takes a longer time for the system to make a decision; hence, an intruder could have more 
opportunities to abuse a system and a certain amount of abuse could be missed by the security control.  
 
Limitations in the dataset are also likely to have created certain difficulties. As the dataset was collected 
in 2004, the number of mobile applications available for users to choose was limited; this resulted in a 
large similarity of application-level application usage between mobile users and difficulty for any 
classification methods. In contrast, in the early part of 2010, there were around 200,000 mobile 
applications available (Distimo 2010). As mobile users have more options, their application-level usage 
would arguably differ larger. Therefore, it would be easier to discriminate mobile users through their 
application-level usage.  
 
As shown by Table 4, the performance of the telephony application is very good – more than twice that of 
the application-level profiling. This reinforces the hypothesis that knowing both the application and what 
the user does with it, improves the chance of identifying individual users significantly. Moreover, mobile 
users had a far larger set of telephone contacts (the numbers they can dial) compared with the number of 
applications they had also makes the classification process easier because there are more identifiable 
data points from which to discriminate. In comparison with other biometric authentication techniques such 
as keystroke analysis, which has an average EER of 8%, the telephone experiment is within that 
category of performance (Clarke and Furnell 2006).  
 
As presented in Table 6, the results from the text messaging application were even better than those 
achieved by the telephone call application, albeit with a smaller dataset. This may be caused by people 
only sending text messages to very close contacts. Although only 30% of the participants used the text 
messaging application in 2004, the situation has changed considerably: for UK alone, the volume of text 
messaging traffic has increased by 290% since 2004 (Ofcom 2010). This indicates that the text 
messaging based authentication method could serve a good proportion of the mobile users’ population.  
 
From the results presented in this paper, it can be shown that both application-level and application-
specific information can be used to authenticate mobile users. In addition, although it is more difficult to 
profile certain users, more than 81% of all users’ performance was within the bounds of a behaviour-
based biometric. Dynamic-based profiling technique provides the opportunity to develop a more 
meaningful profile of user activities. This does however raise issues with regards to template aging and 
ensuring the samples utilised in creating the template are all legitimate that will need to be addressed. 
Furthermore, in comparison with previous research, which used computationally complicated neural 
networks as the classification method (Li et al 2009; Li et al 2010), this approach employed a light weight 
mathematical formula which saves a significant amount of processing power and storage space; this is 
essential for handheld mobile devices as they have limited processing power and storage space.  
6. Conclusions 
The experiment shows that with an EER of 5.4%, 2.2% and 13.5% for the telephony, text messaging and 
general application usage respectively, and these techniques are viable for a behaviour-based 
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authentication mechanism within the mobile environment. The authentication process could be carried in 
the background while mobile users utilise their applications; if several abnormal activities occurred within 
a fixed time frame, further security methods would be initiated according to the level of the incident.  
 
Future work will focus upon designing an authentication architecture that could accommodate the 
aforementioned behaviour based authentication techniques. As the architecture works behind the scene, 
little attention would be required from the mobile user and an intervention would only be needed when 
anomalous application usage occurs. Hence, such an architecture would provide a transparent and 
continuous protection for users. Furthermore, an operational system, which supports identity verification, 
will be developed for the purpose of evaluation.    
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Abstract 
Over the last decade, the mobile device has become a 
ubiquitous tool within everyday life. Unfortunately, whilst 
the popularity of mobile devices has increased, a 
corresponding increase can also be identified in the 
threats being targeted towards these devices. Security 
countermeasures such as AV and firewalls are being 
deployed; however, the increasing sophistication of the 
attacks requires additional measures to be taken. This 
paper proposes a novel behaviour-based profiling 
technique that is able to build upon the weaknesses of 
current systems by developing a comprehensive multi-
level approach to profiling. In support of this model, a 
series of experiments have been designed to look at 
profiling calling, device usage and Bluetooth network 
scanning. Using neural networks, experimental results for 
the aforementioned activities’ are able to achieve an EER 
(Equal Error Rate) of: 13.5%, 35.1% and 35.7%.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, the mobile device has changed 
significantly; becoming a multimedia and multi-
functional device. The mobile telephone alone, a subset of 
the mobile devices, has over 4.1 billion subscribers 
around the world. The modern mobile device is capable of 
providing a wide range of services over several network 
connections on a continual basis. As a result, many people 
rely upon these services and information to complete their 
business and personal tasks. Such tasks can include 
accessing email via a wireless network, online shopping 
through a 3G network, sharing pictures over a Bluetooth 
connection, and reading documents. The nature of many 
of these activities is likely to be either personally or 
corporately sensitive.  
While people enjoy the convenience and pleasure the 
mobile device provides, it can also bring several security 
concerns, such as service fraud, lost or stolen handsets, 
SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card cloning [1], 
malware, information disclosure, and Denial of Service 
(DoS) [2]. For the malware alone, although it was 
discovered a few years ago, the number of incidents is 
growing significantly every year. For instance, Kaspersky 
have already identified a total number of 106 mobile 
malware families with 514 modifications since 2004 [3].  
To counter these security threats, various mobile 
security solutions have been proposed and developed in 
the area of authentication, firewalls and antivirus. 
However, given the increasing sophistication of the 
threats, additional countermeasures present in the desktop 
environment are being considered for use on a mobile 
device. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are one such 
technology. Unfortunately, the current nature of IDSs 
deployed within the desktop environment is significantly 
different to the mobile environment, with differing 
stakeholders, requirements and capabilities. In addition, 
research to date in the area of mobile IDS has been 
limited to identifying specific threats rather than taking a 
comprehensive approach [4]. This paper focuses upon 
presenting the findings from a feasibility study into 
utilising behavioural profiling to successfully identify 
mobile device misuse. 
This paper begins by introducing the threats associated 
with a mobile device, and general security controls. 
Section 2 identifies the key research completed to date. 
Section 3, presents the methodology for a series of 
experimental studies on three aspects of mobile user’s 
behaviours: telephony, device usage, and Bluetooth 
scanning. The results from the experiments are presented 
along with the discussion in section 4. The paper then 
proceeds to propose a Host-based Multi-Level Behaviour 
Profiling Mobile IDS framework. The paper concludes 
with highlighting the future work.  
 
2. Mobile Intrusion Detection System 
 
The IDS is an established research area for more than 
20 years. There is extensive research on computer-based 
IDSs, but limited emphasis has been given so far on 
mobile IDSs. So, the focus of this section is to review 
existing research on mobile IDS: namely behaviour-based 
and signature-based IDSs. 
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2.1. Behaviour Based Mobile IDS 
 
The research for mobile IDS started around 1995 with 
preliminary focus upon detecting telephony service fraud. 
By monitoring users’ calling behaviour and migration 
activity, the aforementioned attack can be detected.  
The telephony based mobile IDS monitors user’s 
calling features (e.g. start time of call, duration of call, 
dialled telephone number and national or international 
call). By using the combination of these features, a 
historical profile is acquired. Any deviation between the 
current calling session and the historical profile that 
exceeds a threshold, is identified as an intrusion. Several 
studies were proposed by using this procedure, such as the 
European ASPECT (Advanced Security for Personal 
Communication Technologies) project [5], [6], and [7]. 
Migration based mobile IDS monitors the mobile 
user’s migration activities through mobile cell networks. 
By profiling a mobile user’s migration mobility or 
migration itinerary activities, telephony service frauds 
could be detected. A number of studies have been carried 
out by using users’ migration activity: [8-9] employed 
user’s mobility, and [10] used user’s migration itinerary.  
In generally, behaviour based mobile IDS has an 
average high detection rate; also, as the detection process 
is carried out by the network operator, there is no 
overhead for the mobile device. On the other hand, as the 
mobile device has changed significantly, the network 
operator could not monitor all the behaviour any more 
such as Internet surfing over WiFi networks. 
 
2.2. Signature Based Mobile IDS 
 
It is widely recognised that the battery plays a key role 
in a mobile device. Attacking the battery is a major threat 
for the mobile device’s availability; as the battery runs 
out, the device becomes unusable. In order to counter 
battery consumption as a result of security threats, such as 
malware and DoS, several studies on signature based 
mobile IDS have been conducted: such as, Power Secure 
Architecture [11], and Gibraltar [12]. They work in a 
similar fashion: each mobile application consumes unique 
power and so does the malware. As a result, by analysing 
battery activities, attacking signatures can be obtained. By 
comparing the current battery status with attacking 
signatures, any matches will be identified as an intrusion.   
The advantage for the signature based mobile IDS is it 
has a low false alarm rate and meaningful descriptions for 
the intrusion. However, obtaining mobile malware’s 
signatures can be a difficult task; furthermore, it can not 
provide detection for service related attacks such as 
abusing the telephony service or data modification on the 
mobile device. 
 
2.3. Summary Of Current Mobile IDS 
 
From the aforementioned literature, it suggests that the 
behaviour based mobile IDS is able to detect telephony 
service fraud attacks and the signature based mobile IDS 
can identify possible malware and DoS attacks. However, 
in practice it can be seen that the calling and migration 
behaviours were monitored by a single network provider, 
rather than being host-based, and the signature based 
mobile IDSs have limited signatures in the database and 
thus cannot provide much detection for user related 
activities. In addition, as increased functionality, usability 
and compatibility, users are now experiencing a far larger 
set of mobile activities illustrated in the last column of 
Table 1. Therefore none of the current research in mobile 
IDS truly provides a compressive protection against 
device misuse independent of service or application being 
used. As a result, a mobile IDS which can offer the 
detection for a wider range of services and connections on 
the mobile device is certainly needed. 
 
Table 1.  Taxonomy of mobile usage 
Category Behaviours Examples 
Application 
level 
Telephony Call a friend 
Text Send greeting through SMS
MMS Send picture through MMS
File access Write and save a document 
Data Create a copy of work data
Web Read news from the internet 
Network 
level 
3G Access emails
Bluetooth Share picture  
Wi-Fi Connect to a Wi-Fi network
Machine 
level 
CPU 16% CPU is in use
Memory 12M Memory is allocated
Battery An application consumes 1% 
of the battery  
 
3. Feasibility of host-based Behavioural 
Profiling 
 
When looking to develop an IDS for a mobile device, 
the traditional network-based approaches are infeasible 
given the various networking technologies a single device 
is able to use and the differing stakeholders that own 
them. Therefore a host-based approach must be 
considered. Given the difficulty of establishing signatures 
in the first instance [12], and their inability to detect 
unknown attacks, a profiling was taken. However, little 
literature to date has tested the discriminative nature of 
service utilisation. Building upon the taxonomy identity in 
Table 1, a series of experiments have been conducted 
within each category or level: application, network and 
machine. 
 
3.1. Experimental Procedure 
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An MIT Reality dataset was utilised. The dataset 
contained 94 participants’ mobile device activities 
recorded from September 2004 to June 2005 [13]. The 
data was collected from the Nokia 6600 phone which was 
preinstalled with automatic logging software.  
 
Table 2.  The MIT Reality dataset 
Activity Number 
Of Logs 
Information Contains  
Application 662393 Application name, date and time of 
usage 
Bluetooth 
scanning 
1994186 Date, time of each scan along and 
individual device’s MAC address 
Charge 11506 Date and time when the mobile is 
in charge 
Device 
usage 
574788 Date and time the mobile has been 
in use 
On  13012 Date and time when the phone is 
turned on 
SMS 5607 Date, time and number of texting
Voice 54440 Date, time, number of calling and 
duration 
 
As shown in Table 2, the dataset contains a rich 
volume of information which covers all the levels of 
mobile device usage. The experiment analysed the 
telephony, device usage, and Bluetooth scan activities; as 
representative of application level, machine, and network 
levels.  
Telephony service was the first service invented for the 
mobile device. People use it to communicate with other 
people over a voice channel. The telephony service still 
dominates the mobile market along with increasing 
revenues across the globe [14]. The prior literature shows 
that the calling behaviour has been studied a number of 
times over the telecommunication service provider’s 
network environment and it can be used to discriminate 
users. However, within the mobile host environment, the 
calling features have changed slightly, such as the IMSI 
can not be utilised anymore. Hence, it is important to 
establish whether the calling features still remain a 
positive attribute that can be used within a host-based 
environment.  
Once the mobile device is in use, it becomes active; 
otherwise it may be either idle or switched off. When the 
mobile device is in the active mode, the following three 
scenarios would happen: a) the user views whatever 
information appears on the home screen, but does not 
interact with any applications; b) the user utilises one 
application, then sends the device to idle mode; c) the 
user uses more than one application to perform a task over 
one active session. For example, the user takes a 
photograph, views it, and emails it to a friend over a Wi-
Fi connection. Whilst the example shows that the user 
utilises at least three applications to perform one big task 
over an active session, this particular experiment is 
simply focussed upon whether the device is in use and 
how unique and discriminative this information is. 
Bluetooth is one of the short range networking 
technologies employed by the mobile device to 
communicate with nearby Bluetooth enabled devices. In 
order to do this, the mobile device has to scan nearby 
Bluetooth enabled device. Each scan may come up with a 
list of devices. Each device has a unique MAC address. 
Given the nature of a Personal Area Network (PAN) 
certain Bluetooth MAC address(es) may keep showing up 
on the scan list. For example, a user has a Bluetooth 
enabled headset, so its MAC address should appear on the 
Bluetooth scan list. Therefore it is possible to hypothesise, 
that a mobile device will encounter a familiar set of MAC 
addresses during normal activity – particularly within 
home and work environments. By learning those familiar 
Bluetooth MAC addresses, certain locations and potential 
trust can be established.  
For data processing reasons, the experiment employed 
the first 30 users’ activities over the first 10-month period. 
For each experiment however, only one month’s activities 
were extracted for each individual activity in order to 
minimise any resulting inaccuracy, as it is likely that 
user’s behaviour could change over time [15]. Template 
renewal or refresh is something that will be tackled once 
the feasibility of such an approach is proven. A series of 
iterative experiments were conducted across the three 
activities and complete time period. 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
 
4.1. Telephony 
 
Table 3 shows the experimental results for the first 30 
users one month’s calling behaviour. Five calling features 
were utilised: the calling number, the day of calling, the 
time of calling, the duration of the conversation, and the 
weekday. The weekday feature was calculated by using 
the day feature; as people’s activity on different weekdays 
could be different [4] [12]. A Radial Basis Network 
(RBF) was utilised in favour of other approaches given its 
previous success in [4] [7]. The configuration of which 
was iteratively modified to optimise performance. By 
using all five features, the best average Equal Error Rate 
(EER) achieved is 15.6% and it was achieved by using 
150 neurons. Apart from the calling number, every other 
feature was removed from the neural network 
configuration in turn to understand the value that feature 
had upon performance. The best average EER was 13.5% 
and this was achieved by using 125 neurons with number 
of calling, the day, weekday, and duration. By using 
number of calling, time of calling, weekday and duration, 
the system got the highest average EER of 17.7%. 
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Table 3.  Experimental result on calling  
Neurons Features Average 
EER 
Best 
user 
150 Number, day, time, week, 
duration  
15.6% 0%
130 Number, time, week, 
duration 
17.7% 7.1%
125 Number, day, week, 
duration  
13.5% 0%
135 Number, day, time, duration 13.6% 0%
140 Number, day, time, week 15.4% 0%
 
As shown in Table 3, the overall result for calling 
behaviour is positive – remembering the nature of this 
type of profiling is unlikely to result in EER in the same 
order of magnitude as physiological biometrics. As the 
number of features decreases, the number of required 
neurons also decreases; indicating that proper selection of 
the strong and positive features would save a significant 
amount of computing power. This is especially important 
in the mobile device environment: fast, accurate detection 
by using minimal computer power.    
 
4.2. Device Usage  
 
The device usage behaviour study also employed the 
first 30 users’ information from the MIT Reality dataset. 
For the active behaviour, the following features were 
extracted from the dataset: the day, time, duration and 
weekday. Within table 4, the best average EER is 35.1% 
and this was achieved by using 5 neurons with the time, 
day, duration and weekday. The best individual user EER 
is 1% by using 7 neurons in the RBF neural network with 
the day, duration and weekday features. Interestingly, 
with the same neuron network configuration, 43% of the 
whole population achieved less than 30% of the EER, 
although majority of them have an EER in the region of 
20%-30%. 
 
Table 4.  Experimental results on active 
Neurons Features Average 
EER 
Best 
user 
Proportion 
of users 
EER<30% 
5 Time, day, 
duration, 
weekday 
35.1% 3.87% 36.7% 
7 Time, day, 
duration 
35.8% 3.82% 40% 
7 Day, duration, 
weekday 
36.2% 1% 43%
5 Time, day, 
weekday 
36.4% 3.1% 33.3%
 
As there is no indication that what purpose the device 
has been used for, only knowing a usage occurred, the 
usability for distinct mobile users reduces significantly. 
However, this could be improved by knowing what has 
happened during the active duration: such as, one text 
message was sent. Moreover, the result does indicate that 
device usage can be used for identifying a subset from the 
entire mobile population; as at least 1/3 of the users have 
an EER rate less than 30%. 
 
4.3. Bluetooth Scan 
 
As the mobile device’s Bluetooth scan performs 
passively every 5 minutes, a huge amount of information 
was available for processing. Given the repeated nature of 
the scans, samples may keep reappearing if the user stays 
in one location for a while, for example watching a film in 
the cinema or taking a lecture in the classroom. As a 
result, the experiment employed the first 30 users’ 
Bluetooth scans which performed at 10 o’clock each day. 
However, due to the aforementioned restriction, only the 
MAC address, the day, and the week features were 
extracted from the sub dataset. Table 5 describes the 
experimental result on the Bluetooth scanning activities. 
By using 20 neurons with the MAC address and the day 
as the inputs, the RBF neural network achieved the best 
average EER of 35.7%. By using the same configuration, 
30% of the experiment users have less than 30% EER. 
For the best individual user’s EER, 0% was achieved in 
both RBF neural configurations. 
 
Table 5.  Experimental results on Bluetooth scanning 
Neurons Features Average 
EER 
Best 
user 
Proportion 
of users 
EER<30% 
15 MAC address, 
day, week 
36.1% 0% 26.7% 
20 MAC address, day 35.7% 0% 30% 
 
Table 5 does show a positive set of results from 
Bluetooth scan behaviour, although the result is a little bit 
noisy. It may cause by the nature of Bluetooth scan 
behaviour, as the content of a Bluetooth scan list heavily 
relies on other Bluetooth enable devices. For example, in 
an office environment, a mobile user’s Bluetooth scan list 
may contain colleagues’ Bluetooth enabled device and a 
number Bluetooth enabled desktop PCs; as the colleagues 
come in and out the office, the user’s Bluetooth scan list 
will change accordingly. The scan list may change 
slightly but within a familiar set of MAC addresses. Also, 
the experimental results show that a proportion of users’ 
Bluetooth scanning behaviour are quite predictable as 
30% of them have an EER less than 30%.    
From the above three experiments, the positive results 
identify that the calling, device usage and Bluetooth 
scanning behaviours used to profile mobile users. 
However, the level of performance is such that no single 
feature could be utilised to make decisions over misuse – 
the inconvenience of being wrongly identified would be 
too high. This suggests that a new mobile IDS could have 
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a behaviour selector for each individual user to choose 
correct behaviour accordingly. Moreover, it can also be 
seen that the individual user’s performance with each 
activity differs – thereby suggesting that an IDS system 
capable of weighting the input features on an individual 
user basis would be better suited to optimising overall 
performance. Finally, whilst individual results will go 
someway in understanding the legitimacy of a user, the 
combination or fusion of multiple inputs would only serve 
to support the decision making process [16, 17]. 
 
5. Host Based Multi-level Behaviour Profiling 
Mobile IDS Framework 
 
With the aim of providing accurate and robust 
detection of misuse, a proposed framework is presented in 
Figure 1. The Host-based Multi-level Behaviour Profiling 
Mobile IDS framework is capable of processing multiple 
user activities from all levels of the taxonomy identified 
in Table 1 and intelligently interpreting the results to 
provide a more robust decision making process. 
As shown in Figure 1, all the user’s mobile behaviours 
can be used as the system input; the input can be one 
activity or the combination of multiple behaviours. For 
example: Wi-Fi activity from the network level. Also, the 
system can select a combination of multiple inputs; for 
example, when a user surfs the Internet, surfing features 
(explorer, web address, day and time of visiting) from the 
application level, network features (network type, number 
of data packets, and transmission rate) from the network 
level, and CPU usage from the machine level. As each 
individual user may have a different way to use the 
mobile device, therefore the system employs a Multi-
Level Behaviour Selector to choose appropriate inputs 
accordingly. The selection process is carefully considered 
and the selection criteria are defined differently for 
individual behaviour. For example, the percentage of 
unique dialled numbers: when it is bigger than the 
threshold, the calling activity will be selected; as the user 
makes a unique set of calls, it is much easier to profile the 
user’s behaviour. Another example is the frequency of 
application usage; when it is smaller than the threshold, 
that application’s features will not be used as the input; as 
if an application is not regularly used, there will not be 
enough information to help the profile building. Also, as 
the user’s behaviour may change over time, the Multi-
Level Behaviour Selector will update the input selection 
accordingly. 
 
Fig. 1. Host based multi-level behaviour profiling 
mobile IDS framework 
Following by the information provided by the Multi-
Level Behaviour Selector, the Behaviour Manager sends a 
command to the Data Collection Engine to collects the 
user behaviour features accordingly. Depending on the 
selected inputs, the Classification Engine can use various 
classification methods to compare the current activity 
against the profile: such as neural networks, fusion 
functions, and decision trees. The result will be further 
processed by the Fusion Algorithm. The Fusion 
Algorithm calculates the weight for each activity as each 
behaviour has a different impact on the decision making; 
for example, a more regular used application will have 
more weight on the decision when compared with others. 
The Behaviour Manager then sends the decision to the 
Response Mechanism, such as launching antivirus 
software, restricting access to certain applications, or even 
locking down the mobile device.  
As the Host based Multi-Level Behaviour Mobile IDS 
framework takes all the possible activities as the inputs, 
so it will provide full detection for all the mobile 
applications, the network connection and machine levels. 
Moreover, the framework will operate independently for 
each individual mobile user. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It is essential that new approaches are developed to 
enable real time detection of mobile misuse on both 
known and unknown threats. Given the personal nature of 
the mobile device, behavioural profiling provides an 
opportunity to closely map an individual’s use of a 
device. The experiments have demonstrated that 
individual activities can indeed be profiled and used to 
identify legitimate and illegitimate use. 
The strength of this identification however is highly 
variable between users with some experiencing very high 
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levels of classification and others not. Given this 
variability no single technology would be stable for 
uniform deployment but rather through the utilisation of 
multiple activities within an appropriately flexible and 
robust framework, a more secure yet convenient approach 
can be realised. 
Future work will seek to identify further activities that 
can be used for classification. Focus will also be given to 
the theoretical and practical issues surrounding the 
proposed framework. 
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Abstract 
In recent years, an increasing focus has been given to the development of security 
controls to counter current existing mobile security threats; such as Anti-Virus and 
firewalls, which are both now commercially available. Nevertheless, with the increasing 
functionality of mobile devices, a need exists for more sophisticated security controls and 
research is focusing upon other security controls like Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). 
Indeed, a number of research efforts on IDS for the mobile device have already been 
given. However, those mobile IDSs are designed to detect particular security threats 
related to individual service (e.g. telephony). The aims of this paper are firstly to identify 
the need for a novel mobile IDS which can provide detection for multiple services and 
support multi-networks simultaneously; and to identify the positive calling activities’ 
features to discriminate users. This paper begins with investigating the current research 
on mobile IDS with a view of examining the positive and negative aspects. The paper 
then processes to describe an experimental study on user’s calling activity. The 
experiment result shows that within the host environment, the number of calling, the time 
of calling and the duration of calling can be used to discriminate legitimate users and 
attackers. The paper will conclude with the future research for the mobile IDS. 
Keywords: Intrusion Detection System, mobile devices 
1. Introduction 
Currently, the mobile device has become a ubiquitous computing device. It has 
experienced an evolutionary shift from a purely telephony based handset into a modern 
computing device with multiple variants, such as the Smartphone, PDA (Personal Digital 
Assistant), and Ultra-mobile PCs. For the mobile telephone alone, it has over 3.2 billion 
subscribers around the world (GSM Association, 2008). Indeed, a large number of 
developed countries are experiencing well in excess of 100% market penetration (ITU, 
2007). The modern mobile device is capable of providing a wide range of services over 
several network connections and is able to store a broad range of information from 
business to personal data. As a result, many people rely on those services and information 
to complete their business and personal tasks. Such tasks can include email accessing via 
wireless network, online shopping through the 3G network, sharing pictures over the 
Bluetooth connection, and reading word documents. However, those activities can 
contain sensitive data related to the business and personal private information.  
The mobile device faces several security threats. Traditionally, service fraud, handsets 
being lost or stolen and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card cloning were three major 
security threats (BBC, 2005; Metropolitan Police Service, 2008; Rao et al, 2002). 
According to the Forum for International Irregular Network Access, the service fraud is 
estimated to cost telecom service providers $55 billion every year around the world 
(European Communications, 2005). Recently, with the evolution of the mobile device, it 
is also experiencing several new security threats, such as malware, information 
disclosure, and Denial of Service (DoS) (Muir, 2003; Swami and Tschofenig, 2006; 
Stajano and Anderson, 1999). Although these new threats were discovered a few years 
ago, the number of incidents grows significantly every year (McAfee, 2007). For 
instance, there were already more than 100 variants of mobile malware in existence at the 
end of 2005 (IT-Observer, 2007). To counter those security threats, various mobile 
security projects have been proposed and developed; such as antivirus, biometrics, 
encryption and firewalls (F-Secure, 2008; Clarke and Furnell, 2007; Check point, 2008; 
Anthasoft, 2008). This reveals that a real lack of effective information security still exists 
(Perelson and Botha, 2004).  
Due to the incompatibility of the existing IDS with the mobile device, research for the 
mobile IDS started in the middle of 1990s. Early mobile IDS research developed 
mechanisms of detecting traditional attacks; such as the European project Advanced 
Security for Personal Communications (ASPeCT) for detecting telephony service fraud 
(Gosset, 1998). More recent mobile IDS studies have focussed upon detecting newer 
attacks; i.e. the battery based mobile IDS and the mobile agent based IDS (Jacoby et al, 
2006; Kannadiga et al, 2005). However, the amount of mobile IDS research is 
significantly smaller compared to other aforementioned mobile security projects. 
Moreover, those existing mobile IDSs were designed to detect the individual security 
threats: telephony based mobile IDSs only detect telephony service fraud; battery based 
mobile IDSs only detect battery attacks. Therefore, none of these mobile IDSs is capable 
of offering the comprehensive detection for the services running on the modern mobile 
devices. 
 
This paper begins with introducing the concept of the modern mobile device, the threats 
associated with the device, and general security controls. The main discussion starts with 
presenting the history of the traditional IDS and follows by a critique of the mobile IDS: 
their different variants and their working principles, performance, and advantages and 
disadvantages. In section 3, a behaviour and host based mobile IDS is proposed. The 
paper describes a research programme underway to design, develop and evaluate a novel 
mobile IDS. The paper then proceeds to present some initial experimental results and 
concludes with highlighting the future work.  
2. Mobile Intrusion Detection System 
In 1980, the first notion of intrusion detection was created in Anderson’s paper 
“Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance”: by using mainframe audit 
trails to trace misuse actions and to understand users’ behaviour in the computer system 
(Anderson, 1980). In 1987, Denning proposed the seminal work: “An Intrusion Detection 
Model”, which identified basic IDS components and their functionalities (Denning, 
1987). Since then, a considerable amount of IDS research has been carried out and a 
range of prototypes and commercial products were developed (Stefan, 2000). However, 
because of the unique characteristics that the mobile device has: low processing power, 
small storage space, differing network accesses and a unique set of services; these 
existing IDSs are not suitable to provide detections for the mobile device. Host based 
IDSs are too complicated for mobile devices to handle; network based IDSs can only 
monitor a single network at any one time. 
The research for mobile IDS started around 1995 with preliminary focus upon detecting 
telephony service fraud. Telephony service fraud occurs when the mobile device is lost or 
stolen, or the SIM card is cloned. In the worst case, the owner would not notice the attack 
until the end of the billing month. At that moment, significant financial damages would 
have been made for both the owner and the telecom service company. By monitoring 
users’ calling behaviour, the aforementioned attacks can be detected (Samfat and Molv, 
1997).  With increasing computational power, the mobile device offers more services: 
such as, accessing emails, and transferring data file over different network connections. 
However, those services raise new security risks: malware and DoS attacks. As a result, 
several signature based mobile IDSs have been developed. 
2.1. Behaviour based mobile IDS 
The modern mobile device provides a wide range of services, however, the way people 
use those services can be completely different. As a result, people’s behaviour on their 
mobile device can be arguably distinguished. Indeed, the user’s calling activity, migration 
mobility activity and migration itinerary activity have already been utilised to detect 
telephony service fraud, SIM card cloning and lost or stolen of the device. To date, all 
behaviour based mobile IDSs are network based systems; as user’s behaviours are 
obtained and monitored by network services providers. 
2.1.1. Telephony based mobile IDS  
The telephony based mobile IDS monitors user’s calling attributes (e.g. international 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), start date of call, start time of call, duration of call, 
dialled telephone number and National or International call) to detect service fraud, SIM 
card cloning, and lost or stolen of devices (Moreau et al, 1997). By using the combination 
of those attributes, a historical profile can be acquired. If the deviation between the 
current calling session and the historical profile exceeds a threshold, an intrusion is 
identified. There are several telephony based mobile IDSs existing, and they can be 
separated by their pattern classification techniques. For example, Stormann (1997), and 
Boukerche and Notare (2002) utilised a supervised method; and Samfat and Molva 
(1997), and Alves et al (2006) employed an unsupervised method. Generally speaking, 
telephony based mobile IDSs have a good system performance: high detection rate and 
low false alarm rate. In addition, as the detection process is carried out by the network 
operator, there is no restriction on the mobile device. The major disadvantage is that they 
only focused upon telephony services and can not provide any detection for other 
network services. Moreover, those systems can not provide any detection for data related 
attacks.  
2.1.2. Migration mobility based mobile IDS 
By calculating the chance of a mobile user travelling from one mobile cell to another, the 
migration mobility based mobile IDSs can also detect traditional attacks. If the calculated 
result exceeds the threshold, a possible intrusion occurs. There are several mobility based 
mobile IDSs: Buschkes et al 1998, Sun et al 2004, and Sun et al 2006. Among those 
systems, Sun et al 2006 has the best system performance. It employed several methods to 
achieve this: the high order Markov chain model, the Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Average Model and the Shannon’s entropy theory. As a result, the system has a 
constantly updated profile, and a suitable threshold. Furthermore, as the user’s activities 
could be extremely different over the weekdays and weekends, two separated profiles 
were used according to those two periods. From their simulation result, it shows that the 
system’s best detection rate is around 94% and the lowest false positive rate is around 5% 
when the user travels at the speed of 60 miles per hour. However, the performance 
decreases dramatically when the user travels on foot. The main advantage for those 
systems is they are suitable for those long distance regular travellers who spend a lot of 
time on travelling. However, the number of those travellers is reasonably small within the 
mobile users’ population. Furthermore, those systems can not provide detection for 
malware and data related attacks. 
2.1.3. Migration itinerary based mobile IDS  
Whilst similar to migration mobility based mobile IDS, the migration itinerary based 
mobile IDS also monitors cells to detect traditional attacks. However, instead of only 
monitoring one cell each time, the migration itinerary based mobile monitors all the cells 
the user covers from one location to another. People always have the destination in their 
mind when they travel. Therefore, certain routes will be chosen as regular or favourite 
routes. As a result, the probability of the mobile user travels over those routes is much 
higher than when they travel through other routes. To extend this, when an attacker 
carries other people’s mobile device, the route he is going to cover will be probably 
different in comparison with the owner’s routes. In 2005, Hall et al have published a 
paper on using public transportation user’s itinerary profile to detect intrusions via an 
instance based learning pattern classification technique (Hall et al, 2005). However, their 
simulation result was not particularly promising. In addition, the system could only 
monitor those mobile users who take the public transport system. Moreover, these 
systems suffer the same problem as the mobility based mobile IDS does: they can not 
provide detection for malware and data related attacks.   
2.1.4. Comparison on behaviour based Mobile IDS 
Table 1 illustrates the comparison for all aforementioned behaviour based mobile IDSs. 
Generally speaking, telephony based mobile IDSs have a better Detection Rate (DR) and 
False Alarm Rate (FAR) than the migration activity based mobile IDSs do. In addition, 
the telephony based mobile IDS provides the detection for more users than the migration 
activity based mobile IDS could. However, the migration activity based mobile IDS does 
have the potential ability to provide the detection for all services provided by the service 
provider. The advantages for behaviour based mobile IDSs are: as the detection process is 
carried out by the services provider, there is no overhead or requirement for the mobile 
device. Also, those IDSs can identify the telephony service fraud, SIM card cloning and 
the lost or stolen of devices. On the other hand, those systems can not detect any other 
service frauds. Also they can rarely provide any detection against following mobile 
security threats: malware, information leakage, DoS, and data modification. Furthermore, 
the mobile user’s privacy could also be an issue.  
Name Behaviour  Pattern classification model DR FAR 
Samfat and Molva, 1997 
Itinerary Mathematical formula   82.5% 4% 
Calls Mathematical formula 80% 3% 
Boukerche and Notare, 2002 Calls RBF neural network model 97.5% 4.2% 
Stormann, 1997 Calls Rule based 99% 24% 
Alves et al, 2006 Calls Distance-based and clustering 91% NA 
Buschkes et al 1998 Mobility Bayes decision rule 87.5% NA 
Sun et al 2004 Mobility High order Markov model 87.5% 15% 
Sun et al 2006 Mobility High order Markov model 89% 13% 
Hall et al, 2005 Itinerary Instance based learning 50% 50% 
Table 1: Comparison for the Behaviour based Mobile IDS  
2.2. Signature based mobile IDS 
The research on the signature based mobile IDS started in early 2000. The main aim of 
developing the signature based mobile IDS was to detect malware and DoS attacks for 
the mobile device. At present, there are four prototype signature based mobile IDSs and 
they are categorised into two groups: the battery based mobile IDS and the mobile agent 
based mobile IDS.   
2.2.1. Battery based mobile IDS 
It is widely recognised that the battery plays a key role in a mobile device, to provide 
continuous services to the user. If the attacker is able to drain the battery, the mobile 
device’s servicing time will be reduced. Therefore, attacking the battery is a major threat 
for the mobile device’s availability. In order to counter battery attacks, three studies 
based on analysing the battery activities have been conducted: Power Secure 
Architecture, Battery Based Intrusion Detection Model and Gibraltar (Martin et al, 2004; 
Jacoby et al, 2004; Jacoby et al, 2006). These systems all work in a similar fashion. Each 
mobile application consumes unique power, so does malware. As a result, by analysing 
current activities, various signatures for either legitimate applications or malicious codes 
can be obtained. The battery based mobile IDS continually monitors battery activities and 
compares them with its signatures to detect any anomalies. The advantage for these 
systems is that by monitoring battery activities, malware attacks and attacks on the 
battery can be detected. However, obtaining malware’s signatures can be a very difficult 
task.  
2.2.2. Mobile agent based mobile IDS 
In 2005, Kannadiga et al proposed a mobile agent based IDS for the pervasive computing 
environments (Kannadiga et al, 2005). In a pervasive computing environment, various 
mobile devices can be found: such as mobile phones and PDAs. Their mobile IDS 
employs the mobile agent, by moving it from one mobile device to another within the 
network, collecting information (such as application log files) from mobile devices, to 
indentify malicious activities on each mobile device. It is reasonable to use mobile agents 
to detect intrusion for those low computing powered mobile devices. In addition, by 
knowing the attack on the mobile host, the network threat can also be identified. The 
major drawback is that signatures are created by monitoring malicious activities on 
networked static hosts (i.e. virus on the desktop PC); therefore those signatures are more 
related to static hosts, rather than for mobile devices. As a result, mobile malwares 
attacks can not be detected. Also, the mobile device can be not protected when it leaves 
the network.  
2.2.3. Comparison on signature based mobile IDS 
Table 2 illustrates the comparison for signature based mobile IDSs. For the battery based 
mobile IDS, their sensors are all allocated on mobile devices’ battery. For the mobile 
agent based mobile IDS, the mobile agent is the sensor. The correlation process is carried 
out in three different ways: Martin et al 2004 is done on the mobile device, Kannadiga et 
al 2005 is executed on the network based server, and Jacoby et al 2004 and Jacoby et al 
2006 can be carried out both locally or on the network based server. Various approaches 
have been taken to obtain the signature: Martin et al, 2004 uses the legitimate services as 
the signatures, any process’ signature not in the database can be identified as malicious. 
The signature database is reasonably small as the number of legitimate mobile services is 
currently limited. Both Jacoby et al, 2004 and Jacoby et al, 2006 employed the most 
popular network relate attacks as the attacking signature. However, the database is pretty 
small when compared with the number of existing attacks; moreover, as those network 
attacks are found in the traditional desktop environment, they are less relevant for the 
mobile device. The Kannadiga et al 2005 also suffers this problem as their attacking 
signatures are gathered by the static agent from local hosts. The major break through for 
the signature based mobile IDS is that it can possibly detect the malware and battery 
attacks. On the other side, it can not provide any protection against data related attacks, 
and service fraud. Also, obtaining accurate and a wide range of signatures is a very 
challenging task in practice. 
Name 
Sensor  
location 
Correlation 
location 
Signatures types 
Attacks can be 
detected 
Martin et al, 
2004 
Battery Host 
Legitimate 
Services 
Malware and 
Power attacks  
Jacoby et al, 
2004 
Battery Host and network 
Common network  
attacks 
 Common 
network attacks 
Jacoby et al, 
2006 
Battery Host and network 
Common network  
attacks 
Common 
network attacks 
Kannadiga et 
al, 2005 
Mobile 
Agent 
Network server 
Signatures from 
the desktop 
environment 
Network related 
attack 
Table 2: Comparison for the Signature based Mobile IDS 
 
2.3. Summary of current Mobile IDS 
The behaviour based mobile IDS is able to detect attacks on telephony service fraud. The 
signature based mobile IDS could identify possible malware and DoS attacks. However, 
both types fail to provide any detection for other services and network connections as 
shown in Table 3. This is really worrying as people use these services on the mobile 
device on a daily basis. As a result, a mobile IDS which can offer the detection for a 
wider range of services and connections on the mobile device is certainly needed.  
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Boukerche and Notare, 2002 Y - - - Y - - - 
Sun et al 2006 Y - - - Y - - - 
Samfat and Molva, 1997 Y - - - Y - - - 
Martin et al, 2004 - - - - - - - - 
Jacoby et al, 2006 - - - - - Y - - 
Kannadiga et al, 2005 - - - - - Y - - 
Table 3: Mobile IDS VS mobile device’s services and networks 
3. Experimental studies on a behaviour & host based mobile IDS 
As mentioned previously, the usage of the mobile device has changed dramatically. Also, 
as shown in section two, current existing mobile IDSs can not provide continuous 
detection for all the services the mobile device offers, along with the information stored 
on the device. Given the specific requirements, a Behaviour and Host based Mobile IDS 
is proposed. There are several reasons behind this proposal: the behaviour and host based 
mobile IDS can provide detection for services running on the mobile device against the 
service fraud, data disclosure and modification attacks. Also, the host based mobile IDS 
can monitor all network connections which a single network based system is unable to 
achieve. 
It is arguable that people’s behaviour on the mobile device can be different due to the 
purpose of the usage. For example, a user accesses his mobile calendar service to find out 
what his schedule looks like, the features related to this behaviour can be the time of 
accessing (7.15 AM), the duration of accessing (1 minutes) and the day of accessing 
(Monday). However, when an intruder accesses the same calendar service, the intruder 
may choose a time which the owner would not use the device such as 3 AM in the 
morning and the duration of accessing should be much longer such as 5 minutes as the 
intruder wants to explore as much information as possible. As a result, various user’s 
behaviours within the mobile platform should be studied to identify positive behavioural 
features that could be utilised to discriminate between legitimate users and intruders. In 
this paper, an experiment study on user’s calling behaviour is presented on the following 
section. 
3.1. Telephony based experiment 
The prior literature shows that the calling behaviour has been studied a number of times 
over the telecom service provider’s network environment and its features can be used to 
discriminate users. However, within the mobile host environment, the number of calling 
behaviour’s features reduced significantly: from 6 features for the network based 
environment down to 3 features within the host platform. According to the Ofcom’s “The 
International Communication Market 2007” research report, the calling service still 
predominate the mobile communication market (Ofcom, 2007). As taken those two points 
of views into consideration, the research started with identifying positive calling 
behaviour’s features within the host environment. 
The experiment employed 45 participants who had more than four month’s calling 
activity from the existing MIT Reality dataset (MIT, 2008). As the condition is under the 
host environment, only the number of dialling, the calling time, and the duration of the 
conversation were extracted from the dataset as these can be established by the mobile 
host. The dataset for those 45 participants contains a total 15,702 calls. In addition, those 
15,702 calls have been formed two sub-datasets: weekdays and weekends as people’s 
activities can be extremely different over those two periods.  The datasets were divided 
into two: the first half was used for training the classifier and the second half was used for 
the validation. Two neural networks (Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron Neural 
Network and Radial Basis Function Neural Network) with a total of 99 configurations 
were chosen (81 for FF MLP and 18 for RBF).  
Table 4 demonstrates a summary of best sets of experiment results with three groups of 
inputs over three sets of time periods by using various FF MLP Neural network 
configurations. The results clearly shows that by using the number of calling alone as the 
input, the FFMLP neural network achieved the lowest Equal Error Rates (EER) with 
8.71%, 7.05% and 8.57% for weekdays, weekends and weekly accordingly. With the 
number of the inputs increases, the FFMLP neural network’s performance gets worse. 
The results indicate that by adding the time of calling and the duration of calling, those 
two features made more impact for the weekends’ performance than they did for the 
weekdays’.  
Input(s)/ Features Periods Neurons Epochs EER 
Number of calling only  
weekdays 150 150 8.71% 
weekends 150 100 7.05% 
weekly 150 50 8.57% 
Number of calling, 
and time of calling 
weekdays 50 150 21.61% 
weekends 50 150 25.80% 
weekly 100 50 21.96% 
Number, 
Time of calling,  
and duration of calling 
weekdays 50 100 22.58% 
weekends 50 100 25.44% 
weekly 50 100 21.03% 
Table 4: Experiment result on FFMLP Neural network  
Table 5 illustrates all the experiment results by using RBF neural network. Due to too 
much input data, it is not feasible for the RBF neural network to simulate the weekly 
situation. In order to compare the performance with the FF MLP neural network, same set 
of maximum number of neuron has been chosen for the RBF neural networks. The result 
demonstrates that by using only the number of calling as the input and maximum 150 
neurons, the RBF neural network obtained the best performance with the EER 6.95% and 
6.21% for weekdays and weekends. With increasing number of inputs, the RBF neural 
network’s performance gets worse; however, the RBF neural network’s EER only grew 
around twice comparing with three times for the FF MLP neural network did. Also when 
the number of inputs increases, they have more impact for the weekends’ performance 
than they do for the weekdays’; this pattern is also shown by the FF MLP neural network 
in Table 4.  
Input(s)/Feature(s) Periods 
Neurons 
50 100 150 
Number of calling only 
Weekdays 8.12% 7.55% 6.95% 
Weekends 6.80% 6.30% 6.21% 
Number of calling, 
And time of calling 
Weekdays 11.82% 9.66% 9.53% 
Weekends 14.23% 12.86% 12.09% 
Number of calling, Time of 
calling, and duration of calling 
Weekdays 12.60% 11.24% 10.95% 
Weekends 16.32% 15.44% 16.67% 
Table 5: Experiment result on RBF neural network 
From the above two set results, they show that by using the number of calling alone, the 
best simulation results were obtained. With the number of inputs increases, the overall 
performance decreases. This shows that the number of calling is a positive discriminate 
feature and the time of calling and the duration of calling are having a negative 
discriminative effect for this particular dataset. By using number of calling only, the 
weekends’ performance is better than weekdays’, this may because over the weekends 
less numbers have been dialled; or the user may only contact their family and friends over 
the weekend. With the number of inputs increases, the neural networks got better 
performance during the weekdays than they do over the weekends. This shows that 
people may do regular tasks during weekdays and their weekends’ activities are much 
more random.  
The experiment results are what would be expected as users regularly call a subset of 
people. However, using only number of calling feature, a category of misuse is missed 
when people do call the same number. As a result, more analysis has been made on those 
45 individual users. Within those 45 users, three groups users have been found: within the 
first group, 12 users never share any same dialled number with any one; within the 
second group, 13 users shares between a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 18 dialled 
numbers between minimum 2 users and maximum 8 users within those 13 users; and for 
the third group, users only share a few number of same dialled numbers among one or 
two other users. This reviews that more than 2/3 of users with the 45 users’ dataset do not 
share large amount dialled number with others. The hypotheses is that if the number has 
been dialled before, the time of calling and the duration of calling would play positive 
discriminate roles to identify the different mobile users. Otherwise, they play negative 
discriminate roles in the identification process.   
More experiments have been carried out to test the hypotheses to identify roles the time of 
calling and the duration of calling play for different types of users by using RBF neural 
network. The reasons for employing the RBF neural network are: simulation results from 
Table 4 and Table 5 show that the RBF neural network outperformance the FFMLP 
neural network; similar conclusion has also been found by previous study (Boukerche 
and Notare, 2002); moreover, during the experiment, the RBF neural network was much 
more stable comparing with the FFMLP neural network was.  
Table 6 demonstrates the experiment result on the first group users which contains total 
2811 calls. The best performance is achieved by using the number of calling only with 
the EER of 3.24%, 3.31% and 4.30% for weekdays, weekends and weekly accordingly. 
Those results are even better than the results from Table 5. With the number of inputs 
increases, the performance gets worse and worse. This is due those user do not share any 
dialled number, by adding more inputs, it will only confuse the neural network and get 
poorer performance.  
Neurons Input(s) EER(weekdays) EER(weekends) EER(weekly) 
50 
1* 3.24% 4.60% 4.30% 
 
2* 5.93% 14.13% 8.10% 
3* 8.50% 15.39% 8.45% 
100 
1* 3.33% 3.31% 4.74% 
2* 6.64% 11.17% 7.34% 
3* 7.59% 14.60% 8.00% 
150 
1* 3.33% 3.31% 4.60% 
2* 5.91% 12.11% 7.53% 
3* 8.22% 14.89% 8.32% 
Table 6: Experiment result on first group users 
 1* number of calling 2*: number of calling, and time of calling 3*: number of calling, 
time of calling and duration of calling 
Table 7 illustrates the experiment result on the second group users who do share a 
number of same dialled numbers with total number of 3966 calls within this dataset. 
Interesting results are shown by Table 7 as by using only the number of calling the neural 
network has the worst performance. By adding the time of calling to the inputs, the neural 
network’s performance improved significantly for all the network configurations; by 
adding the duration of calling to the inputs, the neural network’s performance improved 
slightly for most configurations. This reviews that both of the time of calling and the 
duration of calling play a positive role when the number has been dialled before and the 
time of calling has a stronger impact for the performance than the duration of calling 
does. Generally speaking, by using three inputs together, the neural network’s 
performance is better than by using the number of calling only, and is worse than by 
using the time of calling and the number of calling together. 
  
Neurons Inputs EER(weekdays) EER(weekends) EER(weekly) 
50 
1
# 
20.27% 21.58% 20.70% 
2
# 
18.35% 18.64% 16.92% 
3
# 
19.32% 21.31% 19.39% 
4
# 
19.65% 21.91% 17.41% 
100 
1
# 
18.05% 22.17% 20.75% 
2
# 
17.52% 18.48% 16.17% 
3
# 
19.35% 21.24% 18.82% 
4
# 
17.04% 21.15% 17.12% 
150 
1
# 
17.78% 22.18% 18.90% 
2
# 
15.49% 18.18% 16.08% 
3
# 
19.83% 20.71% 18.62% 
4
# 
  17.74% 21.43% 17.15% 
Table 7: Experiment result on second group users 
1
#
: number of calling 2
#
: time of calling and number of calling, 3
#
 number of calling and 
the duration of calling and 4
#
: number of calling, time of calling and duration of calling.  
From the above experiment results, it shows that the number of calling, the time of calling 
and the duration of calling could all play the positive role to discriminate users. However, 
the time of calling and the duration of calling treated differently depend on whether the 
number of calling has been dialled before. If the number has never been dialled before, by 
adding the time of calling and the duration of calling can only decrease the classifier’s 
performance. For the number has been dialled before, the performance for the classifier 
improves by adding the time of calling and/or the duration of calling; this will help the 
classifier to detect the data related attacks, as data can be viewed by anyone, however, the 
time or the duration for the attacker to access the same file may be different with the 
legitimate users.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, a comprehensive literature view on the mobile IDS has been given. It is 
clear that people use the mobile device to complete both business and personal work on a 
daily basis, and an increasing range of threats exist. By studying the positive and negative 
aspect of current mobile IDSs, a new mobile IDS which can offer the detection to cover a 
wider range of services is required.   
The experimental results show that three positive calling features have been found to 
discriminate users within a mobile host platform. In order to support the development for 
a Behaviour & Host based Mobile IDS, other user’s behavioural features should be 
studied. The results of these experiments will inform the design of proposed mobile IDS 
that is capable of detecting and acting upon a wide range of threats in an efficient and 
effective manner.   
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